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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three essays on corporate credit markets and corpo-
rate finance. The first essay examines the impact of unconventional monetary policies
(UMPs), including Quantitative Easing (QE), Operation Twist (OT), and Forward
Guidance (FG), on corporate credit markets. These policies were expected to reduce
credit spreads by decreasing credit risk premium and/or liquidity premium, and to
further lengthen borrowing maturity. During the crisis, Quantitative Easing (QE) 1
reduced these risk premia as expected. However, after the crisis, QE 2 and Oper-
ation Twist announcements increased fears of a weaker economy and, consequently,
widened credit spreads. In contrast, Forward Guidance reduced credit risk premia
without increasing fear premia. I also find that QE had a minimal eﬀect on corporate
bond maturities, which most likely reflected the considerable increase of new Treasury
issuance and the declining fraction of preferred-habitat investors. The largest impact
on corporate bond maturities came from UMPs that significantly flattened the yield
curve.
The second essay (published in the Journal of Fixed Income) studies the impact
of margin requirements on the Credit Default Swap (CDS) basis. The CDS basis was
significantly negative during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, which was considered an
anomaly. Using single-name CDS data, we find that the CDS basis decreases as the
funding costs, credit risk premium, and market illiquidity increase. Further, cross-
sectional results show that the sensitivities of the CDS basis to funding costs, credit
risk premium, and market illiquidity are priced, even after controlling for the indi-
vidual bond liquidity and other firm characteristics. The results are consistent with
vi
the margin-based asset pricing theories that the diﬀerence in margin requirements on
two otherwise identical securities gives rise to bases.
The third essay (co-authored with Yongqiang Chu) examines the relationship be-
tween a firm’s leverage and that of its customers. The bargaining theory of capital
structure predicts that, when a customer increases its bargaining power by increas-
ing its leverage, the supplier will raise its leverage as well in order to maintain its
bargaining power. However, the relation-specific investment theory of capital struc-
ture suggests an opposite relationship. An increased leverage ratio reduces the value
of such investments, and, therefore, the supplier may not compete on the leverage
ratio. We find that, in general, a firm’s leverage is positively associated with its
customer’s leverage, and we find empirical evidence supporting both theories. The
result is robust to a battery of specifications and instrumental variables.
vii
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Unconventional Monetary
Policies:Evidence from Corporate Credit
Markets
1.1 Introduction
When the Federal Funds (FF) rate reached zero in late 2008, the Federal Reserve
(Fed) undertook unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), which include Quanti-
tative Easing (QE), Operation Twist (OT), and Forward Guidance (FG), to lower
long-term interest rates.1 The goal of UMPs was to ease credit market conditions and,
consequently, to increase real investments. Although UMPs decreased Treasury rates
as expected, they did not impact credit market conditions according to the plan.2 For
example, when studying Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads, which directly measure
corporate borrowing costs, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] document
that CDS spreads decreased for some firms in QE 1 but increased, on average, in
1QE programs are also known as Large-scale Asset Purchase programs, which are used to pur-
chase long-term agency, agency mortgage-backed, and Treasury securities. OT is used to buy long-
term Treasury securities, which is financed by selling the same amount of short-term Treasury
securities. FG in this paper refers the time-contingent FG announcements, in which the Fed stated
that they would keep the FF rate at zero for an extended period.
2In general, the literature suggests that these programs eﬀectively decrease long-term Treasury
rates. For example, Gagnon et al. [2010], Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012], D’Amico
and King [2013], Joyce et al. [2012], Greenwood and Vayanos [2010], and Wright [2012] find that QE
programs decreased interest rates; Swanson et al. [2011] find that the 1960 OT decreased interest
rates; and Woodford [2012] find that time-contingent FG decreased interest rates.
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QE 2.3 These empirical findings are diﬃcult to explain if UMPs worked as the Fed
intended.
Using single-name CDS data and corporate bond issuance data, this paper investi-
gates the channels through which UMPs aﬀected corporate credit markets. Previous
literature suggests that UMPs could decrease credit spreads by decreasing credit risk
premia and/or liquidity risk premia (e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 2013; Gagnon et al.
2010; Hancock and Passmore 2011; He and Xiong 2012). However, UMPs could also
increase credit spreads if their main impact was to stoke fears of another down-
turn. When investors adjust their expectations of the economy after monetary policy
actions, UMPs could deliver the message that the Fed forecasts a weaker economy
(Romer and Romer 2000; den Haan 2013). In such cases, UMPs might increase credit
spreads by creating a “fear” premium. This paper examines each UMP and its impact
on credit risk premia, liquidity premia, and “fear” premia.
This paper also relates the changes in CDS spreads during UMP announcements to
firm fundamentals to examine the cross-sectional impact of these programs. Studies
such as Almeida et al. [2009] and Gopalan et al. [2010] indicate thatïĳŇ among
non-financial firms, those with a large amount of maturing debt are more likely the
firms in critical conditions in a frozen credit market. Therefore, UMPs should have
helped firms with high rollover risks. However, the QE literature such as D’Amico
and King [2013], Greenwood and Vayanos [2010], and Hancock and Passmore [2011]
suggests that QEs increase the demand for assets that are close substitutes for assets
purchased by the Fed, which implies that QE would have had a greater impact on
high-quality firms. Alternatively, by pushing risk-free rates to extraordinarily low
levels, the Fed intended to drive investors into riskier assets (e.g., Rajan 2013). Such
3CDS spreads are the market prices of corporate credit risk and are gradually adopted in deter-
mining corporate debt prices. For example, since the second quarter of 2008, one third to a half of
total investment-grade bank lending in the syndicated loan market ties loan interest rates to CDS
spreads (Ivanov et al. 2014).
2
“reaching-for-yield” would have decreased CDS spreads more for riskier firms.
Finally, this paper analyzes corporate bond issuance maturities to better under-
stand the channels through which UMPs aﬀect corporate financing decisions. The
Fed’s rationale for reducing long-term interest rates, as opposed to short-term interest
rates, is to increase corporate debt issuance related to corporate investments (Rajan
2013). This goal could be achieved through the gap-filling channel (Greenwood et al.
2010), which relies on the preferred-habitat theory. This theory argues that, a lower
supply of long-term Treasuries will spur firms to issue long-term debt. An alternative
channel is market-timing, which argues that firms time the market by issuing debt
at the maturities that have the lowest interest rates (e.g., Stein 1996; Baker et al.
2003). Therefore, by flattening the yield curve, UMPs could have induced firms to
issue longer-term debt.
Using an event-style two-step panel regression methodology, I find that the 12
announcements related to expanding UMPs had inconsistent eﬀects on CDS spreads.
QE 1 announcements reduced all three risk premia. However, QE 2 and OT an-
nouncements increased the “fear” premia by about 10%, which accounted for more
than 1/3 of the total increases in average CDS spreads. These later announcements,
especially those indicating the need for stimulus but not giving the specific plans,
had the most negative eﬀects. In contrast, FG, which eliminated the medium-term
uncertainties in FF rates, had desirable outcomes and reduced credit risk premia and
“fear” premia. Further analyses show that these findings are unlikely to be driven by
non-UMP events.
My results show that the impact of UMPs was most significant to large firms,
which cannot be explained by the liquidity of CDS contracts. I also find evidence
consistent with flight-to-quality and reaching-for-yield. When QE 2 and OT an-
nouncements increased “fear” premia, firms with better quality (higher distance-to-
default) experienced smaller increases in CDS spreads, supporting a flight-to-quality.
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And when FG reduced the “fear” premia, firms with higher leverage ratios experi-
enced greater declines in CDS spreads, suggesting a reaching-for-yield. In addition,
I find that only the fifth QE 1 announcement that specified the amount of Treasury
purchase reduced corporate rollover risk, supporting the “substitution” argument in
the QE literature.
Using corporate bond issuance data between 1990 and 2012, I find that firms did
not typically extend borrowing maturity during QE 1 and 2 periods, whereas, in the
FG/OT period, highly rated firms did. QE 1 and 2 had little eﬀect on corporate bond
maturity because they did not significantly reduce the average Treasury maturity,
which left little room for the gap-filling channel. Further, the fraction of preferred-
habitat investors required for gap-filling to work (approximately 30%) was higher than
the level that existed after 2008 (approximately 20%).4 In contrast, market-timing is
an important factor in explaining the changes in corporate bond maturities in FG/OT
periods. Both term spreads and the interest rate levels were lowered as a result of the
FG in August 2011 and were pushed even lower by the OT that started in September
2011. Because the term spreads of highly rated corporate bonds closely trace those of
Treasuries, such firms could take advantage of low term spreads and time the market
by extending their bond maturities. My results indicate that the decreases in term
spreads contributed 1 year out of the 1.2 years increase in investment-grade (IG)
corporate bond maturities during the FG/OT period.
The Fed uses UMPs to stimulate the economy at the zero lower bound. Of the
three programs, I find that, although QE had a positive impact in a crisis, FG came
closest to accomplishing what the Fed intended in a recovery period. FG both elimi-
nated the uncertainties about interest rate policies in the medium term and flattened
the yield curve. Hence, it reduced risk premia and encouraged firms to issue long-
4Greenwood and Vayanos [2010] and Chen et al. [2012b] indicate that preferred-habitat investors
could be defined as insurance companies, pension, and retirement funds.
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term debt. FG avoided the dilemma that a new monetary stimulus in the recovery
period might actually increase the fear of another downturn.
The evidence from corporate markets in this paper helps to explain several findings
and concerns in the literature. First, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2012]
find that CDS spreads increased on QE 2 announcements; additionally, Gilchrist
et al. [2014] find that the credit spreads of BBB-rated corporate bonds widened in
response to UMPs. My results suggest that a stimulus program in the recovery
period could spur fears of another downturn, which in turn would increase CDS
spreads. Second, Bernanke and Reinhart [2004] discuss these possible programs and
raise the concern that, if FG were to lack credibility, it could be ineﬀective. My paper
examines these policies in a unified framework and shows that the time-contingent
FG was most eﬀective in extending investors’ expectations of low interest rates and
had the most desirable results for non-financial firms. Third, Swanson et al. [2011]
show that the 1960 OT had a small eﬀect on high-quality bond yields and little
eﬀect on relatively lower-quality bond yields. My findings show that the impact of
UMPs is more prominent on larger firms, which are more sensitive to macroeconomic
conditions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and empirical framework.
Section 4 presents a description of data and summary statistics. Section 5 shows the
empirical results on how each UMP aﬀected credit spreads. Section 6 displays the em-
pirical results on the cross-sectional heterogeneous eﬀects of UMPs. Section 7 shows
the empirical results on how UMPs changed corporate bond maturities. Section 8
presents the conclusions.
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1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The Fed exhausted its ability to use the FF rate in late 2008. Since then, the Fed has
continued a series of UMPs to lower long-term interest rates, increase investments,
and reduce the unemployment rate (e.g., Bernanke 2009). The first QE announcement
was made on November 25, 2008, which only involved purchasing agency bonds and
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Later, the Fed expanded the program to
include purchasing medium- to long-term Treasury bonds. The first round of QE
purchased $850 billion in agency MBS, $175 billion in agency debt, and $300 billion
in Treasuries. QE 2 was initiated on August 10, 2010 by an FOMC statement, which
said that the Fed would continue purchasing assets but without a specified amount.
The Fed announced a $600 billion purchase of Treasuries on November 3, 2010. On
August 9, 2011, the Fed took on the time-contingent FG and announced that they
would keep the FF rate at zero until mid-2013. An FOMC statement on January 25,
2012 extended this period to late 2014. Furthermore, the Fed took on the OT to sell
oﬀ $400 billion in short-term Treasuries and buy $400 billion in long-term Treasuries
on September 21, 2011. An FOMC statement on June 20, 2012 extended the amount
to $600 billion.
The literature shows that QE programs reduced Treasury rates mainly through
the preferred-habitat/ portfolio-balance channel. The preferred-habitat theory (Cul-
bertson 1957) assumes that preferred-habitat investors favor long-term safe securities
to match their liability maturity and risk structures (Chen et al. 2012b). When
the supply of long-term government securities is less than the amount desired by
preferred-habitat investors, the interest rates on long-term government securities will
be lower than the rates implied by the expectations theory. Researchers such as
Greenwood and Vayanos [2010], Gagnon et al. [2010], Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen [2011], and D’Amico and King [2013] provide supportive empirical evidence
of this theory. Swanson et al. [2011] argue that OT should have similar eﬀects as QE
6
2 because they are similar in size and assets. They further show that the 1960 OT de-
creased interest rates. Woodford [2012] shows that the time-contingent FG decreased
long-term interest rates. Swanson and Williams [2012] show that FG increased the
expected time until the FF rate increased from 25 bps and, therefore, enhanced the
impact of zero FF rates on medium- to long-term interest rates. Hanson and Stein
[2012] argue that depressing short-term interest rates could reduce long-term real
interest rates because risk-tolerant investors tend to reach for yield.
UMPs could have reduced credit spreads by reducing credit risk premia. Lower
Treasury rates could have led to lower corporate debt yields given unchanged credit
spreads (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 2013; Chen et al. 2013). Lower yields could have
resulted in lower financing costs and better investment opportunities, which would
have led to decreased credit risk and credit risk premia. QE and OT could also have
reduced credit spreads by reducing liquidity risk premia. In economic downturns,
investors worry that they may have to liquidate securities at a fire-sale price, and,
therefore, they require higher spreads on the assets that are more illiquid (e.g.,He
and Xiong 2012). Because the Fed was committed as a significant buyer, it assured
investors that they could sell easily when needed, which would have reduced liquidity
induced credit risk premia (Gagnon et al. 2010). Therefore, the first two parts of the
first hypothesis are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (a): UMPs decreased credit spreads by reducing credit risk pre-
mia.
Hypothesis 1 (b): QE and OT decreased credit spreads by reducing liquidity
risk premia.
In contrast, UMPs could also increase credit spreads. Investors may take monetary
policy actions as signals of the Fed’s private information and adjust their expectations
accordingly (Romer and Romer 2000). Almost all UMP announcements began with
the statement that the economy was weak and needed stimulus. If investors believed
7
that the Fed had more information, they would adjust their economic outlook expec-
tations (den Haan 2013). In this case, the “fear” of bad realizations would create a
“fear” premia. FG could be an exception because FG reduced the uncertainty about
the path of interest rates. Therefore, part three of the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (c): UMPs could increase credit spreads by increasing the “fear”
premia, but FG could have the opposite eﬀect.
These eﬀects could diﬀer over time. The UMPs implemented in a crisis could have
more favorable influences because these announcements calmed the panic by showing
that the Fed still had the power to ease market conditions (e.g., Swanson et al. 2011;
den Haan 2013). They could also be more helpful after the crisis. By purchasing
safe assets and decreasing risk-free rates, the Fed was hoping that investors would
reach for yield and reinvest in riskier assets, which in turn could improve broad credit
markets such as corporate credit markets (e.g., Rajan 2013). However, in crises,
investors prefer safer assets and are reluctant to invest in riskier assets (e.g., Erel
et al. 2012; Bai et al. 2012). Put diﬀerently, crises involve flight-to-quality rather
than reaching-for-yield. Therefore, UMPs could be more helpful for corporate credit
markets in the recovery period through the reaching-for-yield channel. Part four of
the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (d): UMPs could have been more useful for corporate credit
markets during the crisis when the risk-aversion was high; they could also have been
more helpful after the crisis because of reaching-for-yield.
Next, the literature that studies the average changes in credit spreads by rating
categories suggests that the eﬀects of UMPs were cross-sectionally heterogeneous
on firms. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] document that CDS spreads
decreased on QE 1 only for very high- and low-rated firms and increased on QE 2
for all firms. Swanson et al. [2011] show that the 1960 OT had a small eﬀect on very
high-quality firms and little eﬀect on lower-quality bond indices, and they ascribe the
8
diﬀerence to the asset substitution channel.
These heterogeneous eﬀects could be attributed to both the credit market condi-
tions when the UMPs were implemented and the approaches of these policies. Unlike
other UMPs, which were intended to stimulate the recovery, the first QE program in
the crisis was undertaken to thaw the frozen credit markets (Bernanke 2009; Boyson
et al. 2013). Firms that suﬀered most from the frozen market were those with high
rollover risk. Rollover risk arises when firms have to finance maturing debt in a tight
credit market when credit risk premia are high (Diamond 1991) or liquidity premia
are high (e.g., He and Xiong 2012). Refinancing at high cost destroys firms’ value;
hence, it may be optimal for firms to default (Titman 1992). Alternatively, if credit
rationing happens, then firms cannot refinance (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Therefore,
if the first round of QE were useful for the corporate credit markets, firms with higher
rollover risk should experience larger decreases in credit spreads.
Hypothesis 2 (a): QE 1 relieved rollover risk.
UMPs could also be more helpful for high-quality firms because of asset-substitution.
As reviewed above, QE and OT reduced Treasury rates through the preferred-habitat/
portfolio balance channel, suggesting that their eﬀects only spill over to financial as-
sets that were close enough to what were purchased by the Fed. Moreover, crises
often involve flight-to-quality (e.g., Erel et al. 2012; Bai et al. 2012), indicating that
the liquidity injected by the QE programs might mainly flow to safe assets rather
than assets with high credit risk.
Hypothesis 2 (b): UMPs helped high-quality firms more than low-quality firms
through the asset substation channel or the flight-to-quality channel.
Alternatively, by depressing risk-free rates using UMPs, the Fed expected investors
would reach for yield and reinvest in riskier assets such as corporate bonds (Rajan
2013). Becker and Ivashina [2014] find supportive evidence that investors intend to
reach for yield. They find that, within each rating category, insurance companies tend
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to hold higher-yield assets. Therefore, if reaching-for-yield is the working channel,
then UMPs could increase the demand for securities issued by riskier firms, which in
turn decreases these firms’ CDS spreads. Part three of the second hypothesis is as
follows:
Hypothesis 2 (c): The CDS spreads of riskier firms experienced greater drops
because of a reaching-for-yield.
Finally, UMPs might increase long-term investments by lengthening corporate
debt maturities. The demand from preferred-habitat investors drives the long-term
interest rates abnormally low when the Fed decreases the supply of long-term Trea-
suries. Because of their limited capital, arbitragers cannot completely remove the
mispricing. Given the mispricing, firms issue long-term corporate bonds to fill the
gap (Greenwood et al. 2010). Using Compustat data on debt structure, Greenwood
et al. [2010] find that the fraction of long-term corporate debt (>1 year) to total cor-
porate debt is negatively correlated with long-term government bond supply at both
the aggregate and the individual firm level, supporting the theory. Using corporate
debt issuance data, Badoer and James [2014] show that the high-quality firms fill the
“gap" in government securities in the very long term.
Therefore, if QE purchases were large enough to create a “gap” in the average
Treasury maturity, firms could have extended their borrowing maturity. However,
firms incur costs when they switch maturity to fill the “gap;" therefore, they will
only react to changes in the Treasury market when the interest saving is suﬃcient
to compensate the cost. Put diﬀerently, the higher the fraction of preferred-habitat
investors, the larger the changes in interest rates, and the more likely firms will fill
the “gap." Therefore, I test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 (a): QE and OT significantly reduced the average Treasury ma-
turities.
Hypothesis 3 (b): The fraction of preferred-habitat investors is suﬃcient to lead
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firms to extend borrowing maturities.
Alternatively, the market-timing theory predicts that firms would issue long-term
debt when term spreads are low. Firms face an upward-sloping credit yield curve.
Using sets of bonds issued by the same firm, but of diﬀerent maturities, Helwege and
Turner [1999] find that the credit yield curve is upward-sloping for both investment-
grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) firms. Meanwhile, firms try to maximize short-term
earnings (Stein 1996) by issuing long-term debt when term spreads are low. This
statement is supported by the empirical evidence that debt maturity is shorter when
the slope of the yield curve is steeper (e.g., Guedes and Opler 1996; Barclay and
Smith Jr 1995) and by the survey evidence showing that managers want to issue short-
term debt when the short-term rate is low (Graham and Harvey 2001). Therefore,
part three of the third hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (c): UMPs that significantly flattened the yield curve could
lengthen corporate bond maturity.
1.3 Methodology
The impact of UMPs on credit spreads
To investigate how UMPs aﬀected credit spreads, I employ an event-style two-step
panel regression to estimate the changes in credit risk premia, liquidity risk premia,
and “fear” premia during each announcement events. The event study method is
commonly used in the UMP literature. For example, Gagnon et al. [2010] use event
studies to evaluate the eﬀect of QE on interests rates; Swanson et al. [2011] use this
method to study the impact of the 1960 Operation Twist; and Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] use event studies to evaluate the impact of QE on corporate
bond yields and credit risk spreads.
In the first step, I estimate the sensitivity of changes in individual firm CDS
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spreads to changes in credit risk (proxied by Baa-AAA spreads), liquidity risk (proxied
by the spreads between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run 10-year Treasuries), and “fear”
index (VIX).5,6 A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method is used to control for unobservable
risk factors and time-series autocorrelation. The variables suggested by the Merton
model, namely the leverage ratio, individual volatility, and the risk-free rate, are also
controlled. The following equation is estimated on a rolling basis:
∆CDSi,t =α+ β1∆Baa_AAAt + β2∆on_offt + β3∆V IXt
+ β4∆T10t + η∆mklevi,t + λ∆voli,t + εi,t (1.1)
where all changes are non-overlapping log 2-day changes from day t-1 to t+1;
∆CDSit is the log 2-day change in 5-year CDS spreads (log(CDSt+1/CDSt−1)) for
firm i; ∆Baa_AAAt is the log 2-day change in MoodyâĂŹs’ Baa-AAA spreads;
∆on_offt is the log 2-day change in the spread between 10-year oﬀ-the-run and
on-the-run Treasuries; ∆V IXt is the log 2-day change in VIX; ∆T10t is the log 2-day
change in yields on 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities; ∆mklevit is the
log 2-day change in the market leverage ratio; and ∆volit is the log-2 day change
in option-implied volatility. This equation is estimated for each firm each day using
data in the window [t-180,t-1].
Then, I use the estimated β1-β4 in the second-stage regression to study how UMPs
changed each risk premium. The following equation is estimated:
∆CDSi,t =α+
∑k=4,j=16
k=1,j=1
∆γk,jβk,i,t ∗ Eventj,t +
∑16
j=1
θjEventj,t
+
∑4
k=1
ηkβk,i,t + κControli,t−1 + εi,t (1.2)
5This paper focuses on CDS spreads rather than the yield spreads between corporate bonds and
Treasuries because these yield spreads have trading liquidity components (e.g., Longstaﬀ et al. 2005)
that are more substantial in the crisis (e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012). Therefore, CDS spreads are
cleaner measures of the required returns of bearing corporate default risks and serve the purpose of
this paper better.
6Two-day changes in CDS spreads are used to study the “event” eﬀects of QE announcements.
On the one hand, as the financial crisis is turmoil, long event window will introduce too much noise.
On the other hand, CDS contracts are not as liquid as equities. Therefore, the event window is set
to be [-1,+1].
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where βk,i,t, k=1 to 4, are βs calculated in Equation 1.1 for each firm i on each day;
Eventj, j=1 to 16, includes the sixteen QE event dummies listed in Appendix 2, from
the first QE announcement on November 25, 2008 to the second OT announcement on
June 19, 2012, and Eventj,t equals one if day t is an event date; Controli,t−1 includes
asset, market-to-book ratio, market leverage, tangibility, and profit (see Appendix 1
for detailed variable definitions). Other variables are the same as in Equation 1.1.
This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares, with firm-fixed eﬀects.
Intuitively, if CDS spreads are the products of beta risks multiplied by risk premia,
then changes in CDS spreads are the products of beta risks multiplied by changes in
risk premia. If any UMP event reduced a risk premium, ∆γ on credit risk, liquidity
risk, or VIX is expected to be negative during that event.
The heterogeneous impact of UMPs on firms
I proceed by testing the second hypothesis that the impact of UMPs was diﬀerent on
firms with diﬀerent rollover risk and quality. To achieve this goal, I investigate the
relationship between changes in credit spreads and firm characteristics during UMP
announcements using the following equation:
∆CDSi,t =α+
∑k=8,j=16
k=1,j=1
βk,jFirm Characteristicsk,i,t−1 ∗ Eventj,t +
∑16
j=1
θjEventj,t
+
∑8
k=1
ηkFirm Characteristicsk,i,t−1 + κControli,t−1 + εi,t (1.3)
where Firm Characteristicsk,i,t−1, i=1 to 8, include maturing long-term debt,
Roll (individual bond liquidity measure), log asset, distance-to-default, market-to-
book ratio, market leverage ratio, tangibility, whether a firm is a potential user of
commercial paper, and whether the firm has a financial business segment.7 CP user
equals 1 if the firm has an S&P short-term debt rating of A-1+, A-1, or A-2 and
zero otherwise. Fin segment equals 1 if the firm reports a business segment with an
7Distance-to-default is calculated using Merton model. Thanks to Yongqiang Chu for generously
providing this variable.
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SIC code between 6000 and 6999 in the recent fiscal year and zero otherwise. This
equation is estimated using ordinary least squares, with firm-fixed eﬀects.8
If a UMP helped a specific type of firm, such a firm should experience a larger
decrease in CDS spreads during the event.
UMPs and corporate bond maturities
I compare the average corporate bond maturity in both UMP and non-UMP periods
using the following equation:9
Bond maturityi,t = α+ βUMP dummiest + γRecessiont + ηControlsi,t−1 + εi,t (1.4)
where Bond maturityit is the log of bond issuance maturity in month t for firm i.
Key independent variables are UMP dummies, including QE 1, QE 2, and FG/OT;
QE 1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond was issued between March 2009
(when the first QE announcement regarding the purchase of Treasuries was made)
and October 2009; QE 2 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the bond was issued
between November 2010 and June 2011; FG/OT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the bond was issued between August 2011 and December 2012. Because the FG and
OT periods largely overlapped, I only define this period as FG/OT. recession is the
NBER recession dummy. Controls include firm age, firm size, yearly stock return
before bond issuance, credit rating, market to book ratio, profitability, tangibility,
asset maturity, RND, asset volatility, and leverage ratios.
8Because the 2007-2009 crisis was related to subprime mortgages, and QE involved the purchase
of MBS, this paper also considered whether a firm reported a real-estate segment. None of the firms
in the sample reported such a segment in Compustat.
9This paper studies bond maturity instead of bank loan maturity for the following two reasons:
(1) while most bonds are of fixed rates, bank loans are more of floating rates, which make their
maturities less sensitive to long-term interest rates; and (2) bank loan maturities are less likely to
subject to firms’ discretion. As stated by Thomson Reuters, which is the data provider of syndicated
bank loans, investment-grade firms only draw down credit lines when something happens; and the
maturity of revolving loans of high-yield firms is mostly restricted to one year because of capital
reserve requirements on the bank side.
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To test Hypothesis 3 (a), I compare the average Treasury maturity before and
after considering the Open Market Operation (OMO). Then, I test the gap-filling
channel in Hypothesis 3 (b) and the market-timing channel in Hypothesis 3 (c) using
the following equation:
Bond maturityi,t =α+ β1Treasury maturityt + β2Preferred− habitatt
+ β3Treasury maturityt × Preferred− habitatt + β4Term spreadt
+ β5Timetrendt + β6Recessiont + γControlsi,t−1 + εi,t (1.5)
where Treasury maturity, following Greenwood et al. [2010] and Badoer and
James [2014], is the weighted average maturity of outstanding principal and coupon
payments of US Treasuries; Preferred− habitatt is the fraction of preferred-habitat
investors in the corporate bond and Treasury market; Timerend is calculated as
(year−1989)∗12+month to control the decreasing trend in corporate bond maturities
(Custódio et al. 2012).
The gap-filling theory predicts a negative β1; if Hypothesis 3 (b) holds, then β3 is
expected to be negative; and the market-timing theory predicts a negative β4.
1.4 Data and Sample
Data on US non-financial firms are from Markit Inc., Compustat, the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), OptionMetrics, Mergent FISD, and TRACE.
Data on outstanding Treasury securities are from Mergent FISD, TreasuryDirect,
and Open Market Operation. Data on the investor composition of Treasuries and
corporate bonds are from Flow of Funds. I collect the UMP announcement dates
based on FOMC statements and minutes releases, and I also refer to the discussions
in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] and Fawley and Neely [2013]. A
detailed description of the event dates studied in this paper is in Appendix 2.
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CDS data and variables
Single-name CDS data are from Markit Inc., one of the leading CDS data providers.
Their pricing inputs are from multiple industry practitioners and observable pricing
sources with data cleaning processes applied to remove outlying or stale inputs. I
use 5-year CDS data, which are most liquid.10 I further restrict the sample to CDS
spreads on senior debt and the “MR” term. The sample period is between June 2005
and June 2012. The original sample has 778 non-financial firms with Compustat and
CRSP identifiers. To mitigate the survival bias, I only keep firms that have more than
566 trading days, thus excluding one quarter of the firms. To study CDS changes,
only the “most liquid” firms are included in the sample, thus excluding firms with
more than 70% days with zero changes (5% of the entire sample) and more than 35%
days with zero 2-day changes (10% of the whole sample). Next, 142 firms are deleted
because they never had valid TRACE data in the entire sample period (needed to
construct individual bond liquidity). Finally, I also require firms to have option-
implied volatilities from OptionMetrics. The final sample has 321 firms, of which
64.5% are of investment grades. This sample covers firms with a wide range of credit
quality, with the number of firms and rating distributions not significantly diﬀerent
from year to year (Table 1.1)
Following Ericsson et al. [2009], I use a 45-day rule to match CDS data with
quarterly Compustat data, assuming that financial reports are not available until 45
days after each fiscal quarter. Market leverage ratios are calculated each day using
stock prices in CRSP and quarterly accounting data in Compustat. OptionMetrics
oﬀers option-implied volatility on various terms.11 All variables are winsorized at the
10Ideally, 1-year CDS would fit the study better because 1-year CDS puts more weight on near-
term credit risk. However, 1-year CDS contracts are illiquid that they are not suitable for event
studies in this paper. I use 5-year CDS to generate benchmark results and 1-year CDS to conduct
robustness checks.
11To make consistent estimates, I only keep the option contracts that mature in the following
month and have a delta closest to 0.5 (-0.5). Then, I take the average value of the volatility implied
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1% and 99% levels. On average, the logged asset size is 9.25, which is larger than
the average firm size in Compustat. The average market leverage ratio is 21.1%, and
the average market-to-book ratio is 1.64, both of which are close to those of firms in
Compustat.
Regarding the rollover risk measures, this paper use long-term debt maturing in
one year and bond liquidity measure (Roll). Measuring eﬀective bid-ask spreads, Roll
is constructed following Bao et al. [2011] using TRACE-enhanced bond transaction
data, which reports uncapped trading volume but has an 18-month reporting lag. For
easy interpretation, the Roll measure is standardized to have a sample mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. Higher Roll denotes higher bid-ask spreads and,
therefore, lower liquidity. On average, the fraction of maturing long-term debt in one
year decreased in 2009 and 2010 and then picked up. Bonds were most illiquid in
2008 and 2009. At the beginning of 2008, 36 of 295 firms had the ratio of maturing
long-term debt over total long-term debt ratio larger than 20%. The number of firms
with high rollover risk was approximately half of the 87 firms identified by Almeida
et al. [2009] using whole Compustat data.
The market conditions include Moody’s Baa-AAA spreads, spreads between 10-
year oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run Treasuries, VIX, and 10-year Treasury rates. Moody’s
Baa-AAA spreads are from the Federal Reserve H.15, where higher Baa-AAA spreads
are associated with higher credit risk premia. Spreads between 10-year oﬀ-the-run
and on-the-run Treasuries are from the Citi Yield Book, where higher spreads suggest
higher market liquidity premia. VIX is from the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE), where an increased VIX means that investors are more worried about the
economic outlook. It is also known as the “fear” index. Ten-year Treasury rates are
interest rates of 10-year constant maturity Treasuries from the Federal Reserve H.15,
where higher Treasury rates are usually associated with better economic conditions.
by a call option and a put option as the option-implied volatility.
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Indeed, as shown in Table 1.2, the changes in 5-year CDS spreads and market
condition indicators during most of UMP announcement days are economically large.
They are close to the 10th or 90th percentiles in the whole sample (Table 1.1 Panel
C). On average QE easing announcements decreased CDS spreads, and tapering an-
nouncements increased CDS spreads. The eﬀect of QE 1 is much stronger than that
of QE 2. Considering that the 10th/90th percentiles of historical log 2-day changes
in CDS spreads are - 4.09% and 4.27%, the changes in CDS spreads on UMP an-
nouncements are economically significant. On average, FG decreased CDS spreads,
and OT increased CDS spreads. The changes in log 2-day CDS spreads for IG firms
are not very diﬀerent from those of HY firms.
Debt maturity data and variables
The detailed outstanding Treasury data are from three sources. Mergent FISD, which
is a comprehensive database of publicly oﬀered US bonds, provides detailed Treasury
issuance and outstanding amounts for all bills, notes, and bonds since mid-1995. Trea-
sury issuances and outstanding amounts before 1996 are collected from the Monthly
Statement of the Public Debt, provided by TreasuryDirect. To estimate the matu-
rity and quantity changes caused by the QE programs, I collect detailed data on the
purchase of Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York through
the OMO. Following Greenwood et al. [2010], I consider both principal and coupon
payments. The Treasury sample consists of 278 monthly observations between 1990
and 2012.
Corporate bond issuance data are from Mergent FISD. I include all the US non-
convertible industrial bonds issued between 1990 and 2012 with Compustat identi-
fiers.12 The original data include 22,197 bonds issued by 2,536 firms. The mean
12My sample does not include the years before 1990 because the bonds matured before 1990 are
not included in the Mergent FISD. Including data before 1990 may thus introduce a mechanical
decreasing trend in the bond maturity.
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issuance maturity is 9.94 years, and the median is 9.03 years. After being matched
with Compustat quarterly data, 15,476 bond issuances with non-missing variables
are left. The observations are lost mainly because of missing market value and asset
maturities. I further collapse the data to one observation per firm-month. The depen-
dent variable, the maturity of bonds, and the control variables are monthly averages,
weighted by the issuance amount. The collapsed data avoid putting too much weight
on firms that issue many times in a month.
The final corporate bond sample consists of 8,346 firm-month observations be-
tween 1990 and 2012. My sample is comparable in size to that used by Erel et al.
[2012], which consists of 7,523 firm-month observations between 1985 and 2007. IG
firm-month observations account for 60% of the sample.
A key variable used in the test is the fraction of preferred-habitat investors. Green-
wood and Vayanos [2010] and Chen et al. [2012b] suggest that preferred-habitat in-
vestors should be defined as property-casualty insurance companies, life insurance
companies, private pension funds, state and local government employee retirement
funds, and federal government retirement funds. Flow of Fund L209 and L212 tables
provide quarterly information on Treasury and corporate bonds held by each sector.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the proportions of preferred-habitat investors in both the
Treasury and the corporate bond market have dramatically decreased in the past two
decades. This change is not caused by the shrinkage of the preferred-habitat capital
because there is no clear decreasing pattern for the percentage of preferred-habitat
investors over GDP (Figure 1.1).
1.5 The Impact of UMPs on CDS Spreads
In this section, I first discuss how each UMP aﬀected the credit risk premia, liquidity
risk premia, and “fear” premia components of CDS spreads. Then, I discuss two
alternative explanations of how UMP could have increased CDS spreads.
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How did UMPs aﬀect CDS spreads?
I use a two-step event-style panel regression to study the changes in CDS spreads
during each UMP event. In the first step, I use Equation 1.1 to estimate rolling risk
exposures regarding market credit risk, liquidity risk, and the “fear” index for each
firm. As shown in Table 1.3 Panel A, the changes in the independent variables are
not highly correlated, except the changes in VIX and the 10-year Treasury rate. The
-0.35 correlation between changes in VIX and the 10-year Treasury rate is consis-
tent with the argument that low risk-free rates are usually associated with economic
downturns (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Ericsson et al. 2009). The summary statistics
of the estimated covariance risks (βs) are shown in Table 1.3 Panel B. On average,
firm CDS spreads positively correlate with market credit risk, liquidity risk, and the
“fear” index, but they negatively correlate with 10-year Treasury rates. The average
positive relationships are intuitive in that the increase in market credit risk, market
illiquidity, and “fear” about future growth inflate default risk and risk aversion, which
in turn increase CDS spreads. The negative relationship between CDS spreads and
the 10-year Treasury rate is consistent with the literature (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001;
Ericsson et al. 2009). A possible explanation for the inverse relationship is that lower
risk-free rates are associated with expanding monetary policies and a weak economic
outlook.
Then, in the second step, I use the estimated risk exposures in the first step to
study the changes in credit risk premia, liquidity risk premia, and “fear” premia.13
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.4. Because dependent variables take
the form of log changes, the coeﬃcients reported in Table 1.4 can be interpreted as
the percentage changes in risk premia. QE 1 announcements decreased the credit risk
13Because the negative empirical relationship between 10-year Treasury rate and CDS spreads
does not mean that a decrease in 10-year Treasury rates increases CDS spreads (Gilchrist and
Zakrajšek 2013), this paper only estimates the “risk-free rate premia” for control purposes without
further analysis.
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premium by 2-5% and the “fear” premia by 5-13%. The initial QE announcement
decreased the liquidity premium by 20% and the interest rate risk premium by ap-
proximately 7%. The first two QE 2 announcements that indicated the stimulation
but not a plan increased the “fear” premia significantly by more than 10%, while the
third QE 2 that specified the size of the second round of QE purchase decreased the
“fear” premia. The empirical results on QE 1 and 2 suggest that the UMPs in the
crisis reduced credit risk premia, liquidity premia, and “fear” premia. However, the
UMPs after the crisis, especially those with unclear statements, may have delivered
the information of a weak economic outlook, which resulted in higher credit spreads.
The results on OT further confirmed that the UMPs during the recovery period
could have persuaded investors that the economy was weaker than they had expected.
Hence, the credit spreads increased during the OT announcements. In contrast to
QE and OT, the FG that eliminate the uncertainty in FF rate policies for two years
decreased credit risk premia and “fear” premia. The results indicate that FG was
eﬀective with little cost.14
To estimate the economic significance, this paper further decomposes changes in
average CDS spreads to components due to changes in each risk premia during each
announcement (Table 1.5). The results show that changes in these risk premia explain
a significant fraction of average changes in CDS spreads during those expanding policy
announcements (from 31% to 139%, with a mean of 60%). The increase in average
CDS spreads during the 2011 FG was abnormal that it could not be explained by
changes in risk premia studied in this paper.
14The estimated independent variables (risk exposures-βs) may lead to biased estimations. To
deal with this issue, I re-estimate Equation 1.2 using βs weighted by their standard errors (Table
C.4), which does not change the quality of the results. Still, the coeﬃcients in Table 1.4 may be
biased toward insignificant because of attenuation errors. However, in most cases, the signs of the
insignificant coeﬃcients are in line with the arguments in this paper.
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Two alternative explanations
The first alternative explanation of why CDS spreads increased on QE 2 announce-
ments is that the size of the QE 2 purchase failed market expectation. This explana-
tion is not supported by the results in this paper. In particular, average CDS spreads
increased during the first two QE announcements, in which the Fed did not mention
the size of the new stimulus. Furthermore, average CDS spreads decreased during
the third QE 2 announcement, in which the Fed announced the size and the asset
they would purchase. These empirical results contradict the prediction of the first
alternative explanation.
The second alternative explanation is that other events may contribute to the
findings in this paper. In particular, the Euro Crisis (occurring before the QE 2
announcements) and the US credit downgrade (occurring before the announcement of
FG and OT) might have increased CDS spreads on average. In such cases, the changes
in “fear premia” found in this paper might have just picked up the legacy of the Euro
Crisis and the US credit downgrade, among other events. To mitigate this concern,
this paper investigates the “fear” index during a 10-day window surrounding each
UMP announcement. As shown in Figure 1.8 (a), all QE 1 announcements, except
the Bernanke Speech on 12/1/2008 (QE 1_2), slightly decreased the “fear” index.
The most supportive evidence that the changes in “fear premia” found in this paper
were caused by UMP announcements comes from QE 2, OT, and FG (Figure 1.8 (b)-
(d)). In particular, the VIX was relatively stable within 5 days before each QE 2 and
OT announcements; and, in contrast, it sharply changed after these announcements.
Moreover, the first FG announcement obviously reversed the increasing trend in the
VIX.15 Last, the plots of the S&P 500 index mirror the plots of the VIX and support
15It is not surprising that the second OT announcement and the second FG announcement had
minimal eﬀect on VIX because these two announcements did not add much new information. The
second OT announcement extended the size of the OT from $400 billion in Treasuries to $600 billion,
and the second FG announcement reinforced that the low Fed Funds rate would continue for a long
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the argument in this paper that UMP announcements shaped the expectations about
future growth and, consequently, aﬀected the “fear” premia in CDS spreads.
Overall, the empirical results support the first two parts of Hypothesis 1 that
UMPs could reduce credit spreads by reducing credit risk premia and liquidity risk
premia; they also support the third part of Hypothesis 1 that UMPs could increase
credit spreads by creating a “fear” premia. The positive eﬀects are more likely to
happen in a crisis, and the negative eﬀects tend to dominate in a recovery period.
1.6 Which Firms Did UMP Announcements Help More?
This section discusses what type of firms each UMP announcement helped more in
order to understand the channels of diﬀerent UMPs. Using an event-style panel re-
gression, I study the impact of rollover risk (measured by long-term maturing debt and
Roll), asset size, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, distance-to-default, whether a
firm is a potential commercial paper user, and whether a firm reports a financial
segment on CDS spreads during each announcement. While the maturing long-term
debt measures the refinancing pressure in general, Roll measures the rollover risk
caused by illiquid bond and illiquid credit markets. If an event relieved the refinanc-
ing pressure, then firms with higher rollover risk should experience larger decreases in
CDS spreads. If UMPs worked through the substitution channel or drove investors to
securities issued by high-quality firms, then firms with a larger size, lower leverage, or
higher distance-to-default should experience larger decreases in CDS spreads. Alter-
natively, if UMPs targeted on the short-term debt market or the financial industries,
then firms with a commercial paper rating or a financial segment should have larger
drops in CDS spreads, respectively.
The most significant results come from asset size (Table 1.6). In particular, when
time.
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a UMP decreased CDS spreads on average, the CDS spreads of the larger firms
decreased more, and vice versa. A one standard deviation increase in asset size is as-
sociated with an approximately 1% greater decrease (increase) in CDS spreads in QE
1 and FG (QE 2 and OT) announcements. The results suggest that UMPs were more
eﬀective to large firms. These results could be explained by the empirical findings
that the CDS spreads of larger firms are more sensitive to changes in macroeconomic
conditions (Table C.3). This relationship holds after controlling for the liquidity of
CDS contracts.
Furthermore, the results in Table 1.6 show that the fifth announcement in QE 1
that specified the schedule and size of the Treasury purchase relieved the refinancing
pressure caused by individual bond illiquidity and market illiquidity (Roll). A one
standard deviation increase in Roll, which is 1, is associated with a 0.7% larger
decrease in CDS spreads. Given that the average decrease in CDS spreads on this
QE announcement is 2.58%, the impact of rollover risk is economically significant.
The announcement of agency debt and MBS purchase (QE 1_1) did not have such
an impact, nor did the announcement of the intention to buy Treasuries (QE 1_3 and
QE 1_4). Although the coeﬃcients on maturing long-term debt during QE 1 and 2
are also negative in general, they are not significant. The results indicate that QE 1
could relieve the rollover risk caused by market illiquidity; however, this result might
only be achieved through the purchase of Treasuries, which were closer substitutes
for corporate bonds.
Lastly, the results also support the flight-to-quality and reaching-for-yield argu-
ments. In the first announcements of QE 2 and OT that significantly increased the
“fear” premia, safer firms with higher distance-to-default experience smaller increases
in CDS spreads, with a one standard deviation increase in distance-to-default (4.7)
associated with a 1.5% lower increase in CDS spreads. This result is consistent with
the flight-to-quality statement. In contrast, the second FG announcement that signif-
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icantly reduced the “fear” premia decreased CDS spreads more for firms with higher
leverage ratios, with a one standard deviation increase in the leverage ratio (0.13)
associated with a 0.6% larger decrease in CDS spreads. This result is consistent with
the reaching-for-yield argument. Given that the average changes in CDS spreads in
the first announcement of QE 2, the 2011 OT, and the 2012 FG announcements were
3.6%, 5.09%, and 3.01%, respectively, the coeﬃcients of distance-to-default and lever-
age ratios are economically significant. Because the first announcements of all UMPs
were the most unexpected, their eﬀects should be more prominent. The reason FG in
2012 had a larger impact on reaching-for-yield could be that the Treasury yields at
2012 FG were much lower than those at 2011 FG, which gave investors more incentive
to reach for yield.16
Overall, I find some evidence that UMPs relieved the rollover risk in the worst
time. Furthermore, in the post-crisis period, the UMPs that increased the “fear”
for another downturn drove investors’ flight-to-quality; the UMPs that decreased the
“fear” and reduced the risk-free rates spurred reaching-for-yield.
1.7 The Impact of QE on Bond Maturity
Next, I examine how QE programs might have aﬀected corporate credit markets by
changing corporate bond maturities using a firm-month panel of new bond issuance
data between 1990 and 2012. Because most firms do not issue bonds very often, I
have an unbalanced panel. For the 1,971 firm-month observations where firms issue
more than one bond in a month, the median (mean) number of issuances per month
is 2 (3), and the maturity is calculated as the average of bond maturities weighted
by the oﬀering amount of each bond. I examine how the corporate bond issuance
16The empirical studies in the previous section and this section use log 2-day changes in 5-year
CDS spreads as measures of changes in credit spreads. These results are robust to using 1-year CDS
spreads or absolute changes in CDS spreads as dependent variables.
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maturity has changed in UMP periods and then explore channels leading to these
changes.
Corporate bond maturity in QE periods
I start by comparing corporate bond maturities in both UMP and non-UMP periods.
On average, firms did not extend borrowing maturities in QE 1 and 2 periods (Table
1.8). Only IG firms extended borrowing maturities in the FG/OT period, while HY
firms did not extend borrowing maturities at all.
Table 1.8, Column 1 presents the estimations of Equation 1.4 using the whole
sample. With market conditions and firm characteristics controlled, the average cor-
porate bond issuance maturity was shorter in the QE 1 and 2 periods and not diﬀerent
from other times in the FG/OT period. Because IG firms may respond to QE pro-
grams more aggressively than HY firms (Greenwood et al. 2010), I further estimate
the equation using IG and HY subsamples separately. Table 1.8, Columns 2 and 3
display these results, showing that IG firms did not extend the borrowing maturity
until the FG/OT period and that HY firms always borrowed in the shorter-term in
QE periods. On average, IG firms extended bond issuance maturities by 1.2 years in
the FG/OT period.
Additionally, consistent with Erel et al. [2012], I find that firms issue debt in
the shorter-term during recessions because of flight-to-quality. Consistent with the
information asymmetry arguments in Flannery [1986] and Diamond [1991], debt ma-
turities are hump-shaped across credit ratings. For HY firms, debt maturity increases
with investment opportunity to avoid liquidity risk (Diamond 1991; Diamond and He
2012). Consistent with most of the existing empirical literature, debt maturity in-
creases with asset maturity. For HY firms that have high liquidity risk, I find that
their debt maturities increase with asset volatility. Regarding leverage ratios, I show
that debt maturities decrease with leverage ratios. The result is consistent with stud-
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ies that rely on bond issuance data (e.g.,Custódio et al. 2012) and is contrary to the
research based on balance sheet data (e.g., Stohs and Mauer 1996; Chen et al. 2012a).
The comparable coeﬃcients of the control variables in Table 1.8, Columns 1 and 4
indicate that QE eﬀects are unlikely to be caused by changes in firm characteristics.
Because the average corporate bond issuance maturity was longer in the 1990s
than in the 2000s (Custódio et al. 2012), I re-estimate the equation only using bonds
that were issued after 2000 to mitigate the sample selection bias. These results are
presented in Table 1.8, Columns 5 through 7, which are similar to my main results.17
Preferred-habitat and gap-filling channel
Second, I examine the two conditions for QE to change corporate bond maturities
through the preferred-habitat and gap-filling channels.
The first condition is that QE had to lower the average Treasury maturity eﬀec-
tively to create a gap for firms to fill in. Figure 1.8 shows the changes in outstanding
Treasury securities before and after accounting for the Fed’s purchases. The total
amount of outstanding publicly-held Treasury securities nearly doubled, from less
than $6 trillion before the crisis to more than $10 trillion in 2012. QE 1 and 2 pur-
chases did not reduce the average Treasury maturity due to net Treasury issuance.18
In contrast, OT reduced the average Treasury maturity and, therefore, might have
induced firms to issue longer-term debt to fill the “gap.”
The second condition is that the fraction of preferred-habitat investors has to be
suﬃcient for firms to react to the changes in Treasury maturities. I first examine
17Although not reported here, the results for HY & NR firms in columns three and four do not
change the quality if I exclude non-rated bonds from the sample. In unreported tables, I redefine
QE 1 as between November 2008 and October 2009 and QE 2 as between August 2010 and June
2011. These specifications yield similar results. I also redefine the beginning date of each QE as
one month after each oﬃcial announcement date to allow responses to occur. The main results still
hold.
18Following Greenwood et al. [2010], the average Treasury maturity in this paper is calculated
using both principals and coupons. Excluding coupons does not change the quality of the results.
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this condition by estimating Equation 1.5. Consistent with Greenwood et al. [2010]
and Badoer and James [2014], I find that corporate bond issuance maturities are
negatively correlated with outstanding Treasury maturities (Table 1.9, Column 1). If
this relationship holds unconditionally, the Fed purchases between March 2009 and
December 2012, which decreased the log of Treasury maturities by 0.13 (approxi-
mately 0.7 years), could have increased the log of average corporate bonds by 0.05
(approximately 0.4 years) on average. However, firms react to changes in Treasury
maturities more aggressively when there are more preferred-habitat investors (Table
1.9, Column 2). With the specifications in this paper, preferred-habitat investors
need to be approximately 13 of the total investors for the gap-filling channel to work
in UMP periods. Starting from the first QE announcement in November 2008, the
average fraction of preferred-habitat investors in the Treasury and corporate bond
markets is approximately 20%, indicating a non-negative relationship between Trea-
sury maturities and corporate bond maturities. This relationship holds for both IG
and HY firms (Table 1.9, Columns 3 and 4).
Because both the average Treasury maturity and the fraction of preferred-habitat
investors display significant time trends (Figure 1.1), I also run the regressions using
trend-adjusted key independent variables to check for robustness. To achieve this
goal, I regress the average Treasury maturity and the preferred-habitat investors on
the time trend to obtain residual terms, which are used as new independent variables
in Table 1.9, Columns 5 to 7. The results for the impact of preferred-habitat investors
are robust.
Because corporate financing policies are endogenous, the decision to issue a bond
may also aﬀect corporate bond maturity, introducing a selection bias. To mitigate
this bias, I re-estimate Equation 1.5 using Heckman selection models. In the first
stage, I regress the issuance dummy variable on the independent variables, using
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all firms in quarterly Compustat.19 In the second stage, corporate bond maturities
are regressed on the variables of interest. The estimations using Heckman selection
models (Table 1.10) are very close to my baseline results (Table 1.9).
Taken together, QE were unlikely to change corporate bond maturities through
the preferred-habitat and gap-filling channel for the following reasons: (1) QE 1 and
2 purchases of Treasury did not outweigh the net Treasury issuance; and (2) the
relationship between corporate bond maturities and Treasury maturities depends on
the fraction of preferred-habitat investors, which might be too low for the relationship
to be negative in UMP periods.
Market-timing channel
Finally, I discuss how market-timing could explain changes in corporate bond maturi-
ties in UMP periods. The negative coeﬃcients on term spreads and 10-year Treasury
rates in Table 1.9 are consistent with the literature, which maintains that firms issue
debt in the longer-term when term spreads or interest rates are lower. While overall
interest rates were low in the whole QE period (Figure 1.8), Treasury term spreads
were mostly historically high in QE 1 and 2 because of the zero FF rate policy (Jarrow
and Li 2012). Therefore, these high term spreads might have driven firms to issue
shorter-term debt in QE 1 and 2.
However, with increasingly more QE announcements, investors gradually believed
that low FF rates would continue in a longer period (Figure 1.8 b).20 The FG an-
nouncement in August 2011 convinced investors that the low FF rate would continue
for at least two years, which, according to the expectations theory, dramatically drove
down term spreads (Figure 1.8 b). The term spreads between 10-year and 1-year Trea-
19I delete firms with quarterly negative assets, negative sales, and long-term debt to asset ratio
less than 5%.
20Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] shows that each QE announcement in QE 1 and
2 had lengthened the expectation by about one month.
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sury yields decreased approximately 130 bps from the announcement of FG in August
2011 to the end of 2012, indicating a 1 (0.2) year increase the log maturity of IG (HY)
corporate bonds, respectively.
Therefore, the low term spreads and long-term interest rates in the FG/OT pe-
riod together should have driven corporate bond maturities to the longer domain.
This projection is supported by Table 1.8, which shows that IG firms extended the
borrowing maturity in the FG/OT period. One possible explanation for why HY
firms did not respond is that the term spread of HY bonds does not closely follow
the term spread of Treasuries. Figure 1.8 shows that while term spreads of IG bonds
closely follow Treasury term spreads, with a correlation of 0.77, term spreads on HY
bonds are mostly around zero and sometimes move in the opposite direction, with a
correlation of -0.19 between 2002 and 2012.
Overall, QE programs were unlikely to change corporate bond maturities through
the preferred-habitat and gap-filling channel. Alternatively, the monetary policies
that flattened the yield curve were able to lengthen high-quality firm bond maturities
through the market-timing channel.
1.8 Conclusions
This paper studies how UMPs aﬀected corporate credit markets and finds that FG
came closest to achieving what the Fed intended. QE 1 reduced credit spreads because
it boosted confidence and reduced risk-aversion in the crisis. However, QE 2 and
OT increased credit spreads because they stoked the fear of future downturns; as
a result, they might have induced a flight-to-quality. In contrast, FG that preset
the path of the interest rates decreased risk premia, provoked a reaching-for-yield,
and lengthened corporate borrowing maturities. In the crisis, QE aﬀected corporate
financing via the substitution channel in that the purchase of Treasury securities, as
opposed to mortgage-related securities, decreased corporate rollover risk. In general,
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the impact of UMPs was most significant to large firms. Regarding corporate bond
maturities, I find that firms did not lengthen borrowing maturities in QE 1 and 2,
but high-quality firms did in the FG/OT period. The empirical results show that
the market-timing channel was more eﬀective than the gap-filling channel in UMP
periods.
The policy implications are as follows. First, although the UMPs helped calm
credit markets in a crisis, these policies could have undesirable consequences in a
recovery period, such as increasing the “fear” about another downturn. Second,
if implemented creditably, FG could have the most desirable impact in a recovery
period. Last, if the Fed intends to help firms that are most in need of refinancing in
a crisis, then they could, if allowed, purchase corporate bonds with credit risks.
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(a) Outstanding amount (in trillions) (b) Weighted average maturity (in years)
Figure 1.1 Preferred-habitat Investors
This figure shows the amount of preferred-habitat investors between 1990 and 2012. Preferred-
habitat investors include property-casualty insurance companies, life insurance companies, private
pension funds, state and local government employee retirement funds, and federal government re-
tirement funds. Data are provided by Flow of Funds.
(a) Percentage of preferred-habitat investors (b) Preferred-habitat capital in
in Treausry/corporate bond market Treausry/corporate bond market over GDP
Figure 1.2 Treasury Securities Before and After Open Market Operations
This figure shows the total outstanding amount, weighted average maturity, and the fraction of
short-term debt of US public-held Treasury securities before and after accounting for the OMO.
The vertical line represents the start of the first-round Treasury security purchase, the vertical dot
line represents the start of the second-round Treasury security purchase, and the vertical dash line
represents the start of the Operation-Twist. The numbers in this figure are calculated using Treasury
principals available in Mergent FISD.
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(a) Treasury rates (in percentage) (b) The number of months the FF rate is
expected to be below 25 bps (in months)
Figure 1.3 Treasury Rates
Figure (a) shows the interest rates on 10-year and 1-year constant maturity Treasuries. The shaded
area represent recessions, QE1, QE2, and FG/OT, respectively. Figure (b) shows the number of
months that investors expected the Fed Fund rate to be below 25 bps. The length is calculated
using Fed Fund 30-day futures.
Figure 1.4 Term Spreads
This figure shows term spreads for Treasuries, IG bonds, and HY bonds. The term spread of
Treasury is calculated as the diﬀerence in interest rates on 10-year and the average of 1- to 7-year
bonds for Treasuries. The term spreads of IG(HY) bonds are calculated using industrial corporate
bond IG(HY) indices with 10-year and 1-7 years maturities provided by The Yield Book.
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Figure 1.5 VIX and S&P 500 Index Around UMP Announcements
These figures show the VIX and the S&P 500 index during 10 weekdays around the UMP an-
nouncements studied in this paper. Figure (a)-(d) show the VIX around QE 1, QE 2, OT, and
FG announcements, and Figure (e)-(h) show the S&P 500 index around QE 1, QE 2, OT, and FG
announcements. Shaded areas represent two-day windows ([-1,1]) around announcements.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of the Credit Spreads Sample
This table presents the summary statistics of the CDS sample. Panel A presents the distribution of
firms by credit rating and year. Panel B shows the summary statistics of firm characteristics. dd1_at
is maturing long-term debt over asset. Roll is the individual bond liquidity measure, standardized
to have a sample mean of 0 and a sample standard deviation of 1. log asset is the log of asset.
5-year CDS is single-name 5-year CDS spreads. dd is “distance-to-default” calculated using Merton
model. mk lev is market leverage ratio calculated using daily stock caption. mk2bk is market to
book ratio. CP user equals 1 if the firm has an S&P short-term debt rating of A-1+, A-1, or A-2.
Fin segment equals 1 if the firm reports a business segment with an SIC code between 6000 and 6999
in the recent fiscal year. Panel C shows the summary statistics of log changes in 2-day CDS spreads
and log changes in market condition proxies. All changes take the log form (log(Xt+1/Xt−1)).
Baa_AAA is the spread between Moody’s Baa and AAA index yields. on_oﬀ, a market liquidity
measure, is the spread between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run 10-year Treasury yields from Citi Yield
Book. T10 is the yield on 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities. VIX is the CBOE volatility
index.
Panel A. Distribution of firm by year and rating
Year AA A BBB BB B C Total
2005 48 67 61 46 31 15 268
2006 47 68 63 51 37 16 282
2007 48 69 71 52 40 17 297
2008 49 68 75 50 40 13 295
2009 49 66 77 51 39 11 293
2010 48 65 76 49 37 13 288
2011 45 62 76 48 37 11 279
2012 46 63 76 48 32 8 273
Total 53 75 79 55 39 20 321
Panel B. Summary statistics of firm characteristics
Var Firm-year Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Std. Dev
dd1_at 2247 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03
Roll 1835 -0.01 -1.23 -0.68 -0.16 0.5 1.29 1
log asset 2247 9.25 7.85 8.48 9.22 10.02 10.62 1.04
5-year CDS 2247 165.36 23.01 44.28 85.64 189.59 406.38 211.11
dd 2219 2.07 4.19 7.22 10.87 14.39 4.74
mk lev 2247 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.3 0.4 0.13
mk2bk 2242 1.61 1.04 1.15 1.38 1.84 2.57 0.65
tangibility 2247 0.36 0.07 0.14 0.31 0.55 0.7 0.23
profit 2247 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.06
CP user 2247 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 0.49
Fin segment 2247 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0.29
Panel C. Summary statistics of log 2-day changes in 5-year CDS spreads and market conditions (%)
Var N Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Std. Dev.
∆CDS 224,991 0.08 -4.09 -1.48 0 1.45 4.43 4.07
∆Baa_AAA 841 0.05 -2.49 -1.12 0 1.19 2.56 2.24
∆on_off 841 0.16 -12.76 -5.26 0 5.64 13.44 11.07
∆T10 841 -0.14 -3.23 -1.49 -0.21 1.31 3.03 2.85
∆V IX 841 -0.13 -10.68 -5.6 -0.77 4.6 10.85 8.74
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Table 1.2 Two-day Log Changes in CDS and Market Conditions During UMP
Events
QE 1_* are five QE 1 announcements. QE 2_* are three QE 2 announcements. OT∗ stand for
Operation Twist. FG∗ are time-contingent Forward Guidance announcements. QE 1 T_* are three
QE 1 exiting announcements. QE 2 T is a QE 2 exiting announcement. All variables, except ∆
CDS*, are 2-day log changes from day t-1 to day t+1 (log(Xt+1/Xt−1)), where t=0 stands for the
event date. ∆ CDS* is CDSt+1−CDSt−1. Baa and AAA are Moody’s Baa and AAA index yields.
Baa_AAA is the spread between Moody’s Baa and AAA index yields. on_oﬀ, a market liquidity
measure, is the spread between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run 10-year Treasury yields from Citi Yield
Book. T10 is the yield on 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities. VIX is the CBOE volatility
index, also known as the “fear” index. All values are in percentage points. Numbers in bold are
significant at the 99% confidence level.
Event date Event ∆T_10 ∆Baa ∆AAA ∆Baa_AAA ∆V IX ∆on_off # firms ∆CDS∗ ∆CDS
11/25/2008 QE 1_1 -11.37 -1.76 -3.44 1.2 -16.39 26.75 255 -7.77 -3.2
12/01/2008 QE 1_2 -8.92 -2.7 -5.13 1.15 13.04 13.42 256 6.77 2.25
12/16/2008 QE 1_3 -13.98 -4.87 -6.85 -1.82 -13.01 17.93 253 -8.54 -3.25
01/28/2009 QE 1_4 10.26 2.69 5.2 -1.68 0.89 3.43 246 -6.65 -2.81
03/18/2009 QE 1_5 -14.6 -2 -3.55 1.03 6.82 -2.88 248 -6.21 -2.58
08/10/2010 QE 2_1 -5.02 -1.04 -1.96 2.57 13.69 -2.22 269 7.42 3.6
09/21/2010 QE 2_2 -6.07 -2.3 -2.21 -2.65 4.59 9.92 262 2.87 1.77
11/03/2010 QE 2_3 -3.88 1.04 1.91 -2.9 -15.25 2.38 266 -5.81 -3.67
09/21/2011 OT 2011 -12.56 -5.04 -5.33 -4.09 22.98 -25.16 261 10.74 5.09
06/20/2012 OT 2012 -0.62 -1.4 -1.65 -0.73 8.84 -9.19 250 1.34 0.77
08/09/2011 FG 2011 -10.08 -1.53 -2.82 4.12 -11.03 -5.57 261 3.83 2.17
01/25/2012 FG 2012 -5.95 -1.71 -1.03 -3.62 -1.82 3.28 257 -5.99 -3.01
08/10/2009 QE 1 T_1 -3.29 -0.16 -0.38 0.77 -5.06 -31.34 270 5.23 2.89
09/21/2009 QE 1 T_2 -1.75 -0.64 -0.59 -0.89 7.79 -17.98 273 -4.64 -2.41
11/03/2009 QE 1 T_3 1.98 0.93 1.7 -2.7 -12.48 -6.38 272 -2.31 -1.21
06/22/2011 QE 2 T -2.03 -0.88 -1.22 1.3 2.25 8.83 258 2.14 1.54
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Table 1.3 Estimated Covariance Risk Exposures
This table shows the covariance of non-overlapping log 2-day changes in market conditions and
summary statistics of the β covariances estimated using the following equation:
∆CDSit = α+β1∆Baa_AAAt+β2∆on_offt+β3∆V IXt+β4∆T10t+η∆mklevit+λ∆volit+εi,t
The equation is estimated for each firm each day using an 180-day rolling window. Baa_AAA is
the spread between Moody’s Baa and AAA index yields. on_oﬀ, a market liquidity measure, is the
spread between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run 10-year Treasury yields from Citi Yield Book. T10 is
the yield on 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities. VIX is the CBOE volatility index, also
known as the “fear” index.
Panel A. Correlation Matrix of changes in market conditions (N=841)
∆Baa_AAA ∆on_off ∆V IX
∆on_off 0.051
∆V IX 0.054 0.046
∆T10 -0.095 0.007 -0.345
Panel B. Summary statistics of estimated βs
Var N Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Std Dev
βBaa_AAA 225,880 0.241 -0.144 0.016 0.202 0.438 0.706 0.353
βon_off 225,880 0.004 -0.078 -0.031 0.004 0.041 0.090 0.073
βV IX 225,880 0.056 -0.066 -0.012 0.039 0.115 0.203 0.111
βT10 225,880 -0.145 -0.613 -0.324 -0.097 0.058 0.246 0.361
Panel C. Correlation Matrix of estimated βs (N=225,880)
βBaa_AAA βon_off βV IX
βon_off 0.045
βV IX 0.109 -0.113
βT10 0.021 0.036 0.057
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Table 1.4 The Impact of UMP on Risk Premia
The table shows the impact of UMPs on credit risk premia, liquidity risk premia, “fear” premia,
and risk-free rate risk premia. The following equation is estimated:
∆CDSi,t =α+
∑k=4,j=16
k=1,j=1
∆γk,jβk,i,t ∗ Eventj +
∑16
j=1
θjEventj
+
∑4
k=1
ηkβk,i,t + κControli,t−1 + εi,t
where βk,i,t, k=1, 2, 3, and 4, are the estimated sensitivities of log 2-day changes in CDS
spreads to log 2-day changes in Baa-AAA spreads, on-oﬀ run 10-year Treasury spreads, VIX,
and 10-year Treasury rates in the window [t-180,t-1]; Eventj , j=1 to 16, are the QE, FG,
and OT announcement dates; Controli,t−1 are firms characteristics including maturing long-
term debt, firm size, market to book ratio, market leverage ratio, tangibility, and profitability.
To save space, this table only reports the estimations of ∆γk,j. The equation is estimated
using the whole sample and IG and HY subsamples. Columns 1-3 report the estimations of
∆γBaa_AAA,j ; columns 4-6 report the estimations of ∆γon_off,j ; columns 7-9 report the estima-
tions of ∆γT10,j ; and columns 10-12 report the estimations of ∆γV IX,j . Firm-fixed eﬀects are
controlled. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
∆γBaa_AAA,j ∆γon_off,j ∆γV IX,j ∆γT10,j
(Expected sign if easing: -) (Expected sign if easing: -) (Expected sign if easing: -) (Expected sign if easing: +)
All IG HY All IG HY All IG HY All IG HY
Eventj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
QE 1
QE 1_1 -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.019 -0.223*** -0.239*** -0.188** -0.080*** -0.056* -0.147*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.082***
QE 1_2 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.028** -0.067 -0.117* -0.016 0.036 0.042 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.002
QE 1_3 -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.054*** 0.004 0.076 -0.082 -0.131*** -0.073*** -0.253*** 0.042*** 0.036** 0.077**
QE 1_4 -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.044*** -0.106* -0.072 -0.134 -0.051*** -0.021 -0.130*** 0.027 0.024 0.028
QE 1_5 -0.028*** -0.024** -0.029** 0.076 0.014 0.152** -0.080*** -0.076*** -0.081** -0.046** -0.037 -0.058*
QE 2
QE 2_1 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.026 0.074 -0.023 0.120*** 0.142*** 0.105** -0.015* -0.016 -0.014
QE 2_2 -0.010 -0.009 -0.015 0.069 0.131* -0.051 0.105*** 0.120*** 0.100*** -0.009 -0.014 0.011
QE 2_3 -0.017 -0.036** 0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.021 -0.087*** -0.075*** -0.115*** 0.015 0.031* -0.011
OT OT 2011 0.031** 0.035** 0.019 0.140** 0.151* 0.160 0.100*** 0.121*** 0.085 -0.025* -0.019 -0.046**OT 2012 -0.016 -0.020 -0.009 -0.252*** -0.334*** -0.145 0.035 0.016 0.067 -0.035* -0.046** -0.021
FG FG 2011 -0.038*** -0.036** -0.019 -0.260*** -0.249** -0.210 -0.038 -0.048 -0.087 0.047*** 0.020 0.081***FG 2012 -0.043*** -0.032* -0.056*** -0.051 -0.028 -0.076 -0.091*** -0.088** -0.085* 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.067***
Taper
QE 1 T 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.009 0.012 -0.048 0.069 0.055*** 0.053** 0.031 0.002 0.014 0.003
QE 1 T 0.004 -0.001 0.012 -0.043 -0.068 0.028 -0.044** -0.035 -0.048 -0.011 -0.019 -0.000
QE 1 T -0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.109** 0.092 0.155 0.021 0.029 0.010 -0.000 -0.009 0.012
QE 2 T -0.005 0.001 -0.013 -0.053 -0.112 0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.010 0.007 0.012 -0.004
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Table 1.5 Decomposing Changes in Credit Spreads to Changes in Risk Premia
This table shows the average changes in CDS spreads and the decomposition of these changes
during UMP announcements. The decomposition is based on the whole sample. Column 1 reports
the average changes in CDS spreads during each announcement. Columns 2-5 display changes
attributed to credit risk premia, liquidity risk premia, “fear” premia, and risk-free rate risk premia
components, respectively. Each component is calculated as changes in risk premia (∆γ) multiplied
by average beta (β) during each announcement. Column 6 presents percentages of changes in average
CDS spreads that are explained by changes in all four risk premia. Numbers in bold are significant
at the 95% confidence level.
∆γk,j × βk
Eventj ∆CDS Baa_AAA on_off VIX T 10 % explained
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
QE 1
QE 1_1 -3.2 -1.17 -1.86 -0.37 -1.06 139
QE 1_2 2.25 1.6 -0.45 0.25 0.02 63
QE 1_3 -3.25 -2.36 0.02 -0.98 -0.28 110
QE 1_4 -2.81 -1.59 -0.46 -0.33 -0.11 88
QE 1_5 -2.58 -1.36 0.34 -0.39 0.08 51
QE 2
QE 2_1 3.6 0.33 -0.01 1.16 0.44 53
QE 2_2 1.77 -0.3 -0.09 1.14 0.11 48
QE 2_3 -3.67 -0.32 0 -1.07 -0.13 41
OT OT 2011 5.09 0.61 0.47 0.44 0.06 31OT 2012 0.77 -0.09 0.3 0.19 0.15 71
FG FG 2011 2.17 -0.17 0.02 -0.01 -0.84 -47FG 2012 -3.01 -0.89 -0.06 -0.38 -0.76 69
Taper
QE 1 T_1 2.89 0.74 -0.03 0.49 0 41
QE 1 T_2 -2.41 0.13 0.22 -0.5 -0.05 8
QE 1 T_3 -1.21 -0.12 -0.63 0.11 0 52
QE 2 T 1.54 -0.06 0 0.05 -0.17 -12
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Table 1.6 Which Firms Did Each UMP Help More?
This table shows the relationship between changes in CDS spreads during UMP announcements and
firm characteristics. The following equation is estimated:
∆CDSi,t =α+
∑k=8,j=16
k=1,j=1
βk,jFirm Characteristicsk,i,t−1 ∗ Eventj +
∑16
j=1
θjEventj
+
∑8
k=1
ηkFirm Characteristicsk,i,t−1 + κControli,t−1 + εi,t
where Firm Characteristicsk,i,t−1, i=1 to 8, include rollover risk measures (dd1_at and
Roll), log asset, market-to-book ratio (mk2bk), market leverage ratio (mklev), distance-
to-default, whether a firm is a potential user of commercial paper, and whether a firm
has a financial business segment. CP user equals 1 if the firm has an S&P short-
term debt rating of A-1+, A-1, or A-2. Fin segment equals 1 if the firm reports a
business segment with an SIC code between 6000 and 6999 in the recent fiscal year.
To save space, only βk,j are reported in this table. Columns 1-8 report the coeﬃ-
cients of the interaction terms between UMP announcements and eight firm characteristics,
respectively. This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares, with firm-fixed eﬀects.
Numbers in bold are significant at the 95% confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eventj βdd1_at βRoll βlogasset βmk2bk βmklev βdd βCP user βFin seg
QE 1
QE 1_1 -0.088 0.001 -0.009 0.007 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
QE 1_2 0.062 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.033 -0.001 0.007 -0.001
QE 1_3 -0.117 -0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 -0.010
QE 1_4 0.112 0.002 -0.012 -0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.010
QE 1_5 -0.115 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.008
QE 2
QE 2_1 -0.072 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.010
QE 2_2 0.093 0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.002 0.012 -0.001
QE 2_3 -0.028 0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.022 0.001 0.013 0.003
OT OT 2011 0.072 -0.000 0.012 0.002 -0.017 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002OT 2012 0.082 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.032 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
FG FG 2011 0.104 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.011 0.001 -0.009 0.010FG 2012 -0.053 0.000 -0.006 -0.003 -0.05 0.002 -0.004 -0.003
Taper
QE 1 T_1 0.102 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.063 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
QE 1 T_2 0.072 -0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.005
QE 1 T_3 0.195 0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.007 -0.000
QE 2 T -0.027 -0.006 0.003 -0.000 -0.031 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005
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Table 1.7 Summary Statistics of Corporate Bond Maturities Sample
This table shows the summary statistics of bond maturities, macro variables, and firm characteristics.
The sample period is between 1990 and 2012. Firm characteristics are collapsed to one observation
per firm-month. Data in panel A and B are from Compustat and FISD. Data in panel C are from
Flow of Funds.
Panel A. Corporate bond maturity by rating group
Rating Group firm-month Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
AAA 317 13.385 10.044 10.748 1.011 99.983
AA- above 773 13.32 10.014 12.601 0.878 100.019
A- above 2944 12.718 10.011 11.348 0.833 100.031
BBB- above 3264 11.892 10.003 10.222 0.608 100.042
BB- above 1401 9.394 9.739 4.291 0.567 60.65
B- above 2675 8.769 9.539 2.179 1.703 30.019
C 389 8.679 8.019 4.272 2 30
NR 560 9.523 9.592 5.446 0.739 57.65
Panel B. Firm Characteristics
Variable firm-month Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
age 8385 26.854 25 17.752 2 61
log_at 8385 8.208 8.179 1.535 4.707 11.611
rating 8385 4.68 5 1.593 1 8
mk2bk 8385 1.723 1.452 0.87 0.805 5.67
profit 8385 0.033 0.033 0.023 -0.046 0.101
tangibility 8385 0.404 0.365 0.243 0.031 0.914
asset maturity 8385 6.249 4.52 5.422 0.653 26.593
rndat 8385 0.012 0 0.024 0 0.117
asset vol 8385 0.154 0.086 0.172 0.012 0.891
bklev 8385 0.392 0.358 0.207 0.003 1.116
Panel C. The fraction of preferred-habitat (ph) investors in Treasury and corporate bond markets
Variable # quarter Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Ph in Treasury market 92 0.136 0.132 0.028 0.095 0.186
Ph in Corporate bond market 92 0.385 0.368 0.101 0.255 0.563
Ph in Treasury and Corp bond markets 92 0.267 0.281 0.047 0.183 0.341
Total amount of corporate bond (tn) 92 6.44 5.483 3.755 1.626 12.51
Total Treasury (tn) 92 4.695 3.723 2.326 2.227 11.568
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Table 1.8 Corporate Bond Maturities in UMP Periods
This table shows the changes in corporate bond maturities in UMP periods. The dependent variable
is the log of corporate bond issuance maturity. Key independent variables are QE 1, QE 2, and
FG/OT. QE 1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between March 2009 and
October 2009. QE 2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between November 2010
and June 2011. FG/OT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between August 2011
and December 2012. Control variables are defined in the appendix. Columns 1 to 4 are estimated
using the sample between 1990 and 2012. Columns 5 to 7 are estimated using the sample between
2000 and 2012. Standard errors that are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level
are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Whole sample After 2000
All IG HY & NR All IG HY & NR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
QE 1 -0.067** 0.036 -0.120*** -0.053* 0.001 -0.094***
(0.029) (0.054) (0.027) (0.029) (0.055) (0.027)
QE 2 -0.065*** -0.072 -0.042** -0.032 -0.035 -0.016
(0.022) (0.052) (0.017) (0.023) (0.052) (0.018)
FG/OT 0.013 0.155*** -0.059*** 0.052** 0.137*** -0.032*
(0.024) (0.046) (0.020) (0.024) (0.043) (0.019)
recession -0.133*** -0.139*** -0.082*** -0.140*** -0.106*** -0.143*** -0.059***
(0.022) (0.034) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038) (0.020)
age -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log asset -0.013 -0.066*** 0.018** -0.014 0.024** -0.008 0.034***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.026) (0.012)
IG dummy 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.077**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
stock return 0.089*** 0.243*** 0.036*** 0.092*** 0.059*** 0.062 0.035**
(0.015) (0.050) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.049) (0.014)
rating -0.042*** -0.078*** -0.021** -0.043*** -0.014 0.022 -0.029**
(0.011) (0.026) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.036) (0.013)
rating square -0.000 -0.010* 0.001 0.000 -0.002** -0.007 -0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
mk2bk -0.011 -0.064** 0.033*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.040 0.054***
(0.015) (0.029) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.034) (0.017)
profit 0.024 -0.242 0.674** 0.010 1.096** 1.509 0.951**
(0.375) (0.786) (0.288) (0.373) (0.460) (1.068) (0.436)
asset maturity 0.006*** 0.004 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.007** 0.009 0.004*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
rndat -0.160 0.522 0.190 -0.138 -1.150 -1.140 -0.214
(0.642) (1.231) (0.622) (0.642) (0.741) (1.411) (0.854)
asset volatility 0.079* 0.059 0.096*** 0.087** 0.018 -0.089 0.042
(0.042) (0.139) (0.031) (0.042) (0.062) (0.189) (0.052)
bklev -0.114*** -0.193 -0.149*** -0.111** -0.162*** -0.027 -0.213***
(0.044) (0.170) (0.033) (0.044) (0.051) (0.172) (0.046)
Constant 2.515*** 3.313*** 2.112*** 2.521*** 2.029*** 2.228*** 2.003***
(0.109) (0.236) (0.088) (0.107) (0.138) (0.316) (0.142)
4-digit SIC-fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,016 4,040 3,976 8,016 4,648 2,052 2,596
R-squared 0.153 0.170 0.234 0.152 0.190 0.233 0.255
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Table 1.9 Gap-filling and Market-timing
This table shows the estimations of the impact of Treasury maturities, preferred-habitat investors,
and term spreads on corporate bond maturities. The dependent variable is the log of corporate bond
issuance maturity. In columns 1-4, Treasury maturity is the log of the average outstanding Trea-
sury maturities, and preferred-habitat is the fraction of preferred-habitat investors in the Treasury
and corporate bond markets. In columns 5-7, Treasury maturity and preferred-habitat investors
are orthogonalized to the variable “time trend”. All regressions include 4-digit SIC-fixed eﬀects.
Standard errors that are corrected for clustering of observations at the firm level are in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Using orthogonalized key variables
All All IG HY All IG HY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treasury maturity -0.442*** 1.832*** 2.383** 1.367*** 0.254** 0.494** 0.053
(0.096) (0.593) (0.964) (0.473) (0.123) (0.233) (0.099)
Treasury maturity -5.767** -6.718* -4.971*** -47.725*** -58.026*** -40.483***
*preferred-habitat (2.282) (3.752) (1.771) (10.616) (17.061) (8.836)
preferred-habitat -0.573 -6.279 6.222** -7.445*** -13.822*** -0.270
(4.054) (6.718) (3.091) (1.490) (2.560) (1.116)
Term spread -0.014* -0.056*** -0.092*** -0.017** -0.050*** -0.086*** -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007)
Time trend -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
10-year Treasury rate -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.107*** -0.013 -0.054*** -0.100*** -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.011)
recession -0.118*** -0.093*** -0.117*** -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.093** -0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.017) (0.024) (0.037) (0.018)
age 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log asset 0.005 0.008 -0.041* 0.032*** 0.008 -0.043** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007)
IG dummy 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.082***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
stock return 0.105*** 0.095*** 0.182*** 0.050*** 0.089*** 0.172*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.047) (0.010) (0.015) (0.048) (0.011)
rating -0.027** -0.026** -0.043 -0.018** -0.025** -0.044 -0.018**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028) (0.009)
rating square 0.000 -0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 -0.010** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
mk2bk -0.004 0.005 -0.017 0.032*** 0.005 -0.017 0.033***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.009) (0.014) (0.026) (0.009)
profit 0.095 -0.027 -0.397 0.684** -0.037 -0.403 0.676**
(0.372) (0.373) (0.779) (0.287) (0.373) (0.780) (0.288)
asset maturity 0.006*** 0.005** 0.003 0.003** 0.005** 0.003 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
rndat -0.682 -0.713 -0.099 0.068 -0.683 -0.066 0.096
(0.637) (0.635) (1.231) (0.610) (0.642) (1.257) (0.611)
asset volatility 0.046 0.070 0.139 0.043 0.074* 0.143 0.048
(0.044) (0.045) (0.137) (0.033) (0.045) (0.136) (0.033)
bklev -0.129*** -0.117*** -0.088 -0.153*** -0.116*** -0.086 -0.153***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.160) (0.032) (0.041) (0.158) (0.032)
Constant 3.839*** 3.546*** 6.059*** 0.798 2.890*** 3.813*** 2.216***
(0.276) (1.044) (1.712) (0.799) (0.151) (0.300) (0.116)
4-digit SIC-fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,016 8,016 4,040 3,976 8,016 4,040 3,976
R-squared 0.167 0.177 0.197 0.263 0.179 0.199 0.267
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Table 1.10 Heckman Selection Model: The Impact of Preferred-habitat Investors
This table shows estimations of corporate bond maturities using Heckman Selection models. For
each specification, the determinants of whether a firm issues a bond are estimated in the first stage.
The determinants of corporate bond maturities are estimated in the second stage. Issue bond is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm issues a bond in a month. Standard errors that are corrected
for clustering of observations at the firm level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3)
Issue bond bond maturity Issue bond bond maturity Issue bond bond maturity
Treasury maturity -0.024 0.086 -0.044 -0.116** 1.046***
(0.052) (0.065) (0.043) (0.052) (0.342)
Treasury maturity -2.936**
*preferred-habitat (1.159)
preferred-habitat 1.638*** 2.700*** -8.029*** 3.001*** -4.460**
(0.418) (0.423) (1.049) (0.448) (1.959)
Time trend -0.001** -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Term spread 0.066*** -0.063*** 0.069*** -0.086*** 0.074*** -0.097***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
10-year Treasury rate 0.029*** -0.039*** 0.006 -0.041*** 0.009 -0.031**
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
recession -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.086*** -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.058**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024)
age 0.007*** -0.004*** 0.007*** -0.005*** 0.007*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log asset 0.248*** -0.140*** 0.249*** -0.137*** 0.247*** -0.126***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
IG dummy -0.236*** 0.331*** -0.239*** 0.316*** -0.101**
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.043)
rating 0.237*** -0.250*** 0.242*** -0.241*** 0.319*** -0.377***
(0.092) (0.083) (0.093) (0.082) (0.093) (0.076)
rating square -0.032*** 0.032*** -0.033*** 0.030*** -0.037*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
mk2bk 0.010** 0.013 0.010** 0.023** 0.010** 0.023**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
profit 0.052 0.928*** 0.057 0.799*** 0.066 0.729***
(0.169) (0.279) (0.168) (0.278) (0.168) (0.278)
asset maturity -0.000 0.006*** -0.000 0.005** -0.000 0.005**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
rnd -2.244*** 2.520*** -2.248*** 2.301*** -2.189*** 2.117***
(0.381) (0.731) (0.382) (0.750) (0.381) (0.732)
asset volatility 0.775*** -0.615*** 0.768*** -0.578*** 0.767*** -0.558***
(0.054) (0.067) (0.054) (0.066) (0.054) (0.067)
bklev 0.502*** -0.577*** 0.499*** -0.546*** 0.514*** -0.572***
(0.051) (0.060) (0.051) (0.059) (0.051) (0.061)
long-term debt 0.412*** 0.421*** 0.431***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Constant -5.085*** 5.773*** -5.251*** 8.867*** -5.511*** 7.965***
(0.339) (0.480) (0.344) (0.570) (0.342) (0.714)
4-digit SIC-fixed N Y N Y N Y
Observations 213,326 213,326 213,326 213,326 213,326 213,326
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Chapter 2
Margin-based asset pricing and the
determinants of the CDS basis
2.1 Introduction
Since Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts and their reference cash bonds bear simi-
lar credit risk, the CDS basis, which is the diﬀerence between the CDS spread and the
bond implied credit spread, should be close to zero according to the Law of One Price.
In fact, it was kept close to zero before the 2007-2009 financial crisis due to active
basis arbitrages (Hull et al. [2004]; Blanco et al. [2005]). However, as shown in Figure
2.6, it became significantly and persistently negative during the recent financial cri-
sis, indicating a long-lasting arbitrage opportunity. This phenomenon contradicts the
fact that the non-zero basis is the target of sophisticated traders in investment banks
and hedge funds. Consequently, the basis anomaly draws attention from both prac-
titioners and academic researchers (see Arora et al. [2011]; Bai and Collin-Dufresne
[2010]; Bhanot and Guo [2011]; Garleanu and Pedersen [2011]; Gorton [2009]).
Our paper on the determinants of the CDS basis is closely related to the margin-
based asset pricing theories that attribute the market anomalies to margin require-
ments and investors’ funding status (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]; Garleanu and
Pedersen [2011]). Consistent with the practice, the theories assume that risk-tolerant
investors (arbitragers) rely on collateralized borrowing to fund their trading. Since
the collateral (margin) must be equity capital or uncollateralized loans, risk-tolerant
investors’ the borrowing capacity is subject to the collateral they can use. When
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investors cannot borrow freely, the required return of an asset should compensate for
its margin requirement in addition to the risk-adjusted return. Therefore, all things
being equal, the required return of an asset that has a higher margin requirement
should be higher.
The margin-based asset pricing theories suggest that the long-lasting negative
CDS basis in the financial crisis could be due to diﬀerent margin requirements of
CDS and cash bond trading rather than arbitrage opportunities. For example, the
collateral required on selling the CDS contract is about 5% of the notional amount,
while the collateral required on the leverage buying of investment-grade (high-yield)
corporate bonds is about 20% (50%) (Garleanu and Pedersen [2011])1. For negative
basis trading, arbitragers need to buy CDS contracts and cash bonds at the same
time, generating net margin outflow. When the funding constraint is binding, the
margin capital becomes scarce. Therefore, the required return increases with the
required margin capital. In other words, the CDS basis should not be zero.
The primary purpose of this paper is to test the implications of margin-based asset
pricing theories using single-name CDS data. These theories have both time series
and cross-sectional implications. The time series implication is that the CDS basis
decreases more negatively as the marginal required return of margin capital increases.
The cross-sectional implication is that the CDS basis is proportional to the amount of
margin required. In the time series analysis, we proxy the required return of margin
capital by the shadow cost, credit risk premium, and bond market illiquidity. In
particular, we use Libor-OIS spreads and Repo rates to poxy funding cost (Bai and
Collin-Dufresne [2010]), daily innovations in BAA-AAA spread to proxy the credit
risk premium, and daily bond market Amihud innovations (Lin et al. [2011]) to proxy
the market illiquidity in the fixed income market. Using daily single-name CDS data,
1For trades relying on the repurchase agreement (repo) financing, the Repo haircut for corporate
bonds collateral increased from 3%-4% in 2007 to 5%-7% in 2010. In the crisis, the Repo market
using corporate debt as collateral almost disappeared (Krishnamurthy et al. [2012]).
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our time series results confirm the margin-based asset pricing theories in that the
CDS basis decreases more negatively as the funding costs, credit risk premium, and
market illiquidity increase.
The test of the cross-sectional implications is less straightforward, since the margin
requirements on individual contracts are opaque. However, the margin requirements
can be proxied by the sensitivity of CDS basis to the marginal return on capital. In-
tuitively, when the marginal return of capital changes, the required return of trading
that requires a larger amount of margin capital will change more aggressively. There-
fore, the cross-sectional implication of the margin-based asset pricing theories is that
the CDS basis is more negative if the basis trading is more sensitive to shadow cost,
credit risk premium, and market liquidity. We examine the relationship using daily
Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional regressions. We find that the sensitivities of the
CDS basis to funding costs, credit risk premium, and market liquidity are priced in
the CDS basis. The pricing eﬀect becomes more prominent with economic down-
turns. In particular, one standard deviation change in the sensitivity of CDS basis
to Libor-OIS spread, BAA-AAA spread, and market Amihud in post-Lehman/AIG
bankruptcy period is associated with 40 bps, 16 bps, and 12 bps changes in CDS
basis, respectively. The economic eﬀects are nontrivial considering that one standard
deviation of CDS basis is 185 bps in this period.
Next, we run a horse racing of the non-mutually exclusive determinants in the
literature. In particular, we examine the individual liquidity, counterparty risk, short-
constraint, and cheapest-to-delivery options. Bonds with higher individual liquidity
are relatively more expensive than their CDS contracts, leading to a higher CDS
basis (Bhanot and Guo [2011]; Nashikkar et al. [2011]). Counterparty risk reflects
the concern that the CDS sellers may default before the reference entity defaults. The
higher the counterparty risk, the lower the CDS spread, and the lower the CDS basis
(Arora et al. [2011]; Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010]). Finally, the short-constraint and
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cheapest-to-delivery options drive the CDS basis to the positive domain (Hull et al.
[2004]; Blanco et al. [2005]; Nashikkar et al. [2011]). To the best of our knowledge,
none of the existing papers have tested all the determinants in a unified framework.
The coeﬃcients of all the determinants have the expected sign, except counterparty
risk in the time series analysis. Our results show that the cross-sectional R square
using the explanatory variables suggested by the margin-based asset pricing theories
alone is 17.5%. Adding other determinants in the literature raises the R square to
51.2%.
In sum, we confirm the important cross-sectional implications of the margin-based
asset pricing theories. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the margin requirement
matters both statistically and economically even in normal time, when the funding
constraint is not theoretically binding. Therefore, the margin requirement is an im-
portant element in asset pricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the CDS, the
basis trading, and the potential determinants of the CDS basis. Section 3 describes
the data and variable constructions. Section 4 displays the empirical results using
time series analysis. Section 5 shows the results using Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional
regressions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 CDS, Basis, and Determinants
CDS and basis trading
Corporate bond holders are subject to interest rate risks, funding risks, and default
risks. Default risks, assuming non-defaultable CDS protection sellers, can be hedged
by buying CDS protections on bonds. CDS is like an insurance contract wherein
cash flows are contingent on credit events of its reference entity2. CDS buyers pay a
2According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) definition, credit
events include bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring, obligation default, obligation acceleration,
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fixed amount of money, called the CDS premium, to the CDS seller quarterly until
the maturity of the contract or the occurrence of credit events, whichever comes first.
This stream of CDS buyers’ cash outflows is called the premium leg of CDS payment.
CDS sellers, if no credit event occurs, do not need to pay anything to CDS buyers but
post collateral to reduce the counterparty risk (Arora et al. [2011]). In case of credit
events, there are two kinds of settlements: physical and cash settlements. In physical
settlements, CDS sellers pay the CDS buyers the par value of reference assets and
receive the reference assets from the CDS buyers. In cash settlements, CDS sellers
pay the CDS buyers the diﬀerence between par value and market value of a debt
obligation of the reference entity. This stream of CDS sellers’ cash outflow is called
the contingent leg of CDS payment. In equilibrium, the CDS spread, the market
price of CDS contract, is at a level that the present value of the premium leg equals
that of the contingent leg.
Since CDS contracts and cash bonds carry the same credit risk of a reference
entity, the default probability implied by CDS spreads and bond prices should be the
same. In other words, the real CDS spread and the CDS spread extrapolated using
bond market price implied default intensity (bond-implied CDS spread) should be
the same. Hence, the CDS basis, which is the diﬀerence between CDS spread and
bond-implied CDS spread, should be zero in a frictionless world, because of the Law
of One Price. Otherwise, arbitragers can make riskless profit from trading bonds and
CDS contracts. For example, if the CDS basis is positive, arbitragers can sell the
CDS contract and sell short the bond to earn riskless abnormal profits. Contrarily,
if the CDS basis is negative, arbitragers can buy cash bonds and buy corresponding
CDS contracts, locking in riskless abnormal profits. Such trades are known as basis
trading.
The active basis trading kept the CDS basis close to zero before the 2007-2009
and repudiation/moratorium.
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crisis. Because of short selling constraints and cheapest-to-delivery options3, the
CDS basis was usually slightly positive (Blanco et al. [2005]). However, the CDS
basis became significantly negative and persistent during the financial crisis, forming
one of the violations of Law of One Price during the period (Bai and Collin-Dufresne
[2010]). These violations draw researchers’ attentions to the limits of arbitrage, for
example: the lack of bond market liquidity, slow moving capital, funding risk, and
counterparty risk (see Bhanot and Guo [2011]; Nashikkar et al. [2011]; Mitchell and
Pulvino [2011]; Arora et al. [2011]; Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010]). Another strand
of literature, to which this paper is closely related, attributes the violations to the
funding availability in the market because of the margin requirement involved in the
trades (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]; Garleanu and Pedersen [2011]).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the eﬀect of the potential
determinants implied by the margin based theories. Second, we run a horse race
on all the above mentioned determinants, and show the relative importance of each
factor in diﬀerent market conditions.
Margin-based asset pricing and determinants of the CDS
basis
In the practice, the CDS basis trading requires capital. To make profit from the
negative CDS basis, a trader (e.g., a dealer, a hedge fund, or an investment bank)
will buy cash bond and the corresponding CDS contract to protect the position.
The trader can either fund the long position in cash bond through leverage buying,
which requires margin, or through repurchase agreement, which has haircut. The
long-position in the CDS contract will receive margin from the counterparty. Since
3For example, the CDS contracts with credit event “M” allow the delivery of bonds with maturity
within 30 months of the contractual maturity, giving protection buyers the option to choose which
bond to deliver.
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the value of a CDS contract is zero by design, the margin requirement is only to
mitigate the counterparty risk. Therefore, the margin received in a CDS contract is
much less than that required by the leverage buying of cash bond. In normal time,
the Repo haircut is low. However, in the crisis, the Repo market was in a run and
the Repo transactions using corporate bond as collateral almost disappeared (Gorton
and Metrick [2011]; Krishnamurthy et al. [2012]). That is to say, negative CDS
trading requires margin capital. Positive basis trading also requires margin capital in
that both short selling of cash bonds and selling CDS contracts require margin. The
margin should be from investors’ equity capital or uncollateralized loans.
The margin requirement depends on both securities’ characteristics and market
conditions (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]). On one hand, margin requirements
on riskier and more illiquid securities are higher to control for value at risk. On the
other hand, margin requirements increase with market uncertainty, because investors
cannot determine the fundamental value of financial assets. The increased margin
requirement constrains investors’ funding capacity, which further decreases market
liquidity. When market liquidity decreases, the collateral loses value, and therefore
margin requirements increase. As such, funding illiquidity and market illiquidity
form spirals. When investors’ funding constraint is binding, margin capital becomes
valuable, and investors pick the projects that have the highest return, leaving low-
return text-book arbitrage opportunities outstanding.
Adding a funding constraint to the classic CCAPM, Garleanu and Pedersen [2011]
model the required return of securities with margin requirements. The required return
is the covariance risk premium plus the production of margin premium multiplied by
margin. Therefore, the required returns on two assets that give similar cash flows
can be diﬀerent if the two assets have diﬀerent margin requirements. The CDS basis
is a good example of such asset pairs in that CDS contract and cash bonds bear the
same credit risk and diﬀer in margin requirements. As such, the required return on
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CDS basis is positive because of margin requirements, and investors only trade on
the CDS basis that yields a return higher than the required return.
The margin-based asset pricing model suggests that CDS basis, the return of
basis trading, should increase with margin premium and margin requirements, where
margin premium increases with funding cost and average investors’ risk aversion.
The shadow cost is also referred to as funding illiquidity in the literature. Using the
diﬀerence between Libor and short-term U.S. government debt spread (TED) and the
tightness of credit standards reported in Federal Reserve Board’s survey “Senior Loan
Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices” as proxies of funding liquidity,
Garleanu and Pedersen [2011] find that the basis on CDX widens with the increase in
credit standards tightness in a monthly time series analysis. Using Libor-OIS spread
and the diﬀerence between Repo rates on general collateral and Treasury rates as
proxies for funding liquidity, Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010] find that the CDS basis
decreases more negatively with the increase in funding liquidity risk in time series
analysis. However, they find mixed results in cross-sectional regressions.
In this paper, we propose another measure for funding availability of corporate
bond market: the corporate bond market liquidity. We use market liquidity as a proxy
for funding liquidity of corporate bond investors for three reasons. First, according
to Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009] proposition 1, any asset’s market illiquidity (to
distinguish from the whole market liquidity, we will call it individual liquidity here-
after), measured by the deviation of market price from its fundamental value, equals
the product of its margin requirements and the investors’ shadow cost of capital in
equilibrium. This proposition immediately implies that market liquidity of corpo-
rate bonds captures both the average margin requirement and the shadow cost of
investors’ capital, therefore capturing funding liquidity more comprehensively. Sec-
ondly, capital has a slow moving character in terms of the searching cost and time
of raising capital (Duﬃe [2010]). Putting it diﬀerently, the market segmentation
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does exist to some extent, and the market’s general features such as Libor-OIS/TED
spread or overall credit standard cannot fully capture the corporate bond market
funding liquidity. Contrarily, market liquidity, by the nature of its construction pro-
cess, quantifies funding liquidity of corporate bond investors more precisely. Thirdly,
market liquidity gives information beyond that which is given by individual liquid-
ity, credit rating, and other bond characteristics in studying bond yields (Lin et al.
[2011]; Helwege et al. [2014]). Therefore, market liquidity is not simply measuring
the average of individual liquidities.
In fact, our cross-sectional regression results show that the risk premia on Libor-
OIS/Repo is not significant in early crisis (late crisis). The result on Libor-OIS is
consistent with the anecdotal evidence that Libor rate is subject to manipulation
that it sometimes cannot reflect the real uncollaterized interest rate; and the result
on Repo is consistent with the empirical findings in the literature that Repo market
for corporate bond almost disappeared in late crisis. Contrarily, the risk premium
on market liquidity measured by bond market Amihud is always positive, indicating
that market liquidity describes funding liquidity more reliably.
Other determinants
Individual liquidity
There is a large body of literature on individual liquidity as a determinant of the
non-default component of bond yields (see Longstaﬀ et al. [2005]; Chen et al. [2007];
Covitz and Downing [2007]; Mahanti et al. [2008]; Bhanot and Guo [2011]; Dick-
Nielsen et al. [2012]; Helwege et al. [2014]; Lin et al. [2011]; Nashikkar et al. [2011]).
Since a detailed review of the liquidity literature is beyond the scope of this paper,
we only briefly discuss the working mechanism of individual liquidity. On one hand,
individual liquidity measures the ease of trades; hence, investors require a higher liq-
uidity premium on holding bonds with lower liquidity. On the other hand, the margin
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requirements on illiquid bonds are higher, resulting in higher margin-based liquidity
premium (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]; Garleanu and Pedersen [2011]). The
CDS basis is naturally aﬀected by individual liquidity (Nashikkar et al. [2011]; Bhanot
and Guo [2011]).
We also find that the individual liquidity measures are significant and important
after controlling for funding liquidity and credit risk premium, as well as collateral
requirements.
Counterparty risk
The collapses of Bears Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG highlight the counterparty
risk in CDS trades. Counterparty risk means that the CDS protection buyers are
subject to the risk that the CDS sellers will default before the default of the reference
entity, which renders the CDS contract worthless. In such sense, the spread of the
CDS protections sold by dealers with higher default risk should be lower to compen-
sate for the counterparty risk. Using credit spreads of major CDS dealers as a proxy
for counterparty risk, Arora et al. [2011] find that this is true statistically but not
economically, partially because of the collateral requirement in CDS trading. Using
the stock returns of major dealers as a proxy for counterparty risk, Bai and Collin-
Dufresne [2010] find that the CDS basis increases with primary dealers’ stock returns
in time series analysis, which is consistent with the predication of the counterparty
risk theory. We control for counterparty risk using the primary dealers’ stock return
following Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010].
2.3 Data and Variables
This section describes the data, sample construction, and variables.
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Credit default swap data
The sample period is between November 2006 and April 2009, which covers normal
time, early subprime crisis, and post Lehman/AIG crisis periods. The daily credit
default swap (CDS) spreads are obtained from GFI, which is a major inter-dealer
broker (IDB) that specializes in the trading of credit derivatives. GFI quote data
consists only of real market bid/ask price and trade information, reflecting accurate
market sentiment. Most of the single name CDS contracts on corporate bonds in
this data are written on senior debt, with the rest on subordinated debt. The credit
events are classified as Restructuring, Modified, Modified-modified, and No restruc-
turing4. The credit event “Modified” accounts for about 70% of the quotes in the
data. The maturity of single name CDS contracts are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,10, and a few
uneven years, 81% of which are 5 years. GFI data has been used by Hull et al. [2004],
Saita [2006],Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam [2006], Fulop and Lescourret [2007], and
Subrahmanyam et al. [2009] among others5.
Since neither CDS nor bond markets are very liquid, we follow Bai and Collin-
Dufresne [2010] and use CDS curve data which is constructed by GFI based on real
quotes and trades. Admittedly, the curve data may not respond fast enough to the
real changes in the market. We relieve this concern by only keeping the curve data
on the most liquid CDS contracts, 5 years contracts. As the cheapest-to-delivery
option biased the CDS basis toward a positive domain (Blanco et al. [2005]), we only
keep CDS data with the credit event “Modified" allowing only the delivery of bonds
4According to 1999 ISDA credit derivatives definition, “Restructuring” accounts restructuring
of corporate debt as a credit event, and any bond of maturity up to 30 years is deliverable. In 2001,
ISDA modified the restructuring clause as “Modified restructuring”, which still counted restructuring
(except restructuring of bilateral loans) as credit events, but limited the deliverable bonds to those
with a maturity of 30 months or less after the termination date of the CDS contract. The Modified-
modified clause is introduced in 2003 that allows for the delivery of obligations with a maturity of
60 months or less. No restructuring does not account restructuring as a trigger event. For detailed
discussions, please see Packer et al. [2005].
5See Mayordomo et al. [2010] for detailed comparison of diﬀerent CDS datasets.
55
with a maturity less than 30 months upon the credit event. The contracts written on
subordinated debt are also dropped from the sample. Finally, we restrict the CDS
contracts to those written on US corporations and denoted in US dollars.
Bond data
The bond data is obtained from two diﬀerent sources. The transaction price infor-
mation is from TRACE. The transaction data is further merged with the Fixed In-
vestment Securities Database (FISD) to obtain bond characteristic information, such
as issue dates, maturity dates, issue amount, and rating information. TRACE was
oﬃcially launched in 2002 by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
which replaced NASD. TRACE gradually increases its coverage of the bond market
over time. By July 1, 2005, FINRA requires all its members to report their trades
within 15 minutes of the transaction. Trace provide trading information on 100 per-
cent of OTC activity representing over 99 percent of total U.S. corporate bond market
activity in over 30,000 securities. The only trades not covered by TRACE are trades
on NYSE, which are mainly small retail trades.
To eliminate the noise introduced by retailers, we exclude the trades with trading
amount less than $100,000. Since the CDS contracts are written on senior debts,
we limit the bond data to those on senior unsecured bonds. Further, to keep the
observations comparable, we follow the tradition and focus only on fixed coupon rate
straight bonds with semi-annual coupon payments. The information contained in
TRACE includes transaction dates and transaction price (clean price or price with
commissions). We exclude transactions for which prices are mixed with commissions.
The transactions which are canceled or revised by other submissions are dropped
from the sample. To constraint the liquidity noise, we exclude the bonds with time
to maturity less than one year.
After matching CDS data with bond trading data, we only keep one bond with
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time to maturity closest to 5 years for each firm each day. The cleansing process
result in 242 unique referenced firms and 711 bonds during November 2006 and April
2009.
CDS basis
CDS basis is defined as the diﬀerence between CDS premium and bond-implied credit
risk premium. Following studies such as Elizalde et al. [2009], Bai and Collin-Dufresne
[2010], and Nashikkar et al. [2011], I use par-equivalent CDS spread (PECDS here-
after) method to calculate the bond-implied CDS premium. The CDS basis can be
expressed as follows:
Basisi,τ = CDSi,τ − PECDSi,τ (2.1)
where i stands for firm i, and τ stands for maturity. Some papers also use Z-Spread di-
rectly as a proxy for bond-implied CDS premium. We prefer the PECDS method, de-
veloped by JP Morgan, to Z-Spread in that the former allows default before maturity,
and adjusts for non-par traded bonds6, therefore giving more accurate estimations.
We first use numerical methods to get bond-implied default intensity which equates
the present value of future bond cash flows to the market price. The relationship can
be expressed using the following equation:
MVbond =
n∑
i=1
Z(ti)Sbond(ti)Cbonddt+R
n∑
i=1
Z(ti + ti−12 ) [Sbond(ti−1)− Sbond(ti)]
+ Z(tn)Sbond(tn)Par (2.2)
where MVbond is the market price of bond, Z(ti) is the discount factor, Sbond(t) =
exp(−λτ) is the survival probability with constant default intensity λ, Cbond is the
coupon rate of the reference bond, R is the recovery rate, and par is normalized to 1.
The coupons are paid semiannually, and n counts the times of coupon payment until
6For details of the comparison, please refer to Elizalde et al. [2009] and Nashikkar et al. [2011].
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maturity. We then use iteration method and get the bond-implied default intensity λ.
Discount factor here is constructed using USD-Libor swap rate because Blanco et al.
[2005] find that CDS spreads are quite close to bond yield speeds when using swap
rate as risk free rate. Indeed, as noticed by Nashikkar et al. [2011], the Libor swap
itself contains credit risk of banks, and therefore underestimating the PECDS. The
eﬀect will bias the coeﬃcients on credit risk related variables toward insignificant.
We then calculate par equivalent CDS spread with the bond-implied default in-
tensity using the following equation:
PECDS = (1−R)
∑n
i=1 Z(
ti+ti−1
2 )[Sbond(ti−1)−Sbond(ti)]∑n
i=1 [Z(ti)Sbond(ti)×dt+Z(
ti+ti−1
2 )[Sbond(ti−1)−Sbond(ti)]×dt/2]
× 4 (2.3)
where the nominator represents the present value of the default leg, and the denom-
inator is the value of premium leg if CDS spread is 1 per quarter. As in practice, we
allow the quarterly payment of CDS spread, and ask for accrued premium payment
when credit events occur.
Subtracting the bond-implied CDS spread we get in equation 2.3 from the real
CDS spread, we get the CDS basis. If the CDS basis is less than 0, then the bond
yield is higher than the risk-neutral required return.
Variables
A. Individual bond liquidity
Liquidity of individual bond is proxied by Amihud measure (Amihud [2002]), and
Roll measure (Roll [1984]). Based on the market depth concept introduced by Kyle
[1985], Amihud measure estimates the price impact of trades, while Roll measure
gives an eﬀective bid-ask spread (Roll [1984]). An increase in Amihud measure or the
Roll measure indicates higher bond illiquidity. We follow Lin et al. [2011] to construct
both individual and market liquidity.
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To construct market Amihud measure, we first calculate returns of all trades in
cleaned TRACE data as rτ = (Pτ+AIτ )−(Pτ−1+AIτ−1+Ct)Pτ−1+AIτ−1 , where Pτ is the transaction
price, and AIτ is the accrued interest. Cτ equals semi-annual coupon payment im-
mediately after the coupon payment date, and 0 otherwise. Then we calculate daily
Amihud (Amihud [2002] for each bond in TRACE data using the following equation
Amihudit =
1
N
N∑
j=1
| rij,t |
V olij,t
(2.4)
where N is total number of trades per day, rij,t is the return on the jth trading in
day t for firm i, and V olij,t is the trading volume in dollars associated with trade j.
Since the Amihud measures are too small in value, we time Amihud measure by 100
million.
Daily Roll measure (Roll [1984]) for a bond in day t is defined as
Rollit = 2
√
−Cov(∆Pit,∆Pit−1) (2.5)
where Pit is weighted average daily trading price for bond i. The covariance is calcu-
lated using a 60 day rolling window, and requires at least 8 daily observations in the
window (Friewald et al. [2012]).
B. Funding liquidity
As discussed in section 2, funding liquidity contains two aspects, the funding cost
and funding availability. We use the following proxies.
• Libor-OIS spread. This variable is constructed by subtracting overnight index
swap rates from Libor rates. The spread reflects a liquidity premium in that
higher Libor-OIS spread indicating higher shadow cost of capital and lower
liquidity in money market. However, this spread also contains credit risk com-
ponent, as higher spread implying a higher concern on the default probability of
banks (Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010]; Gorton and Metrick [2011]). Moreover,
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it may also subject to manipulation that it sometimes cannot reflect the real
uncollaterized interest rate.
• Repo. This variable is constructed by subtracting Repo rate collateralized by
government securities from that by mortgage backed securities. Repo here both
reflects the scarcity of capital in the Repo market and the concerns on collateral
quality. Hence higher Repo indicates lower funding liquidity.
• Bond market illiquidity shock. We proxy market liquidity using the weekly
innovations in both market Amihud measure(Amihud [2002]) and market Roll
measure (Roll [1984]). The construction procedure of weekly innovations is
similar to that in Lin et al. [2011]. Higher innovation in market Amihud measure
or Roll measure means higher illiquidity shock to the bond market.
To get weekly market Amihud innovation, we first calculate weekly market Ami-
hud measure as AmihudMt =
∑5
j=1
∑N
i=1
MCi
MC
Amihudij, where Amihudij is the indi-
vidual Amihud measure (equation 2.4) for bond i at day j in a week, N is the number
of bonds each day, and MCi is the market capitalization of bond i, and MC is the
total market capitalization. Then, we extract the innovations from the time series of
weekly market Amihud measure using the following equation:
∆AmihudMt = α0 + ϕ(
Mt−1
M1
)AmihudMt−1 + η∆AmihudMt−1 + ϵt + ψϵt−1 (2.6)
where ∆AmihudMt is the change in market Amihud measure from week t-1 to week
t, Mt is the total trading dollar amount in week t. This equation accounts for the
moving average eﬀects. All the lags are determined by minimum information criteria
based on BIC value. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2.4 Panel A.
Weekly innovation on Roll measure is constructed similarly. Market weekly Roll
measure is defined as RollMt =
∑5
j=1
∑N
i=1
MCi
MC
Rollij, where Rollij is the individual
Roll measure (equation 2.5) for bond i at day j in a week, N is the number of bonds
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each day, andMCi is the market capitalization of bond i, andMC is the total market
capitalization. Then, the innovation in Roll measure is calculated using the following
regression:
∆RollMt = α0 + ϕ1(
Mt−1
M1
)RollMt−1 + ϵt (2.7)
where∆RollMt is the change in market Roll measure from week t-1 to week t,Mt is the
total trading dollar amount in week t. This equation accounts for the autocorrelation
eﬀects. All the lags are determined by minimum information criteria based on BIC
value. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2.4 Panel B.
C. Time varying risk premium
As discussed in section 1 and 2, the CDS basis should be more negative when
the credit risk premium is higher, and for CDS bond pairs with larger diﬀerence in
margin requirements.
A natural proxy for level the default risk premium would be the BAA_AAA
spread, the diﬀerence between the yields of BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds, or
the BAA Treasury spread (see Fama and French [1993]; Collin-Dufresne et al. [2001];
Lin et al. [2011]). We use Moody’s BAA_AAA spread in this paper. Since the
BAA and AAA bonds diﬀer not only in credit risk, but also in liquidities, we would
orthogonalize the spread on liquidity measures. Then we run the following regression
to exclude the eﬀects of autocorrelations. The market risk premium innovation is the
residual term in the following equation:
∆Premt = α0+ϕ1Premt−1+ϕ2∆AmihudMt+ϕ3∆RollMt+ η∆Premt−1+ ϵt (2.8)
where ∆Premt is the change in BAA_AAA spread from week t-1 to week t, Premt−1
is the BAA_AAA spread in week t-1, ∆AmihudMt is the change in market Amihud
measure from week t-1 to week t, and ∆RollMt is the change in market Roll measure
from week t-1 to week t. All the lags are determined by minimum information criteria
based on BIC value. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2.4 Panel C.
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D. Counterparty risk
Counterparty risk is proxied by the average daily stock return of the main dealers
(Bai and Collin-Dufresne [2010]) 7 . When the average stock return of the primary
dealers is low, the primary dealers are riskier, leading to higher concern about coun-
terparty risk. If the counterparty risk is a major concern of the CDS buyers, we
should observe that CDS spread decreases with a decrease in major dealers’ stock
return, driving CDS bond basis down.
E. Other controls
There are two technical reasons that could keep the CDS basis above zero, short
constraint and cheapest-to-delivery option (Blanco et al. [2005]; Nashikkar et al.
[2011]). To address the two problems, we include a dummy variable HY which equals
1 if the referenced bond is high-yield, and time to maturity of the reference bond.
Since high-yield bonds are more diﬃcult to short, their bond prices are more expensive
relative to the CDS price (Nashikkar et al. [2011]). Hence, we expect a positive
coeﬃcient on HY. Regarding to the deliverable debt obligations under the same CDS
contract, the ones with shorter maturity would be more expensive, leading to a higher
CDS bond basis. Along the lines, the coeﬃcient of time to maturity should be
negative.
We also include VIX, which is CBOE’s volatility index, to control for the market’s
expectation of near term volatility. Higher VIX is correlated with higher funding risk
and higher risk premium. Hence, the expected coeﬃcient on VIX is negative.
Summary Statistics
The sample consists of 242 firms, 711 bonds, and 53,904 firm-day observations dur-
ing November 2006 and April 2009. The summary statistics of CDS bond basis by
7A list for current main dealers can be found at http:
//www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_current.html.
62
industry and by rating group are shown in Table 2.1. One third of the firms in the
sample are financial firms, and one third is manufacturing firms. The CDS basis is
winsorized at 1% and 99% to eliminate the outlier eﬀect. The CDS basis is highest
in pre-crisis period (November 2006 to June 2007), lower in crisis slowromancapi@
(July 2007 to August 2008), and lowest in crisis slowromancapii@ (September 2008
to April 2009) for every industry group, except the 2 construction firms. The basis is
highest for construction firms, and lowest for real estate firms. For investment-grade
reference entities, the basis is monotonically decreasing with the decrease in ratings,
highest in pre-crisis period, and lowest in post Lehman/AIG bankruptcy period (cri-
sis slowromancapii@). The relatively high average CDS basis on high-yield reference
entities could be because of short selling constraint.
The summary statistics of variables used in this paper is reported in Table 2.2.
Time series plots of the CDS basis against the potential determinants are shown in
Table 2.6. The average basis for the whole sample period is -51.577 basis points
(bps), for pre-crisis is -7.322 bps, for crisis slowromancapi@ is -33.145 bps, and
for crisis slowromancapii@ is -168.449 bps. Although crisis slowromancapii@ has
the same number of weeks as pre-crisis period, the number of observations in crisis
slowromancapii@ is only one half of that in pre-crisis period, reflecting a decreasing
liquidity in both CDS market and cash bond market. The increasing in Libor_OIS
spread with time reflects an increasing in shadow cost and funding risk. The diﬀerence
between Repo rates using mortgage backed security and government bonds as collat-
eral increases in crisis slowromancapi@ , and then decreases in crisis slowromancapii@,
indicating a hump-shaped funding cost in Repo market. Both Amihud and Roll mea-
sures increase with time, indicating a decreasing bond market liquidity. BAA_AAA
spreads increase with time, showing an increasing credit risk premium. The mean
value of stock return on primary dealers does not change much, but the standard
deviation increases with time, indicating an increasing primary dealers’ risk. The
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increasing in VIX reflects increasing expected short term volatility. The increasing
in bond ratings reflect that the trades on CDS contract with high-yield reference
entities decreased a lot in crisis period. The average time to maturity of bonds in the
samples is 6.27 years. The correlations matrices using levels and changes of variables
are shown in Table 2.3 Panel A.
2.4 Time Series Results
In this section, we report the eﬀects and importance of funding costs, funding liq-
uidity, credit risk premium, and counterparty risk in time series analysis. Since the
dependent variable, the CDS basis, and the explanatory variables are highly auto-
correlated, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method. To further relieve the concern,
we use market liquidity innovation and risk premium innovation calculated using
arima regressions to proxy the changes in funding liquidity and credit risk premium.
The following equation is estimated:
∆Basist = α+ β∆Control_variablet + ϵt (2.9)
Table 2.5 columns 1-6 report the eﬀect of each determinant separately. Both proxies
for funding cost are significant, yet the eﬀect of Repo rates is more prominent both
statistically and economically. One bps increase in Libor_OIS spread decreases the
CDS basis by 0.151 bps, while one bps increase in MB_gov Repo decreases the CDS
basis by 15.122 bps. The funding liquidity proxied by market liquidity measures are
also significant and are as important as the funding cost measures in terms of R square.
A one standard deviation increase in Amihud innovation decreases the CDS basis by
3.1 bps, and a one standard deviation increase in Roll innovation decreases the CDS
basis by 2.53 bps. As projected, the CDS basis decreases with the increase in the
credit risk premium. One bps increase in credit risk premium decreases the CDS basis
by 0.44 bps. Considering the fact that the average BAA_AAA spread increases from
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91 bps before crisis to 280 bps in post Lehman/AIG bankruptcy period, the eﬀect of
credit risk premium on the CDS basis is significant both statistically and economically.
The eﬀect of counterparty risk is not significant, which is consistent with Arora et al.
[2011] that counterparty risk is minimal because of collateral requirements.
Table 2.5 columns 7-10 report the horse racing result using the full sample. The
coeﬃcients of Mb_gov Repo, Roll innovation, and risk premium innovation are always
consistent and remain the same quality. Libor_OIS spread loses significance when the
credit risk premium is included in the regression, indicating that the required return of
capital is stronger in explaining the violation of the Law of One Price than the shadow
cost of capital. Amihud innovation loses significance after controlling for funding
costs, indicating that bond market liquidity, at least in form of Amihud measure,
captures funding cost and availability. Moreover, the fact that adding market liquidity
measure doubled the explanatory power of funding cost suggests that market liquidity
is an important complement of funding cost in studying funding liquidity.
The regression results using investment-grades and high-yield firms only are re-
ported in Table 2.6. While the results on investment-grade bonds mirror those on
whole sample, the results on high-yield bonds are very diﬀerent. The first observation
is that the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on funding liquidity related variables and
credit risk premium in high-yield sample are much higher than those in investment-
grade sample. The result is consistent with the margin-based story in that the invest-
ment in high-yield bonds requires more equity capital. The statistical explanatory
powers of funding related variables in high-yield sample are much smaller than those
in whole sample. But the explanatory power of risk premium innovation increases
60%. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient on Mb_gov Repo is marginally significant in a
univariate test, and loses significance in the multivariate test. One possible explana-
tion is that the Repo market for corporate bond collateral shrinks 3/4 in the dollar
amount from 2007 Q2 to 2009 Q1. The shrinkage of Repo market on low credit rating
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collateral is even larger (Krishnamurthy et al. [2012]). It is possible that the Repo
financing for high-yield bond became unavailable in the crisis period, rendering Repo
rates irrelevant.
Furthermore, 1% decrease in the stock returns of primary dealers increases the
CDS basis of high-yield firms by 3.3 bps. The result is not consistent with the pre-
diction of the counterparty risk theory. Contrarily, the result suggests that, when the
counterparty risk increases (primary dealers’ stock return decreases), the HY firms’
CDS spread increases more relative to their bond yield. One possible explanation is
that the credit spreads of high-yield firms are more sensitive to the stock returns of
primary dealers than bond yields.
2.5 Cross Sectional Results
To examine whether the funding costs, credit risk premium, and market liquidity are
market factors priced in the CDS basis and their relative importance compared to
counterparty risk, individual bond liquidity measures, margin requirement measures,
and time to maturity, we perform Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional tests in this
section.
We first estimate the sensitivity of the CDS basis to each interested variable on a
90-day rolling window. The βs are defined as
βLibor_OIS(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Libor_OIS)V ar(∆Libor_OIS)
βRepo(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Repo)V ar(∆Repo)
βAmihud(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Amihud_Market)V ar(∆Amihud_Market)
βRoll(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Roll_Market)V ar(∆Roll_Market)
βBAA−AAA(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆BAA−AAA)V ar(∆BAA−AAA)
βRpd(it)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Rpd)V ar(∆Rpd) (2.10)
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where β∗(it) is the sensitivity of CDS basis i to variable * between t-1 and t-90.
Then we run the following regressions in each day
Basisit = α +
∑6
j=1 βijtγj(t) + ϵit (2.11)
Basisit = α +
∑6
j=1 βijtγj(t) + ϕ1tAmihudit + ϕ2tRollit + ϕ3tRatingit
+ϕ4tHYit + ϕ5tTtMit + ϵit (2.12)
where βijt is firm i’s basis sensitivity to factor j in day t estimated above. The
individual liquidity measures and characteristics are defined in section 3.
The summary statistics of the coeﬃcients estimated are reported in Table 2.7.
The standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West method, allowing for 15 lags.
Overall, the risk premium associated with Repo, market Amihud, and BAA-AAA
spread are all positive and significant, indicating that these factors are priced, even
after controlling for individual liquidity measures and other characteristics. As shown
in Table 2.7 columns 1-4, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients increases with economic
downturns.
Table 2.7 column 5 shows the average coeﬃcients for the whole period using
equation 2.12. One standard deviation increase in β∆Libor_OIS increases the CDS
basis by 11 bps, and one standard deviation increase in β∆Repo increases the CDS
basis by 30 bps. One standard deviation increase in β∆Amihud increases the CDS
basis by 9 bps, and one standard deviation increase in β∆Roll increases the CDS basis
by 10 bps, which is not significant. One standard deviation increase in β∆BAA−AAA
increases the CDS basis by 8 bps. Considering that one standard deviation in CDS
basis is 125 bps, the impact of these factors are also economically significant. The
cross-sectional results on the margin-related market factors suggest that investors
require higher returns on the basis trades of which the margin requirements are more
sensitive to changes in funding cost and market liquidity.
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Table 2.7 column 5 also shows that one standard deviation increase in individual
Amihud measure decreases the CDS basis by 6 bps, while one standard deviation
increase in individual Roll measure decreases the CDS basis by 19 bps. The results
confirm the findings in the literature that illiquid bonds are relatively cheaper. One
notch decrease in credit rating decreases the CDS basis by 29 bps. It could be that
the CDS basis trading of lower quality reference entities requires higher margins or
higher risk-adjusted return. Being high-yield increases the CDS basis by 77 bps,
which is consistent with the short-constraint story that the diﬃculty to short cash
bond drives the CDS basis to the positive domain. The coeﬃcient on HY becomes
insignificant in the late crisis sample. One possible explanation of is that there are
very few CDS contracts traded on HY bonds in that period. Finally, 1 year increase
in time to maturity decreases the CDS basis by 3.6 bps, which is consistent with the
cheapest-to-delivery argument. All coeﬃcients are of expected signs.
To sum up, funding costs, market liquidity, and credit risk premium are factors
priced in CDS basis. The pricing eﬀect is more prominent in economic downturns
but also significant in normal time.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper tests the implications of the margin-based asset pricing theories using
the CDS basis. Using single-name CDS data between November 2006 and April
2009, we show that (1) in a time series framework, the CDS basis decreases with
higher funding costs, lower market liquidity, and higher credit risk premia; (2) cross-
sectionally, CDS basis is more negative if it has higher beta sensitivities to funding
costs, market illiquidity, or credit risk premia; and (3) the impact of the margin-
related factors is always statistically and economically significant. The impact of the
margin-related factors holds after controlling for counterparty risk, individual bond
liquidity, short-constraint, and cheapest-to-delivery options.
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Our paper belongs to the growing literature that explains market anomalies from
the perspective of funding liquidity and margin requirements (for example, Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen [2009]; Comerton-Forde et al. [2010]; Garleanu and Pedersen
[2011]). Our paper suggests that the margin requirement is an important element of
asset pricing.
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(a)Basis VS. Funding cost (b)Basis VS. Counterparty risk
(c)Basis VS. Market liquidity (d) Basis VS. Risk premium
Figure 2.1 The Determinants of the CDS Basis
This figure shows the plots of daily average CDS basis against its theoretical determinants.
CDS_bond basis is the diﬀerence between CDS spread and bond-implied CDS spread in basis
points. OIS_Libor is the diﬀerence between overnight indexed swap rate and 3-month Libor rate
in basis points. Gov_mb Repo is the diﬀerence between the Repo rates (in basis points) using
government bonds and mortgage backed securities as collateral. Stock return of primary dealers is
the market capitalization weighted daily average stock return of all the primary dealers listed in US.
Market liquidity-Amihud (Roll) is the market capitalization weighted daily average Amihud (Roll)
measure of all the bonds in the sample. BAA_AAA spread is the diﬀerence between the yields on
Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds posted by Federal Reserve board. The left of the
shaded area is normal time, Nov 2006 to Jun 2007. The shaded area is crisis slowromancapi@, Jul
2007 to Aug 2008. The shaded area is crisis slowromancapii@, Sep 2008 to Apr 2009.
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(a) Weekly Amihud (b) Weekly Amihud innovation
(c) Weekly Roll (d) Weekly Roll innovation
(e) Weekly BAA_AAA spread (f) Weekly BAA_AAA spread innovation
Figure 2.2 Market Liquidity and Credit Risk Premium
This table shows the weekly average market liquidity measures, default risk premium, and their
innovations. Weekly Amihud (Roll) is weekly average daily Amihud (Roll) measures, which is the
market capitalization weighted Amihud (Roll) measures of all bonds. Individual daily Amihud (Roll)
is defined in equation 2.4 (equation 2.5). Weekly Amihud (Roll) innovation is the residual term
using equation 2.6 (equation 2.7) which cleans auto-correlated and moving average components in
the Amihud (Roll) time series. Weekly BAA_AAA spread is the weekly average BAA_AAA spread
defined in the previous figure. Weekly BAA_AAA spread innovation is the residuals from equation
2.8.
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of CDS Bond Basis
This table reports summary statistics of the CDS bond basis by industries and by ratings. The
sample period is from Nov 2006 to April 2009. Number represents the number of firms in each
category for the whole sample period. Pre-crisis is from Nov 2006 to Jun 2007. Early crisis is from
Jul 2007 to Aug 2008, and late crisis is from Sep 2008 to Apr 2009.
Panel A. The CDS basis by industries and periods
Industry Number All Pre-crisis Early crisis Late crisis
Finance 83 -51.439 -5.651 -32.363 -175.430
Non-durable goods 45 -32.369 -4.270 -16.833 -109.036
Durable goods 42 -46.790 -0.473 -28.831 -160.298
Retail 16 -65.704 -24.120 -57.653 -165.494
Utility 16 -40.863 -16.450 -51.869 -205.880
Transportation 15 -84.756 -4.888 -69.454 -281.055
Services 11 -85.357 -17.230 -48.407 -271.191
Other 14 -64.303 -21.013 -40.552 -169.180
Panel B. The CDS basis by rating group and periods
Rating Number All Pre-crisis Early crisis Late crisis
AAA 6 -2.280 0.901 9.700 -29.610
AA 36 -20.693 -0.977 -3.263 -98.523
A 83 -44.732 -5.041 -29.109 -132.286
BBB 85 -116.950 -28.625 -89.243 -296.144
BB 14 -48.165 -18.964 -69.543 -165.338
B 15 23.946 31.514 35.599 -254.310
C 3 1.865 17.353 -4.373 -398.227
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics of the variables in each period. Basis is the diﬀerence
between CDS spread and bond-implied CDS spread in basis points. Libor_OIS is the diﬀerence
between 3-month Libor rate and overnight index swap rate in basis points. Mb_gov Repo is the
diﬀerence between Repo rates using mortgage backed securities and government bonds as collateral
respectively in basis points. Amihud (Roll) is the daily Amihud measure calculated using equation
2.4 (equation 2.5). BAA_AAA is the spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated bonds in basis
points. Rpd is the daily market capitalization weighted average stock return of the US listed primary
dealers. VIX is the VIX index published by CBOE. Rating is the S&P rating denoted in numbers,
with AAA coded as 19 and CCC- coded as 1. TtM is the time to maturity of bonds in years.
Panel A. Summary statistics for whole periods
Variable N Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev
Basis 53904 -51.577 244.673 -601.053 125.481
Libor_OIS 53067 60.523 364.42 6.5 59.054
Mb_gov Repo 53023 17.64 255 -10 34.3
Amihud 53638 42.265 7972.664 0 104.469
Roll 47828 1.66 23.895 0.001 1.769
BAA_AAA 53904 141.709 350 77 76.502
Rpd 53904 0 0.275 -0.18 0.037
VIX 53904 24.059 80.86 9.89 13.827
Rating 53904 13.262 19 1 3.3
TtM 53904 6.274 30 1 5.08
Panel B. Summary statistics for normal time
Variable N Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev
Basis 18223 -7.322 244.673 -294.895 46.244
Libor_OIS 17927 8.316 11.56 6.5 0.824
Mb_gov Repo 18223 5.463 90 -2 8.724
Amihud 18191 28.259 6629.023 0 88.383
Roll 16237 0.916 10.061 0.001 0.827
BAA_AAA 18223 91.274 99 85 3.366
Rpd 18223 0.001 0.034 -0.043 0.01
VIX 18223 12.485 19.63 9.89 2.089
Rating 18223 12.793 19 1 3.544
TtM 18223 6.087 27 1 5.174
Panel C. Summary statistics for early crisis
Variable N Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev
Basis 24860 -33.145 244.673 -601.053 99.735
Libor_OIS 24428 62.587 106.35 7.7 22.302
Mb_gov Repo 24778 29.247 255 -10 43.813
Amihud 24722 39.819 2209.738 0 73.773
Roll 21952 1.564 12.324 0.006 1.298
BAA_AAA 24860 118.298 157 77 25.171
Rpd 24860 -0.001 0.119 -0.065 0.026
VIX 24860 22.465 32.24 14.72 3.605
Rating 24860 13.325 19 2 3.373
TtM 24860 6.471 30 1 5.113
Panel D. Summary statistics for late crisis
Variable N Mean Maximum Minimum Std Dev
Basis 10821 -168.449 244.673 -601.053 185.058
Libor_OIS 10712 143.186 364.42 78.75 68.826
Mb_gov Repo 10022 11.084 150 -5 26.355
Amihud 10725 71.658 7972.664 0 166.071
Roll 9639 3.131 23.895 0.014 2.725
BAA_AAA 10821 280.426 350 153 53.791
Rpd 10821 0 0.275 -0.18 0.071
VIX 10821 47.21 80.86 21.43 12.157
Rating 10821 13.908 19 2 2.485
TtM 10821 6.139 30 1 4.821
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Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix
Panel A shows the Pearson correlations of the variables on firm-day level. The variables are defined
as in previous tables. Panel B shows the Pearson correlations of weekly changes in variables. Every
variable is averaged weekly for all firms. The changes are calculated for basis, Libor_OIS, Mb_gov
repo, Rpd, and VIX. Amihud, Roll, and risk premium innovations are the residual terms from the
equation 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8.
Panel A. Correlation for whole sample
Basis Libor_OIS Mb_gov Repo Amihud Roll BAA_AAA Rpd VIX Rating TtM
Basis 1.000
Libor_OIS -0.397 1.000
Mb_gov Repo 0.030 0.124 1.000
Amihud -0.211 0.145 0.021 1.000
Roll -0.515 0.390 0.008 0.315 1.000
BAA_AAA -0.494 0.717 -0.091 0.142 0.464 1.000
Rpd -0.008 -0.026 0.039 0.011 -0.008 0.012 1.000
VIX -0.447 0.859 0.086 0.148 0.446 0.885 -0.081 1.000
Rating 0.072 0.114 0.020 -0.129 -0.177 0.109 -0.002 0.119 1.000
TtM -0.250 0.014 0.020 0.214 0.357 -0.015 -0.006 -0.001 -0.181 1.000
Panel B. Correlation for weekly changes
∆ Basis ∆ Libor_OIS ∆ Mg Repo Amihud innov Roll innov RP innov ∆ Rpd ∆ VIX
∆ Basis 1.000
∆ Libor_OIS -0.197 1.000
∆ Mb_gov Repo -0.322 0.131 1.000
Amihud innovation -0.271 0.332 0.225 1.000
Roll innovation -0.238 -0.130 0.033 0.115 1.000
Risk prem innov -0.246 0.191 -0.043 0.179 0.048 1.000
∆ Rpd -0.039 0.141 0.165 0.257 -0.085 0.034 1.000
∆ VIX -0.199 0.353 0.122 0.019 0.107 0.280 -0.111 1.000
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Table 2.4 Market Liquidity Innovation and Risk Premium Innovation
This table shows the estimations of market liquidity innovations and risk premium innovation. The
number of moving average and autocorrelation lags in the regressions is determined by minimum
information criteria based on BIC value. Panel A shows the estimation of market liquidity innovation
using Amihud measure. The estimated model is
∆AmihudMt = α0 + ϕ(
Mt−1
M1
)AmihudMt−1 + η∆AmihudMt−1 + ϵt + ψϵt−1
where ∆AmihudMt is the change in market Amihud measure from week t-1 to week t, Mt is the
total trading dollar amount in week t.
Panel B shows the estimation of market liquidity innovation using Roll measure. The estimated
model is
∆RollMt = α0 + ϕ1(
Mt−1
M1
)RollMt−1 + ϵt
where ∆RollMt is the change in market Roll measure from week t-1 to week t,Mt is the total trading
dollar amount in week t.
Panel C shows the estimation of credit risk premium innovation using Moody’s BAA_AAA spread.
The estimated model is
∆Premt = α0 + ϕ1Premt−1 + ϕ2∆AmihudMt + ϕ3∆RollMt + η∆Premt−1 + ϵt
where ∆Premt is the change in BAA_AAA spread from week t-1 to week t, Premt−1 is the
BAA_AAA spread in week t-1.
Panel A. Market liquidity innovation using Amihud measure
Parameter α0 ϕ η ψ R square
Estimate 1.742** -0.054*** 0.593*** 0.866*** 0.139
t Value (2.570) (-2.810) (4.540) (10.260)
Panel B. Market liquidity innovation using Roll measure
Parameter α0 ϕ R square
Estimate 0.054** -0.031** 0.043
t Value (2.600) (-2.390)
Panel C. Credit risk premium innovation using BAA_AAA spread
Parameter α0 ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 η R square
Estimate 3.654 -0.015 -0.051 -3.695 0.579*** 0.302
t Value (1.150) (-0.790) (-0.670) (-0.780) (6.960)
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Table 2.5 Time Series Regressions
This table shows the results of time series regressions. The dependent variable is the
weekly change in market capitalization weighted average CDS bond basis. The independent
variables are defined in table 3. Regressions 1, 2, and 3 are testing the impact of funding cost
proxied by Libor_OIS spread and the diﬀerence in Repo rates collateralized by mortgage
backed securities and government bonds respectively. Regression 4 is testing the impact of
bond market liquidity. Regression 5 is examining the impact of risk premium. Regression 6
is examining the impact of counterparty risk using average stock return of primary dealers as
proxy. Table 7 tests the joint impact of funding cost and bond market liquidity. Table 8 tests
the joint impact of funding costs, bond market liquidity, and risk premium. Table 9 tests
the joint impact of funding costs, bond market liquidity, risk premium and counterparty
risk. Table 10 tests the joint impact controlling for changes in VIX index. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***p < .001, **p < .05, *p < .01.
∆ Basis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept -0.756 -0.846 -0.773 -0.848 -0.837 -0.848 -0.778 -0.785 -0.783 -0.757
(-0.701) (-0.813) (-0.749) (-0.818) (-0.785) (-0.773) (-0.785) (-0.809) (-0.805) (-0.774)
∆ Libor_OIS -0.151** -0.120* -0.113* -0.087 -0.088 -0.075
(-2.251) (-1.864) (-1.698) (-1.317) (-1.330) (-1.044)
∆ Mb_gov Repo -15.122*** -14.155*** -12.422*** -13.375*** -13.592*** -13.299***
(-3.824) (-3.583) (-3.207) (-3.513) (-3.537) (-3.411)
Amihud innovation -0.494*** -0.271 -0.213 -0.233 -0.248
(-2.918) (-1.542) (-1.228) (-1.305) (-1.366)
Roll innovation -22.988** -25.535*** -24.251*** -23.743*** -23.005**
(-2.484) (-2.840) (-2.753) (-2.670) (-2.545)
Risk premium innov -0.440*** -0.370** -0.370** -0.350**
(-2.850) (-2.548) (-2.538) (-2.315)
∆ Rpd -19.725 20.509 17.409
(-0.455) (0.509) (0.426)
∆ VIX -0.169
(-0.502)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
Adj R-Square 0.031 0.097 0.114 0.103 0.053 -0.006 0.181 0.216 0.211 0.206
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Table 2.6 Time Series Regressions by IG/HY
This table shows the time series regression results on investment-grade and high-yield bonds
separately. The variables and regressions are defined in the previous table. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***p < .001, **p < .05, *p < .01.
Panel A. Time series regression for investment-grade bonds
∆ Basis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.733 -0.799 -0.792 -0.804 -0.700
(-0.710) (-0.773) (-0.748) (-0.738) (-0.712)
∆Libor_OIS -0.114* -0.056
(-1.760) (-0.781)
∆Mb_gov Repo -13.233*** -12.273***
(-3.349) (-3.147)
Amihud innovation -0.426*** -0.230
(-2.746) (-1.375)
Roll innovation -21.646** -20.012**
(-2.505) (-2.346)
Risk premium innov -0.425*** -0.324**
(-2.776) (-2.132)
∆Rpd -22.140 7.555
(-0.514) (0.182)
∆VIX -0.265
(-0.786)
# of weeks 128 128 128 128 128
Adj R-Square 0.100 0.095 0.050 -0.006 0.186
Panel B. Time series regressions for high-yield bonds
∆ Basis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.680 -0.892 -0.868 -1.575 0.472
(-0.147) (-0.191) (-0.189) (-0.337) (0.111)
∆Libor_OIS -0.653** -0.149
(-2.358) (-0.534)
∆Mb_gov Repo -29.309* -25.251
(-1.795) (-1.657)
Amihud innovation -1.042* -1.075**
(-1.733) (-1.985)
Roll innovation 169.455*** 166.154***
(2.810) (3.024)
Risk premium innov -2.165*** -2.057***
(-3.252) (-2.976)
∆Rpd -331.928** -467.530***
(-2.519) (-3.346)
∆VIX -1.679
(-1.114)
# of weeks 113 113 113 113 113
Adj R-Square 0.066 0.051 0.079 0.046 0.234
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Table 2.7 Cross Sectional Regressions
This table shows the statistics of Fama-MacBeth style daily cross sectional regression coef-
ficients. The betas are defined as
βLibor_OIS(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Libor_OIS)V ar(∆Libor_OIS)
βRepo(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Repo)V ar(∆Repo)
βAmihud(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Amihud_Market)V ar(∆Amihud_Market)
βRoll(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Roll_Market)V ar(∆Roll_Market)
βBAA−AAA(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆BAA−AAA)V ar(∆BAA−AAA)
βRpd(i)= Cov(∆Basisi,∆Rpd)V ar(∆Rpd)
where each β is estimated for each CDS-bond pair on a 90-day rolling window and the
changes in variables are calculated daily. Other variables are defined in the previous tables.
The cross section regression in each day is Basisit = α+
∑6
j=1 βijtγj(t)+ ϵit and Basisit =
α+∑6j=1 βijtγj(t) + ϕ1tAmihudit + ϕ2tRollit + ϕ3tRatingit + ϕ4tHYit + ϕ5tTtMit + ϵit.
The standard errors of estimated parameters are adjusted using Newey-West method. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***p < .001, **p < .05, *p < .01.
All Normal Crisis 1 Crisis 2 All Normal Crisis 1 Crisis 2
βLibor_OIS 2.507 0.761*** -3.725 15.332** 1.97 0.193** -3.072 12.672***
(2.435) (0.078) (2.389) (6.546) (1.902) (0.095) (1.965) (4.514)
βRepo 0.348*** 0.013 0.735*** -0.05 0.249** 0.001 0.549*** -0.073
(0.118) (0.015) (0.211) (0.048) (0.115) (0.009) (0.211) (0.06)
βAmihud 11.033*** 1 9.984** 21.901** 13.891*** 5.735*** 11.279*** 25.909**
(3.498) (1.64) (4.442) (9.191) (4.102) (1.375) (4.19) (12.47)
βRoll 0.088 -0.033 -0.106*** 0.548*** 0.048 -0.042 -0.009 0.231*
(0.065) (0.028) (0.04) (0.174) (0.043) (0.031) (0.025) (0.136)
βBAA−AAA 2.311*** 0.607 1.554** 5.205*** 2.382*** 1.044*** 1.518** 5.14***
(0.682) (0.472) (0.779) (1.801) (0.601) (0.358) (0.609) (1.602)
βRpd 196.513 -12.961 111.576 537.388
(124.207) (20.988) (136.381) (364.802)
Amihud -0.107*** -0.009 -0.091*** -0.223***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.046)
Roll -12.899*** -2.886** -11.044*** -25.207***
(2.228) (1.304) (3.15) (3.062)
Rating 8.896*** 0.85** 5.805*** 21.678***
(1.558) (0.392) (0.965) (2.603)
HY 77.579*** 61.014*** 136.341*** -13.812
(12.968) (4.922) (11.241) (19.731)
Time-to-maturity -3.632*** -5.195*** -4.292*** -1.041
(0.446) (0.224) (0.299) (1.21)
Intercept -44.237*** -2.247*** -21.105*** -123.6*** -151.56*** 10.893 -82.016*** -422.55***
(7.787) (0.563) (4.648) (6.972) (32.084) (6.601) (20.028) (48.432)
Ave # Firms 86 110 85 67 86 110 85 67
# of days 596 144 291 161 596 144 291 161
R-Square 0.175 0.178 0.168 0.187 0.512 0.595 0.475 0.505
Adj R-Square 0.106 0.127 0.099 0.1 0.414 0.535 0.372 0.382
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Chapter 3
Capital Structure along the Supply Chain:
How Does Customer Leverage Affect Supplier
Leverage Decisions?
3.1 Introduction
Firms often have close connections with their major customers, and, therefore, the ma-
jor customers may play important roles in shaping firms’ real and financial decisions.
While the supply chain literature has extensively studied the eﬀects of customers on
corporate real decisions (for example, Vidal and Goetschalckx [1997] and Cohen and
Lee [1988]) and the recent corporate finance literature has studied the eﬀects of var-
ious customer characteristics on corporate financial policies (for example, Hennessy
and Livdan [2009] and Kale and Shahrur [2007]), very few studies have examined the
relationship between the financial policies of suppliers and those of their customers.
This paper presents the first eﬀort to study how a customer’s leverage aﬀects its
supplier’s leverage choice.
We invoke two theories of capital structure, the bargaining theory and the relation-
specific investment theory, to develop two competing hypotheses on the leverage re-
lationship between a firm and its customer. The bargaining theory argues that debt
improves a firm’s bargaining position against its customers or suppliers (for exam-
ple, Bronars and Deere [1991]; Dasgupta and Sengupta [1993]; Hennessy and Livdan
[2009]; Chu [2012]). When a customer increases its leverage, it increases its bargain-
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ing power against its supplier. The supplier, unwilling to lose its bargaining power,
may respond by increasing its own leverage. Therefore, the bargaining theory pre-
dicts a positive leverage relationship between the supplier and its customer. However,
the relation-specific investment theory argues that debt discourages relation-specific
investments made by both the supplier and the customer (Kale and Shahrur [2007];
Hennessy and Livdan [2009]; and Chu [2012]). To mitigate the debt-induced in-
vestment ineﬃciency, the supplier will not increase its leverage when the customer
increases leverage. The relation-specific investment theory, therefore, predicts a neg-
ative leverage relationship between the supplier and its customer.
To examine these two mechanisms of the leverage relationship, we test the im-
plications of these theories. According to the bargaining theory, if the supplier has
a lower ex-ante bargaining power, it has more incentive to use debt as a bargaining
tool. The supplier, therefore, becomes more sensitive to its customer’s leverage change
if its own ex-ante bargaining power is lower or if its customer’s ex-ante bargaining
power is higher. As a result, the positive leverage relationship becomes stronger if
the customer’s ex-ante bargaining power is higher. According to the relation-specific
investment theory, however, if the nature of the relationship between the supplier and
its customer requires more relation-specific investments, the supplier has to reduce
its own leverage more aggressively if the customer increases its leverage. Therefore,
the positive leverage relationship becomes weaker or even negative if relation-specific
investments are more important to the supplier-customer relationship.
We use the Compustat Segment data set to examine the leverage relationship
between suppliers and customers. The Segment data allows us to identify the primary
customers who account for more than 10% of a firm’s total sales. We include the
primary customer’s leverage in an otherwise standard capital structure regression
and find that the firm’s leverage is positively associated with its customer’s leverage
after controlling for other well-documented capital structure determinants.
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We proceed by investigating the bargaining theory and the relation-specific invest-
ment theory of capital structure. To test the implications of the bargaining theory,
we construct three proxies to measure the customer’s ex-ante bargaining power based
on the customer firm size, the customer’s price-cost margin and the customer’s in-
dustry Herfindahl index. Using these three proxies, we find that the positive leverage
relationship is stronger when the customer has more bargaining power. To test the
implications of the relation-specific investment theory, we construct two proxies to
measure the importance of relation-specific investments. The first measure is the cus-
tomer’s industry median research and development (R&D) intensity, and the second
measure is an indicator of whether the customer is in a durable goods industry. Ac-
cording to Titman and Wessels [1988]; Kale and Shahrur [2007]; and Banerjee et al.
[2008], relation-specific investments are more important when the industry median
R&D intensity is high or if the customer firm is in a durable goods industry. Using
both measures, we find that the positive leverage relationship is weaker when relation-
specific investments are more important. Collectively, our results suggest that, while
relation-specific investments are more important in determining customer-supplier
leverage decisions for firms in the durable goods industries, bargaining power is more
important in non-durable goods industries.
For robustness checks, we also show that the positive leverage relationship is not
merely due to local or industry-specific shocks that simultaneously aﬀect the supplier
and the customer’s leverage decisions. To further address the endogeneity problem
of the customer’s leverage, we follow Leary and Roberts [2014] to use the customer’s
idiosyncratic volatility as the instrument for customer leverage, and we find that the
positive leverage relationship holds in two-stage least squares estimations with the
instrument.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first study on how bargaining
power shapes the relationship between a firm and its customers’ leverage ratios. The
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existing literature on the relationship between a firm’s leverage and its customer’s
characteristics, such as Kale and Shahrur [2007] and Banerjee et al. [2008], shows
that a firm tends to lower its leverage when it has important customers. Moreover,
this relationship could be explained by the relation-specific investment theory. We
show that they also tend to increase the leverage ratio to maintain their bargaining
power. We, therefore, complement their analysis and contribute to the literature by
recognizing the importance of bargaining power in the supplier-customer relationship.
Our paper also show evidence that, except for the labor union, firms are likely to
bargain with other stakeholders, such as their suppliers and customers. It has been
shown that firms increase their leverage ratio to bargain with their labor unions
and employees in general (Bronars and Deere [1991], Dasgupta and Sengupta [1993],
Perotti and Spier [1993], Cavanaugh and Garen [1997], Hanka [1998], Matsa [2010],
and Benmelech et al. [2012]). Our paper extends this strand of literature by showing
that firms could increase their leverage ratio to bargain with a broader category of
stakeholders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related liter-
ature and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the data and the sample
construction method. Section IV presents estimates of the leverage relationship and
examines the mechanism of the leverage relationship. Section V shows the robustness
tests. Section VI concludes the paper.
3.2 Hypothesis Development
We invoke two non-mutually exclusive theories of capital structure to explain the
leverage relationship between a supplier and its customer: the bargaining theory and
the relation-specific investment theory. In this section, we first review the literature
on these two theories and develop testable hypotheses according to the implications
of the theories. We then briefly review other closely related literature.
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Leverage and Bargaining Power
Bronars and Deere [1991] argue that firms can use debt as a bargaining tool to
reduce the surplus that labor unions can extract. They also empirically show that
firms facing a greater threat of unionization use debt more aggressively. Dasgupta
and Sengupta [1993] develop a bargaining model to show that debt improves a firm’s
bargaining power against its employees or suppliers. Hennessy and Livdan [2009] put
the supplier-customer relationship within a relational contract framework and show
that debt decreases the amount of surplus the suppliers can extract, and thereby
increases the firm’s bargaining power against its suppliers. Empirically, Kale and
Shahrur [2007] find that when a firm’s customers or suppliers have higher bargaining
power (measured by the industry Herfindahl index), the firm tends to have higher
leverage. Matsa [2010] also find that firms with higher labor union coverage use
higher leverage. The above-mentioned literature all suggests that debt improves a
firm’s bargaining power against its employees, customers or suppliers. Thus, what
does the bargaining theory imply about the leverage relationship between suppliers
and customers?
According to the bargaining theory, when the customer increases its leverage,
it increases its bargaining power against its supplier. The supplier, unwilling to
lose its bargaining power, then responds by increasing its own leverage to improve
its bargaining power. Therefore, the bargaining theory suggests that the supplier’s
leverage and its customer’s leverage should be positively associated. Furthermore, the
bargaining theory also suggests that the leverage relationship is likely to be aﬀected
by the ex-ante bargaining power of the supplier and the customer. If the customer
has a higher ex-ante bargaining power and increases its leverage, its supplier will find
itself in a much worse bargaining position and will, therefore, increase its leverage
more aggressively. As a result, the positive leverage relationship becomes stronger if
the customer has more bargaining power. We summarize below two hypotheses based
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on the bargaining theory.
Hypothesis 1A: According to the bargaining theory of capital structure, a sup-
plier’s leverage is positively associated with its customer’s leverage.
Hypothesis 1B: The positive leverage relationship between a supplier and its
customer is stronger if the customer has more ex-ante bargaining power.
Because the way in which the ex-ante bargaining power aﬀects the leverage re-
lationship depends on whether the leverage relationship is positive or negative, we
have a diﬀerent version of Hypothesis 1B in case of a negative leverage relationship:
Hypothesis 1C: The negative leverage relationship between the supplier and its
customer is weaker if the customer has more ex-ante bargaining power.
Leverage and Relation-Specific Investments
Titman [1984] shows that a firm’s liquidation policy can aﬀect its customer’s welfare
and that the firm can commit to a liquidation policy by choosing a lower leverage. Im-
plicit in Titman’ analysis is that the customer makes relation-specific investments and
that these investments lose value once the firm goes into liquidation. Maksimovic and
Titman [1991] further show that high leverage reduces a firm’s incentive to invest in
its reputation and product quality. More recently, Hennessy and Livdan [2009] study
the eﬀect of leverage on relation-specific investments from a diﬀerent perspective.
They show that high leverage reduces a firm’s ability to pay the suppliers incentive
payments to make relation-specific investments. Based on these theoretical insights,
Kale and Shahrur [2007] find that firms lower their leverage to induce suppliers and
customers to make relation-specific investments. In summary, the relation-specific
investment theory suggests that a firm’s leverage reduces its customer’s incentive to
make relation-specific investments, and the firm, therefore, chooses lower leverage to
induce its customers to make eﬃcient investments. What does the relation-specific
investment theory of leverage imply about the leverage relationship between the sup-
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plier and its customer?
To fix the idea, we consider the case in which the customer has increased its
leverage for some exogenous reasons. On one hand, according to the relationship-
specific investment theory, the customer’s high leverage will decrease the supplier’s
relationship-specific investments. On the other hand, according to the under-investment
theory of Myers [1977], the customer’s high leverage will also decrease the customer’s
own investment, which may also include customer’s relationship-specific investment
to the supply chain. Consequently, to mitigate such investment ineﬃciencies caused
by customer’s high leverage, the supplier can respond by reducing his own lever-
age, which, according to the relationship-specific investment theory, will increase the
customer’s relationship-specific investment, and according to the under-investment
theory, will increase the supplier’s own investment. The above discussion, therefore,
suggests a negative relationship between the supplier and customer leverages.
Hypothesis 2A: According to the relation-specific investment theory of capital
structure, a supplier’s leverage is negatively associated with its customer’s leverage.
Hypothesis 2B: The negative leverage relationship between a supplier and its
customer is stronger if the relation-specific investments are more important.
Because the way in which the importance of relation-specific investments aﬀects
the leverage relationship depends on whether the leverage relationship is positive
or negative, we have a diﬀerent version of Hypothesis 2B for the case of a positive
leverage relationship:
Hypothesis 2C: The positive leverage relationship between the supplier and its
customer is weaker if relation-specific investments are more important.
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3.3 Data
Sample Construction
Our sample consists of all supplier-customer pairs that can be identified in Compustat
between 1976 and 2009. According to the FASB 14 (1976) and 131 (1997), public firms
are required to disclose customers who account for at least 10% of total sales. While
these disclosures are available in the Compustat segment files, the primary customers
are only reported with abbreviated names and without any other identifiers. We use
a method similar to that of Fee and Thomas [2004] to match the reported customer
names to Compustat firms. From the Compustat segment data file, we first discard
all of the customers that are reported as governments, regions, or militaries. We
then run a text matching program to find the potential matches of the reported cus-
tomer name with the Compustat firm names. The program requires all of the letters
in the reported customer name to be sequentially presented in the potential match.
For example, “FAIRCHLD CAM" can be matched with “FAIRCHILD CAMERA &
INSTRUMENT", while “FIARCHLD CAM" and “FAIRCHLD CAMZ" cannot be
matched with“FAIRCHILD CAMERA & INSTRUMENT". We also manually iden-
tify customers from the matched pairs from the text matching program. If there are
multiple potential matches and we cannot choose the unique match by screening the
available public information (Firm websites, annual reports, and Google), we conser-
vatively discard all these possible firm-customer pairs. We also drop all utility firms
(SIC code range from 4900 to 4999) and financial firms (SIC code range from 6000 to
6999). Our sample selection procedure results in a total of 8,645 firm customer pairs
and 35,153 firm customer years. From the 35,153 firm-year observations, we delete
any observations for which the total assets or sales are either zero or negative. We
also delete any firm-year observations with missing data.
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Leverage Measures
We use two leverage measures, Market Leverage and Book Leverage. We define the
Market Leverage as the book value of total debt (debt in current liabilities (dlc) +
long term debt (dltt)) divided by the market value of asset (Market value of equity
(csho*prcc_c) + debt in current liabilities (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt) + preferred
liquidation value (pstkl) - deferred taxes and investment credit (itcb)), and define
the Book Leverage as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total
assets (at).
Measures of ex-ante Bargaining Power
We use three measures of the customer’s ex-ante bargaining power. The first measure
is the customer’s firm size. According to Chipty [1995], Ellison and Snyder [2010],
and Sorensen [2003], large customers often have more bargaining power against their
suppliers and receive more discounts from their suppliers.
The second measure is the customer’s price-cost margin as defined below:
Price-Cost Margin = Sales-Cost of Goods Sold + Change in InventorySales + Change in Inventory (3.1)
The price-cost margin is generally considered as a measure of industry competition,
and therefore it can be used to measure the customer’s ex-ante bargaining power
(Kale and Shahrur [2007] and Chu [2012]). Furthermore, a higher price-cost margin
can only come from two sources: a higher output price, a lower input cost, or both.
If the customer firm has more bargaining power against its suppliers, its input cost
is lower, and, therefore, the price-cost margin is higher.
The third measure is the customer firm’s industry (4-digit SIC) Herfindahl index,
which also measures industry competitiveness. We calculate the industry Herfindahl
index based on all Compustat firms in the 4-digit SIC industry. However, as docu-
mented in Ali et al. [2009], the Compustat based Herfindahl index is a poor proxy for
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industry competition. Ali et al. [2009] also suggest using the census-based Herfindahl
index as a better measure of industry concentration. However, the census data only
cover manufacturing firms for a short period of time and, therefore, do not satisfy
our needs in this paper. We therefore still use the Compustat-based Herfindahl index
as one measure of the customer’s ex-ante bargaining power. Due to the potential
limitation of the Herfindahl index, we will interpret the results using the Herfindahl
index with more caution.
Measures of the Importance of Relation-specific Investments
We use two measures of the importance of relation-specific investments. We first
follow Kale and Shahrur [2007] and use the customer’s industry median R&D intensity
as a measure of the importance of relation-specific investments. If the industry median
R&D intensity is high, the industry requires more relation-specific investments, and,
therefore, relation-specific investments are more important (Kale and Shahrur [2007]).
The second measure is an indicator of whether the customer firm is in a durable
goods industry (SIC code 3400-3990). According to Titman and Wessels [1988] and
Banerjee et al. [2008], firms in durable goods industries require more relation-specific
investments.
Control Variables
In addition to the main variables of interest, we follow the literature (Titman and
Wessels [1988], Frank and Goyal [2009], and Leary and Roberts [2014]) and include the
following control variables (all lagged by one year) in the capital structure regressions:
• Firm Size - the log of total book assets (at).
• Profitability - operating income (oibdp) divided by total assets (at).
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• Tangibility - net property, plant and equipment (ppent) divided by total assets
(at).
• Market-to-Book - market value of assets (Market value of equity (csho*prcc_c)
+ Debt in current liabilities (dlc) + long term debt (dltt) + preferred liquidation
value (pstkl) - deferred taxes and investment tax credit (itcb))divided by total
assets (at).
• Industry Median Leverage - The median leverage of the 4-digit SIC industry
(excluding the firm itself).
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for suppliers and customers, respectively. All
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.1 As shown in Table 3.1, customer
and supplier firms diﬀer significantly along multiple dimensions. Most noticeably, the
customer firms are much larger (about 147 times larger) and more profitable than
the supplier firms.
3.4 The Leverage Relationship
In this section, we first examine the overall relationship between suppliers and cus-
tomers’ leverage ratios. Then, we examine the two possible theories governing the
relationship.
The overall leverage relationship
We first run OLS regressions to examine the relationship between customer leverage
and supplier leverage. Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the regression results with the
1The empirical results are qualitatively the same without winsorizing
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supplier’s market leverage as the dependent variable. Column (1) reports the ordinary
least square estimates with year fixed eﬀects only. Column (2) includes supplier
industry fixed eﬀects. Column (3) includes customer firm controls to address the
concern that some customer firm controls (customer R&D Intensity, for example)
may simultaneously aﬀect both its own leverage and its supplier’s leverage. Column
(4) includes instead the supplier fixed eﬀects to address the concern of unobserved
eﬀects (Lemmon et al. [2008]). Column (5) includes supplier-customer pair fixed
eﬀects to address the concern that unobserved eﬀects of the supplier-customer pair
may contribute to the leverage relationship. The standard errors reported in Table 3.2
are clustered by customer-year because many customer firms are reported by multiple
suppliers as their primary customers, for example, AT&T was reported by 40 firms
on average as their primary customer.2 The results show that Customer Leverage
has a positive and statistically significant eﬀect on its supplier’s leverage across all
specifications.
The positive leverage relationship is also economically significant. The magnitude
of the coeﬃcients on Customer Leverage ranges from 0.037 to 0.060, which implies
that one standard deviation change in the customer’s leverage (22.7%) can change its
supplier’s leverage by 0.80 to 1.36 percentage points or 3.67% to 5.95% of the average
supplier’s leverage. A comparison of the economic significance of all supplier controls
shows that the economic significance of the customer’s leverage is only smaller than
Firm Size, Profitability, and Tangibility, but is greater thanMarket-to-Book and R&D
Intensity.
The eﬀects of most control variables in Panel A are consistent with the existing
literature (for example, Frank and Goyal [2009]). Consistent with the findings in
2Throughout the paper, we will report the standard errors clustered by customer-year. However,
many supplier firms also report multiple customers, and it is, therefore, important to adjust the
standard error by clustering supplier-year. It turns out that all results reported in this paper are
robust to standard errors cluster by supplier-year and also the generic robust standard errors
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Kale and Shahrur [2007], we also find that Customer R & D Intensity has a negative
eﬀect on supplier leverage; however, the negative eﬀect is not statistically significant.
To corroborate with their findings, we exclude Customer Leverage from the regres-
sion and find that Customer R & D Intensity is statistically significant in this case.
However, the statistical significance is not robust to firm fixed eﬀects. These results
suggest that at least part of the negative eﬀect of Customer R & D Intensity on
supplier leverage is caused by the positive leverage relationship, which also suggests
that the positive leverage relationship may be a more important link between the
supplier and the customer.
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that a similar positive leverage relationship exists
between book leverages, which suggests that the positive market leverage relationship
is not due to passive changes in the market value of equity or the accumulation of
retained earnings.
The Mechanism
The above empirical results are consistent with the bargaining power theory of capital
structure that firms compete with their customers in the leverage ratio. We proceed
to examine whether they do so to maintain their bargaining power and whether
the relation-specific investment theory plays a role in the leverage relationship. As
discussed in the literature review section, the bargaining theory predicts that the
positive leverage relationship becomes stronger if the customer has more bargaining
power (Hypothesis 1B) and the relation-specific investment theory predicts that the
positive relationship becomes weaker if relation-specific investments are more impor-
tant (Hypothesis 2C). This section tests these two predictions.
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The Eﬀects of the Customer’ Bargaining Power
To test the eﬀects of a customer’s bargaining power, we first rank the customer firms
according to three measures of their ex-ante bargaining power: the firm size, the price-
cost margin, and the industry Herfindahl index. We then construct three indicators:
Large = 1 if the log assets of the customer firm is greater than two times of the annual
industry median log assets, and Large = 0 otherwise.3 Power = 1 if the price-cost
margin of the customer firm is greater than the annual industry median price-cost
margin, and Power = 0 otherwise. Concentration = 1 if the customer firm’s industry
Herfindahl index is higher than the annual median Herfindahl index of the sample,
and Concentration = 0 otherwise. We then interact these indicators with Customer
Leverage to create the interaction terms. The bargaining theory predicts that the
interaction terms should carry positive signs if incorporated in the capital structure
regressions.
To estimate equations with these interaction terms, we again use Idiosyncratic
Return and its interaction with Large, Power, and Concentration as the instruments.
We present the estimation results for market leverage in Panel A of Table 3.3. The
results show that the coeﬃcients on all of the interaction terms are positive and
statistically significant, which suggests that the positive leverage relationship becomes
stronger when the customer has more bargaining power. In fact, when the customer
has a lower price-cost margin (Power = 0), the marginal eﬀect of the customer’s
leverage is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that bargaining power
plays an important role in establishing the positive leverage relationship. The results
also show that the marginal eﬀect of bargaining power (evaluated at the sample mean
of the customer’s leverage) on the supplier’s leverage is positive, which is consistent
with the view that the customer bargaining power increases its supplier’s incentive to
3The customer firms in our sample are large firms relative to their industry peers; therefore we
choose the threshold to be two times the industry median instead of just the median.
92
use leverage as a bargaining tool (Chu [2012], Hennessy and Livdan [2009], and Kale
and Shahrur [2007]). Panel B of Table 5 shows similar results for book leverage.
The Eﬀects of Relation-Specific Investments
We next use the same strategy to examine the eﬀects of the importance of relation-
specific investments. We construct two indicator variables: Relation = 1 if the
customer industry median R & D is positive, and Relation = 0 if the customer
industry median R & D is 0. Durable = 1 if the customer SIC code is between
3400 and 3990, and Durable = 0 otherwise. We present the instrumental variable
estimation results for market leverage in Panel A of Table 3.4. The results show
that the positive leverage relationship is weaker when relation-specific investments
are more important (Relation = 1) or when the customer firm is in a durable goods
industry (Durable = 1). This result is consistent with the view that when relation-
specific investments are important, the supplier chooses a lower leverage to encourage
relation-specific investments (Kale and Shahrur [2007]). Furthermore, the results also
show that the marginal eﬀect of the importance of relation-specific investments (eval-
uated at the sample mean customer leverage) on the supplier’s leverage is negative,
which is consistent with the findings in Kale and Shahrur [2007].
The above results also complement the findings in Banerjee et al. [2008]. They find
that firms with dependent customers or suppliers use lower leverage if the firms are
in durable goods industries, which is consistent with the relation-specific investment
theory. Our analysis in this paper, while confirming the role played by relation-
specific investments, suggests that bargaining power is as important and is probably
more important for firms in non-durable goods industries.
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3.5 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests
This section presents our eﬀorts in mitigating the concerns regarding a spurious lever-
age relationship. In particular, we investigate whether the positive leverage relation-
ship is caused merely by common shocks to the customers and suppliers, and whether
the positive leverage relationship is caused by the characters of the supplier-customer
industries rather than that of the individual supplier-customer pairs. Also, we con-
duct robustness tests using instrumental variables and other methods.
Leverage Relationship and Common Shocks
One obvious explanation for the positive leverage relationship other than bargaining
power is that the supplier and the customer are subject to economic shocks that
simultaneously aﬀect the supplier and the customer’s leverage decisions. One such
shock can be a local shock which aﬀects all firms in the same geographical area.4 To
examine whether the positive leverage relationship is due to local shocks, we split the
sample into two sub-samples according to whether the supplier and the customer are
in the same state. If the positive leverage relationship is due to local shocks, we should
observe no relationship, or at least weaker relationship if the supplier and the customer
are not in the same state. We show the results using the two sub-samples in Table
3.5, with Panel A for market leverage and Panel B for book leverage. Comparing
the results using these two sub-samples, while the positive leverage relationship is
slightly stronger when the supplier and the customer are in the same state, the
positive leverage relationship remains significant when the supplier and the customer
are not in the same state. The results suggest that the positive leverage relationship
4Macroeconomic shocks that aﬀect all firms in the economy are unlikely to explain the positive
leverage relationship because we control year fixed eﬀects in the OLS regressions
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between the supplier and the customer is unlikely due to local economic shocks.5
The other shock that may lead to the positive leverage relationship is industry-
specific shocks, which may simultaneously aﬀect the supplier industry and the cus-
tomer industry. To examine whether the positive leverage relationship is due to
industry-specific shocks, we carry a matching exercise.
We first match, for each customer firm in our sample, a firm in the same industry as
the customer firm that has similar characteristics as the customer firm. We match on
customer firm’s capital structure determinants and use the Euclidean metric weighted
by the inverse of a variance-covariance matrix to measure the distance between firms.
We choose the firm that is closest to the customer firm in the first year when the
supplier-customer relationship is initiated and call that firm the matched customer
firm. We then follow the same matched customer firm until the supplier-customer
relationship is terminated. To examine whether the positive leverage relationship is
due to industry-specific shocks, we regress supplier leverage on matched customer
leverage, and report the results for market leverage in Column (1)-(2) of Panel A
of Table 3.6. The results show that while the coeﬃcients on the matched customer
leverage are still positive, they are statistically and economically insignificant.
Next we follow the same procedure to construct matched suppliers, and then
regress matched supplier leverage on Customer Leverage. We report the results for
market leverage in Column (3)-(4) of Panel A. Again, the eﬀects of customer leverage
on matched supplier leverage are very small and statistically insignificant. We also re-
port similar results for book leverage in Panel B of Table 3.6. In unreported results,
we also regress matched supplier leverage on matched customer leverage, and the
coeﬃcients on matched customer leverage are even smaller and statistically insignif-
icant. To assure robustness, we also match customers and suppliers with diﬀerent
5In unreported results, we also split the sample according to the geographical distance between
the supplier and the customer and find that the positive leverage relationship remains on the sub-
sample in which the distance between the supplier and the customer is above the sample median.
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sets of firm characteristics, one characteristic at a time and combinations of diﬀerent
characteristics, the results are similar to those in Table 3.6.
Instrumental Variable Regressions
All OLS results above are subject to the obvious concern that customer leverage
may be endogenous. If the supplier’s leverage is aﬀected by its customer’s leverage,
it is natural to expect that the customer’s leverage is also aﬀected by its supplier’s
leverage. This endogeneity problem also arises if some unobserved common factors,
other than the local and industry-specific shocks documented above, simultaneously
aﬀect supplier leverage and customer leverage. For example, a positive shock to the
customer’s output market may create investment opportunities for both the supplier
and the customer. In response to such an increase in investment opportunities, the
supplier and the customer may decrease their leverages simultaneously. Therefore, a
positive leverage relationship from the OLS regression may be biased if the included
control variable Market-to-Book measures investment opportunities with error (for
example, Erickson and Whited [2000]).
In this subsection, we use the instrumental variable approach to address the endo-
geneity problem. A valid instrument has to satisfy both the relevance and exclusion
conditions. In our context, the relevance and exclusions conditions imply that the
instrument aﬀects customer leverage and aﬀects supplier leverage only through cus-
tomer leverage. We follow Leary and Roberts [2014] and use the customer firm’s
idiosyncratic return as an instrument for Customer Leverage. The Idiosyncratic Re-
turn is the five year monthly rolling window regression residual of the customer firm’s
stock return on six common risk factors. In addition to the five commonly used fac-
tors, namely market excess return (RM − Rf ), the small minus big portfolio return
(SMB), the high minus low portfolio return (HML), the momentum portfolio return
(MOM), and the industry portfolio return (Rind−Rf ), we also include the weighted
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average return of all supplying industries (Rsind−Rf ) of the customer industry as an
additional factor to mitigate the contagion eﬀect along the supply chain. We follow
the same procedure as in Leary and Roberts [2014] to construct the instrument. As
argued by Leary and Roberts [2014], the customer’s Idiosyncratic Return is correlated
with Customer Leverage, but is unlikely to directly aﬀect supplier leverage.
While it is impossible to test whether Idiosyncratic Return is truly exogenous, we
follow Leary and Roberts [2014] and run diagnostic tests by regressing Idiosyncratic
Return on a wide range of supplier variables, which include Firm Size, Market-to-
Book, Profitability, Tangibility, R & D, and Supplier Idiosyncratic Return. We also
include year fixed eﬀects and industry fixed eﬀects in the regression. Unreported
results show that none of the supplier variables is statistically or economically signif-
icant, and the F-test of the overall significance also fails to reject the null hypothesis.
While these results cannot ensure the validity of the instrument, these results show
that the instrument does not contain no information about the supplier’s commonly
known capital structure determinants.
We then use the two-stage least squares to estimate the leverage relationship
using Idiosyncratic Return as the instrument. In unreported first stage regressions,
the coeﬃcients on Idiosyncratic Return are all negative and statistically significant.
We report the second stage regression results in Table 3.7, with Columns (1) and (2)
for market leverage and Columns (3) and (4) for book leverage. In all specifications,
the coeﬃcients on customer leverage remain positive and statistically significant. In
fact, the magnitudes are much larger than those from the OLS regressions.
Other Robustness tests
To mitigate the concern of indirect eﬀects on suppliers’ leverage, we include addi-
tional capital structure determinants previously identified in the literature into the
leverage regressions. The additional capital structure determinants are capital in-
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vestment (capx/at), Graham’ marginal tax rate, an indicator of dividend payment,
Altman’ Z-score, selling expense (xsga/sale), and the price-cost margin. We report
the instrumental variable estimation results for market leverage in Column (1) and
(2) of Panel A of Table 3.8, and the instruments used is the Idiosyncratic Return.
The results show that these additional controls have very small eﬀects on the leverage
relationship, and our results still hold.
We then exclude supplier-customer pairs which use the same underwriter for their
public debt and equity issuances. Common underwriters may give similar advice to
the customer and the supplier, which can lead to the positive leverage relationship.
To mitigate this concern, we use the SDC database to identify lead underwriters
for public debt and equity issuances. We also follow Leary and Roberts [2014] and
assume that firms use the same lead underwriter each year until either the end of
the sample or until the firm uses a diﬀerent lead underwriter. We then exclude all
supplier-customer firm-year observations in which the supplier and the customer use
the same underwriters, and run the instrumental variable estimation using these three
instruments. We report the results for market leverage with and without firm fixed
eﬀects in Column (3) and (4) of Panel A, and the results show that the inclusion (or
exclusion) of the supplier-customer pairs with a common underwriter has a negligible
eﬀect on the leverage relationship.
Finally, we exclude supplier-customer pairs who are joint ventures or strategic al-
liances. It can be argued that joint ventures or strategic alliances may have correlated
investment and financing policies, which can lead to the positive leverage relationship.
To mitigate this concern, we also use the SDC database to identify supplier-customer
pairs who are joint ventures or strategic alliances, and we then exclude these firm
pairs from our sample. We report the instrumental variable estimations results for
market leverage with and without firm fixed eﬀects in Column (5) and (6), and the
results show that the inclusion (or exclusion) of joint ventures and strategic alliances
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has a negligible eﬀect on the leverage relationship.
We conduct the following robust tests to insure that our results are robust to
diﬀerent sample periods and diﬀerent sampling methods.6 We first conduct all tests
above on sub-samples before 1997 and after 1997, which correspond to FAS 14 and
SFAS 131, where the customer disclosure requirements diﬀer. We find that our results
hold for both sub-samples. Then, we include only the largest customer of the firm if
the firm reports multiple customers, and our results still hold. Also, we exclude all
retail firms that are reported as customers by any suppliers in the sample, and our
results still hold.
Overall, the positive leverage relationship survives a battery of specifications and
robustness tests. Our results support both the bargaining theory and the relation-
specific theory of capital structure.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the leverage relationship between customers and suppliers along
the supply chain. We find that a supplier’s leverage is positively associated with its
customer’s leverage. Consistent with the bargaining theory, we find that the positive
relationship is stronger when the customer firms have more ex-ante bargaining power,
and, consistent with the relation-specific investment theory, we find that the positive
relationship is weaker when relation-specific investments are more important to the
supply chain. Our paper suggests a dynamic relationship between suppliers and
customers’ leverage ratios. Also, our paper implies that firms may increase their
leverage ratio to bargain with other stakeholders.
6To save space, we present the results below without tables.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The sample period is
from 1976 to 2009. Market Leverage is long-term debt divided by the sum market value of common
equity and book value of the total liability. Book Leverage is long-term debt divided by book value
of assets. The Industry Herfindahl Index is the Herfindahl index based on all Compustat firms in
the 4-digit SIC industries. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net operating income
divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D Intensity is R & D
expense divided by total assets.
Panel A. Firm Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev.
Market Leverage 0.229 0.145 0.000 1.016 0.247
Book Leverage 0.262 0.205 0.000 2.248 0.279
Firm Size 4.505 4.361 0.000 10.587 2.141
Profitability 0.039 0.109 -2.502 0.554 0.279
Tangibility 0.275 0.207 0.000 0.931 0.230
Market-to-Book 1.839 1.167 0.147 42.055 2.173
R & D Intensity 0.012 0.000 0.000 1.067 0.059
Price-Cost Margin 0.232 0.335 -14.164 2.260 0.887
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.228 0.176 0.033 1 0.175
Median Industry R & D 0.047 0.008 0.000 0.478 0.067
Panel B. Customer Firm Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev.
Market Leverage 0.269 0.213 0.000 1.100 0.227
Book Leverage 0.245 0.236 0.000 0.793 0.150
Firm Size 9.498 9.796 3.100 13.590 1.807
Profitability 0.151 0.152 -1.317 4.084 0.104
Tangibility 0.325 0.297 0.000 0.943 0.203
Market-to-Book 1.533 1.074 0.068 39.425 1.955
R & D Intensity 0.036 0.000 0.000 1.335 0.053
Price-Cost Margin 0.351 0.316 -0.502 0.945 0.198
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.264 0.203 0.014 1 0.215
Median Industry R & D 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.477 0.055
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Table 3.2 Ordinary Least Square Leverage Regressions
This table reports regression results of leverage on customer leverage and supplier firm controls.
Panel A reports the results for market leverage regressions, and Panel B reports results for book
leverage regressions. Standard errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample
period is 1976-2009. Market Leverage is total debt divided by the total market value. Book Leverage
is total debt divided by book value of assets. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net
operating income divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D
Intensity is R & D expense divided by total assets. The symbols ***, ** and ** indicate significance
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Customer Leverage 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.022**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Firm Size 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Market-to-Book -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profitability -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.075***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Tangibility 0.264*** 0.226*** 0.223*** 0.214*** 0.198***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
R&D Intensity -0.095*** -0.063*** -0.040** -0.036** -0.041**
(0.033) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 0.135** 0.112* -0.097 -0.128 -0.112
(0.061) (0.063) (0.089) (0.121) (0.097)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Customer Control Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes
Pair Fixed Eﬀects Yes
Observations 10,388 10,388 8,604 8,604 8,604
R-squared 0.198 0.249 0.312 0.072 0.056
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Panel B. Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Customer Leverage 0.053** 0.043** 0.042*** 0.023*** 0.044**
(0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.023)
Industry Median Leverage 0.599*** 0.688*** 0.557*** 0.515*** 0.505***
(0.091) (0.070) (0.085) (0.066) (0.096)
F irm Size -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.047*** 0.064***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
Market-to-Book -0.003* -0.002* -0.003* -0.001** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.433** -0.431** -0.478** -0.088*** -0.077***
(0.171) (0.175) (0.200) (0.017) (0.027)
Tangibility 0.201*** 0.355*** 0.219*** 0.195*** 0.177***
(0.036) (0.073) (0.038) (0.024) (0.046)
R & D Intensity -0.223 -0.244 -0.289 -0.047** 0.000
(0.244) (0.265) (0.285) (0.024) (0.038)
Constant 0.105*** 0.047 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.032
(0.031) (0.072) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Customer Control Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes
Pair Fixed Eﬀects Yes
Observations 12,261 12,261 8,774 8,774 8,774
R-squared 0.080 0.126 0.198 0.062 0.053
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Table 3.3 The Eﬀect of Customer Bargaining Power on the Leverage Relationship
This table presents instrumental variable estimations for regressions of supplier leverage on customer
leverage and customer leverage interacted with indicators of customer bargaining power. Standard
errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample period is 1976-2009. The indicator
variables for customer bargaining power are: Large = 1 if the log assets of the customer firm is
greater than two times the annual industry median log assets, and Large = 0 otherwise; Power = 1
if the price-cost margin of the customer firm is greater than the annual industry median price-cost
margin, and Power = 0 otherwise; Concentration = 1 if the customer firm’s industry Herfindahl
index is higher than the annual median Herfindahl index of the sample, and Concentration = 0
otherwise. The instruments used are the Idiosyncratic Return and its interactions with Large,
Power, and Concentration, respectively. To save space, we only report the coeﬃcient estimates of
the indicator variables and the interaction variables. Market Leverage is total debt divided by the
total market value. Book Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Firm Size is the
log of book assets. Profitability is net operating income divided by total assets. Tangibility is net
property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total
assets to total book assets. R & D Intensity is R & D expense divided by total assets. The symbols
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Leverage 0.077** 0.063*** 0.045 0.030 0.102*** 0.056
(0.024) (0.033) (0.038) (0.051) (0.033) (0.048)
Customer Leverage * Large 0.085*** 0.046**
(0.015) (0.020)
Large -0.010 -0.005
(0.014) (0.027)
Customer Leverage * Power 0.088** 0.045**
(0.019) (0.020)
Power -0.008* -0.006
(0.012) (0.011)
Customer Leverage * Concentration 0.045*** 0.040**
(0.012) (0.021)
Concentration 0.015 -0.002
(0.012) (0.015)
Constant 0.016 0.020 -0.002
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,388 8,604 9,547 7,623 10,388 8,604
R-squared 0.237 0.294 0.236 0.298 0.237 0.298
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Panel B. Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Leverage 0.062*** 0.022 0.109** 0.092 0.136 0.060
(0.016) (0.035) (0.048) (0.102) (0.093) (0.117)
Customer Leverage * Large 0.051*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.023)
Large -0.028 0.083
(0.043) (0.092)
Customer Leverage * Power 0.064** 0.088**
(0.030) (0.043)
Power -0.003 0.154
(0.028) (0.136)
Customer Leverage * Concentration 0.132*** 0.069**
(0.022) (0.031)
Concentration -0.055 -0.031
(0.037) (0.040)
Constant 0.110** 0.089* 0.079
(0.043) (0.047) (0.050)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,261 8,774 11,683 7,957 12,261 8,774
R-squared 0.080 0.128 0.079 0.129 0.075 0.130
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Table 3.4 The Eﬀect of Relation-Specific Investments on the Leverage Relationship
This table presents instrumental variable estimations for regressions of supplier leverage on customer
leverage and customer leverage interacted with indicators of relation-specific investments. Standard
errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample period is 1976-2009. The indicator
variables for the importance of relation-specific investments are: Relation = 1 if the customer firm’s
industry median R & D intensity is positive, and Relation = 0 otherwise; Durable = 1 if the
customer firm is in durable goods industries, and Durable = 0 otherwise. The instruments used are
Idiosyncratic Return and its interactions with Relation and Durable, respectively. Market Leverage
is total debt divided by the total market value. Book Leverage is total debt divided by book value
of assets. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net operating income divided by total
assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Market-to-Book is
the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D Intensity is R & D expense divided by
total assets. To save space, we only report the coeﬃcient estimates of the indicator variables and
the interaction variables. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Leverage 0.065*** 0.066** 0.078** 0.058**
(0.015) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026)
Customer Leverage * Relation -0.026** -0.020
(0.011) (0.026)
Relation -0.039** -0.103*
(0.017) (0.057)
Customer Leverage * Durable -0.045*** -0.068**
(0.012) (0.032)
Durable 0.006
(0.013)
Constant 0.036* 0.005
(0.022) (0.018)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 10,388 8,604 10,388 8,604
R-squared 0.240 0.297 0.236 0.297
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Panel B. Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Leverage 0.145*** 0.280*** 0.103*** 0.281***
(0.031) (0.054) (0.021) (0.065)
Customer Leverage * Relation -0.101*** -0.368***
(0.016) (0.051)
Relation -0.033 0.034
(0.045) (0.165)
Customer Leverage* Durable -0.103*** -0.443***
(0.016) (0.055)
Durable -0.024
(0.034)
Constant 0.109** 0.099*
(0.053) (0.053)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 12,261 8,774 12,261 8,774
R-squared 0.080 0.129 0.079 0.129
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Table 3.5 Local Shocks and the Leverage Relationship
This table reports regression results of leverage on customer leverage and supplier firm controls on
two sub-samples in which the supplier and the customer are in the same states or in diﬀerent states.
Panel A reports the results for market leverage regressions, and Panel B reports results for book
leverage regressions. Standard errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample
period is 1976-2009. Market Leverage is total debt divided by the total market value. Book Leverage
is total debt divided by book value of assets. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net
operating income divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D
Intensity is R & D expense divided by total assets. The symbols ***, ** and ** indicate significance
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
Same State Diﬀerent States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Leverage 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.039** 0.028**
(0.023) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013)
Industry Median Leverage 0.468*** 0.369*** 0.565*** 0.527***
(0.064) (0.077) (0.026) (0.031)
Firm Size 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Market-to-Book -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.164*** -0.068*** -0.072***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibility 0.279*** 0.301*** 0.164*** 0.158***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.017) (0.019)
R & D Intensity 0.000 0.039 -0.035** -0.021*
(0.041) (0.046) (0.016) (0.012)
Constant 0.125*** 0.013 -0.052 -0.216**
(0.033) (0.098) (0.065) (0.096)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,338 1,154 9,050 7,450
R-squared 0.407 0.478 0.294 0.343
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Panel B. Book Leverage
Same State Diﬀerent States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Leverage 0.045** 0.028*** 0.040** 0.020**
(0.058) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010)
Industry Median Leverage 0.944*** 0.820*** 0.817*** 0.750***
(0.249) (0.243) (0.060) (0.062)
Firm Size 0.012* -0.008 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Market-to-Book -0.006 -0.001 0.006* 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Profitability -0.291*** -0.294* -0.228*** -0.241**
(0.110) (0.156) (0.066) (0.101)
Tangibility 0.303*** 0.211* 0.280*** 0.257***
(0.051) (0.110) (0.046) (0.060)
R & D Intensity 0.602 0.220** 0.386*** 0.262***
(0.370) (0.110) (0.101) (0.081)
Constant -0.055 0.077 -0.104** -0.304**
(0.091) (0.118) (0.047) (0.126)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,599 1,178 10,662 7,596
R-squared 0.235 0.296 0.182 0.212
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Table 3.6 Industry-Specific Shocks and the Leverage Relationship
This table reports the leverage regression results with matched customers and matched suppliers.
The first two columns report regressions results of supplier leverage on matched customer leverage,
and the last two columns report regression results of matched supplier leverage on customer leverage.
Panel A reports the results for market leverage regressions, and Panel B reports results for book
leverage regressions. Standard errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample
period is 1976-2009. Market Leverage is total debt divided by the total market value. Book Leverage
is total debt divided by book value of assets. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net
operating income divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D
Intensity is R & D expense divided by total assets. The symbols ***, ** and ** indicate significance
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
Matched Customer Matched Supplier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.020** 0.006
(0.008) (0.011)
Customer Leverage 0.020* 0.009
(0.010) (0.011)
Matched Customer Leverage 0.649*** 0.656*** 0.570*** 0.559***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025)
Industry Median Leverage 0.009*** 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.006*** -0.006**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.001) (0.003)
Profitability 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.207*** 0.211***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Tangibility -0.143*** -0.125*** -0.043*** -0.043***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.006) (0.009)
R&D Intensity 0.027 0.024 0.032 0.027
(0.036) (0.040) (0.080) (0.096)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Observations 9,695 8,125 9,496 8,254
R-squared 0.290 0.302 0.216 0.256
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Panel B. Book Leverage
Matched Customer Matched Supplier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Customer Leverage -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Matched Customer Leverage 0.629*** 0.648*** 0.507*** 0.514***
(0.065) (0.074) (0.058) (0.061)
Industry Median Leverage -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Size -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market-to-Book -0.249*** -0.233*** -0.154** -0.148**
(0.043) (0.047) (0.072) (0.068)
Profitability 0.278*** 0.274*** 0.213*** 0.223***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.042) (0.034)
Tangibility 0.088 0.149 0.063 0.088
(0.138) (0.149) (0.125) (0.134)
R&D Intensity 0.047 0.076** 0.031 0.065
(0.034) (0.038) (0.025) (0.035)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Observations 11,062 8,363 10,797 8,376
R-squared 0.115 0.166 0.112 0.162
110
Table 3.7 Instrumental Variable Regressions
This table reports the second stage regression results of the instrumental variable estimation of the
leverage equations with the customer idiosyncratic return as the instrument. Columns (1) and (2)
report the results of market leverage regressions, and Columns (3) and (4) report results for book
leverage regressions. Standard errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. The sample
period is 1976-2009. Market Leverage is total debt divided by the total market value. Book Leverage
is total debt divided by book value of assets. Firm Size is the log of book assets. Profitability is net
operating income divided by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets. Market-to-Book is the market value of total assets to total book assets. R & D
Intensity is R & D expense divided by total assets. The symbols ***, ** and ** indicate significance
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Dependent Variables Market Leverage Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Leverage 0.125*** 0.249*** 0.148* 0.127**
(0.035) (0.076) (0.081) (0.061)
Medium Industry Leverage 0.671*** 0.489*** 0.537*** 0.385***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.092) (0.061)
Firm Size 0.012*** 0.052*** 0.000 -0.047
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.032)
Market-to-Book -0.002** -0.000 -0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Profitability -0.109*** -0.081*** -0.478** -0.425
(0.019) (0.024) (0.196) (0.278)
Tangibility 0.103*** 0.178*** 0.204*** 0.434**
(0.020) (0.033) (0.037) (0.169)
R&D Intensity -0.166*** -0.017 -0.284 -0.409
(0.034) (0.033) (0.286) (0.330)
Constant 0.002 0.012 0.084*** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes
Observations 9,851 7,532 10,124 7,615
R-squared 0.235 0.288 0.123 0.195
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Table 3.8 Other Alternative Explanations
This table presents tests to rule out other alternative explanations. The sample period is 1976-
2009. Standard errors clustered by customer-year are in parentheses. Column (1) and (2) report
leverage equation regression results with additional supplier controls; Column (3) and (4) report
regression results excluding supplier-customer pairs which use same lead underwriters. Column (5)
and (6) report results excluding supplier-customer pairs who are joint ventures or strategic Alliances.
All results are estimated using Idiosyncratic Return as the instrument. The variables are: Market
Leverage, long-term debt divided by the sum market value of common equity and book value of total
liability, Book Leverage, long-term debt divided by book value of assets, Firm Size, the log of book
assets, Profitability, net operating income divided by total assets, Tangibility, net property, plant,
and equipment divided by total assets,Market-to-Book, the market value of total assets to total book
assets and R & D Intensity, R & D expense divided by total asset. Additional controls include:
investment (capx/at), Graham’ marginal tax rate, an indicator of dividend payment, Altman’ Z-
score, selling expense (xsga/sale), and the price-cost margin. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A. Market Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Leverage 0.125*** 0.064** 0.123*** 0.083*** 0.133*** 0.104***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023)
Industry Median Leverage 0.654*** 0.478*** 0.613*** 0.512*** 0.596*** 0.495***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.034)
Firm Size 0.012*** 0.044*** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.105*** -0.083*** -0.104*** -0.081***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.027) (0.009) (0.025)
Tangibility 0.115*** 0.193*** 0.112*** 0.178*** 0.107*** 0.184***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.029) (0.012) (0.031)
R & D Intensity -0.174*** -0.022 -0.133*** -0.023 -0.115*** -0.025
(0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.005 0.012 0.009
(0.015) (0.013) (0.024)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Supplier Controls Yes Yes
Observations 9,534 7,243 8,432 6,178 8,518 6,048
R-squared 0.263 0.294 0.235 0.288 0.265 0.291
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Panel B. Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Customer Leverage 0.133*** 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.104*** 0.126*** 0.113***
(0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034)
Industry Median Leverage 0.568*** 0.412*** 0.519*** 0.402*** 0.534*** 0.405***
(0.092) (0.102) (0.089) (0.094) (0.090) (0.101)
Firm Size -0.002 -0.061 -0.001 -0.059 -0.002 -0.058
(0.005) (0.045) (0.005) (0.041) (0.006) (0.040)
Market-to-Book -0.003** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profitability -0.415** -0.329 -0.467** -0.375 -0.458** -0.398
(0.203) (0.288) (0.212) (0.312) (0.228) (0.336)
Tangibility 0.197*** 0.415*** 0.201*** 0.436*** 0.203*** 0.421**
(0.036) (0.123) (0.037) (0.148) (0.038) (0.197)
R & D Intensity -0.213 -0.298 -0.224 -0.315 -0.206 -0.378
(0.253) (0.342) (0.237) (0.278) (0.246) (0.345)
Constant 0.076* 0.085* 0.098**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Customer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Supplier Controls Yes Yes
Observations 10,278 7,584 10,019 6,853 9,735 6,745
R-squared 0.089 0.136 0.079 0.128 0.078 0.127
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Appendix A
Definitions of variables for the first chapter
QE 1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between March 2009 (when
the Fed launched the Treasury purchase programs) and October 2009.
QE 2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between Nov. 2010 and June
2011.
FG/OT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond was issued between August 2011
and December 2012. I do not distinguish between the FG period and the OT period
because the two periods largely overlapped.
dd1_at is the fraction of long-term debt maturing in 1 year (dd1/at). Data are from
COMPUSTAT annual file.
Roll is a bond liquidity measure for individual firms. The variable is constructed following
Bao et al. [2011] using the equation Roll = 2
√−Cov(∆Pit,∆Pit−1). Roll is estimated
using all bond transactions within the last month for each firm. If several bonds exist
for a firm, the median value is used.
CDS are single-name 5-year CDS spreads. Data are from Markit Inc.
Baa-AAA spread is calculated using Moodys’ Baa and AAA index yields.
on-oﬀ is the diﬀerence between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run 10-year Treasury rates. Both
are downloaded from the Citi Yield Book. This variable is used to proxy the market
liquidity.
T 10 is the interest rate on 10-year constant maturity Treasuries. Data are from H.15.
VIX is the measure of market expectations of near-term volatilities conveyed by S&P 500
stock index option prices. Data are downloaded from CBOE.
βBaa_AAA, βon_off , βT 10, and βV IX are sensitivities of log 2-day changes in individ-
ual CDS spreads to log changes in Baa-AAA spreads, on-oﬀ run spreads, 10 year
Treasury rates, and VIX, respectively. The βs are estimated using ∆CDSit =
α+β1∆Baa_AAAt+β2∆on_offt+β3∆V IXt+β4∆T10t+η∆mklevit+λ∆volit+εi,t
. For each day, βs are estimated using data in the last 180 days.
imp_vol is the implied volatility calculated as (call implied volatility+put implied volatil-
ity)/2. Only contracts that mature in the next month and have delta closest to
0.5/-0.5 are used. Data are from OptionMetrices.
Treasury maturity is the log of the weighted average maturity of outstanding Treasury
principal and coupon payments. Data are from Mergent FISD and TreasuryDirect.
Preferred-habitat is the fraction of preferred-habitat investors, including property-casualty
insurance companies, life insurance companies, private pension funds, state and local
government employee retirement funds, and federal government retirement funds, in
the Treasury and corporate bond market. Data are from Flow of Fund.
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trend is calculated as (year-1989)*12 + month, following Custódio et al. [2012]
term spreads are calculated as diﬀerences between interest rates on 10-year and 1-year
constant maturity Treasuries. Data are from H.15.
Recession is the NBER recession dummy.
age is the age of a firm proxied by the number of years the company is included in Com-
pustat.
log asset is the log of asset (atq). Data are from Compustat quarterly file.
stock return is the stock return in the previous year. Data are from CRSP monthly file.
IG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is rated BBB- (Baa3) or above.
rating is an ordinal variable, where 1 means credit rating of AAA class, 2 means credit
rating of AA class, 3 means credit rating of A class, 4 means credit rating of BBB
class, 5 means credit rating of BB class, 6 means credit rating of B class, 7 means
credit rating of C class, and 8 means non-rated.
mke is the market value of equity. When studying CDS spreads, mke is prcc*csho calcu-
lated on a daily basis; when studying debt maturity, mke is calculated as prccfq*cshoq.
Data are from CRSP and Compustat quarterly file.
bke is the book value of equity calculated as seq; if not available, (ceqq+pstkq); if not
available, (atq-ltq+txditcq-pstkrvq); if not available, pstklq; and if not available,
pstkq. Data are from COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
mkat is the market value of total assets calculated as (mke+atq-bke). Data are from
COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
bklev is the book leverage ratio calculated as (dlcq+ dlttq) /atq. Data are from COM-
PUSTAT quarterly file.
mklev is the market leverage calculated as (dlcq + dlttq) / mkat. Data are from COM-
PUSTAT quarterly file and CRSP.
mk2bk is the market-to-book ratio calculated as mkat/atq. Data are from COMPUSTAT
quarterly file and CRSP.
profit is the operating income before depreciation over asset (oibdpq/atq). Data are from
COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
asset maturity is the asset maturity calculated as (ppent/(act + ppent)* (ppent/dp)+
act/(act + ppent) * (act/cogs)). Data are from COMPUSTAT annual file.
rnd is the research and development calculated as xrdq/atq. Data are from COMPUSTAT
quarterly file.
asset volatility is the asset volatility coeﬃcient calculated as volatility(asset)/mean(asset)
in past 8 quarters. Data are from COMPUSTAT quarterly file.
CP user equals 1 if the firm has an S&P short-term debt rating of A-1+, A-1, or A-2.
Fin segment equals 1 if the firm reports a business segment with an SIC code between
6000 and 6999 in the recent fiscal year.
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Appendix B
UMP announcements
This appendix lists all UMP announcements between November 2008 and June 2012 studied
in this paper.
QE 1 initiation and expanding announcements
QE 1_1 (11/25/2008) The initial LSAP announcement, in which the Fed an-
nounced that they would purchase up to $100 billion in agency debt, and up to
$500 billion in agency MBS.
QE 1_2 (12/1/2008) Chairman Bernanke’s speech, in which he stated that in
order to “improve conditions in private credit markets", the Fed âĂĲcould pur-
chase longer-term Treasury securitiesâĂęâĂİ.
QE 1_3 (12/16/2008) FOMC statement, which indicated that they were consid-
ering purchases of longer-term Treasury securities.
QE 1_4 (1/28/2009) FOMC statement, which indicated that the Fed stood ready
to expand QE and buy Treasuries.
QE 1_5 (3/18/2009) FOMC statement, which announced the decision to pur-
chase âĂĲup toâĂİ $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities and an ad-
ditional $750 and $100 billion in MBS and GSE debt, respectively.
QE 1 slowing/exiting announcements
QE 1 T_1 (8/12/2009) FOMC statement, which announced gradually slowing
the pace of Treasury transactions and anticipated that the full amount will
be purchased by the end of October.
QE 1 T_2 (9/23/2009) FOMC statement, which announced slowing the pace of
agency MBS and agency debt purchases and anticipated that they would be
executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010.
QE 1 T_3 (11/4/2009) FOMC statement, which stated that they would downsize
the purchase of agency debt to around $175 billion.
QE 2 expanding announcements
QE 2_1 (8/10/2010) FOMC statement, which stated that they would reinvest
principal payments from LSAPs
QE 2_2 (9/21/2010) FOMC statement, which indicated new stimulus by the Fed
to promote economic recovery and price stability.
QE 2_3 (11/3/2010) FOMC statement, which announced a purchase of $600 bil-
lion in Treasuries.
QE 2 exiting announcements
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QE 2 T (6/22/2011) FOMC statement, which announced completing its purchases
of long-term Treasury securities by the end of the month and maintaining rein-
vesting principal payments.
Operation Twist announcements
OT 2011 (9/21/2011) FOMC statement, which announced that they would pur-
chase $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years
to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining
maturities of 3 years or less by the end of June 2012.
OT 2012 (6/20/2012) FOMC statement, which announced to continue the Oper-
ation Twist program through the end of 2012. This announcement extended
the size of the OT to $600 billion in Treasuries.
Forward Guidance announcements
FG 2011 (8/9/2011) FOMC minutes, "Most members...agreed that stating a con-
ditional expectation for the level of the federal funds rate through mid-2013".
FG 2012 (1/25/2012) FOMC minutes, "...[the Fed is] likely to warrant exception-
ally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014."
Note: The selection of the announcement dates is based on FOMC statements and minute
releases and the discussions in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] and Fawley
and Neely [2013].
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Appendix C
Other Robustness Check
Table C.1 Rollover Risk Exposures by Rating and Year
This table shows the number of firms with high/low rollover risk exposures by rating and year. High
rollover risk is defined as having long-term debt maturing in one year over assets larger than 5%.
AAA/AA A BBB BB B CCC Total
2005 dd1_at< .05 44 66 58 40 24 14 246dd1_at>= .05 9 10 12 8 8 2 49
2006 dd1_at< .05 38 62 52 46 29 14 241dd1_at>= .05 8 4 11 8 6 1 38
2007 dd1_at< .05 45 59 58 45 33 14 254dd1_at>= .05 5 9 13 6 9 2 44
2008 dd1_at< .05 46 65 65 42 34 11 263dd1_at>= .05 2 4 11 9 6 2 34
2009 dd1_at< .05 43 64 66 46 32 12 263dd1_at>= .05 6 4 8 4 5 1 28
2010 dd1_at< .05 44 57 68 44 31 13 257dd1_at>= .05 3 5 6 5 5 1 25
2011 dd1_at< .05 42 56 64 42 28 8 240dd1_at>= .05 3 7 10 7 6 3 36
2012 dd1_at< .05 35 44 56 35 23 7 200dd1_at>= .05 2 9 6 6 6 0 29
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Table C.2 Rollover Risk and Changes in CDS Spreads
This table shows how rollover risk aﬀects the sensitivity of changes in CDS spreads to changes
in market condition indicators. In columns 2-6, rollover risk (RO) are proxied by long-term debt
maturing in one year over asset (dd1_at), long-term debt maturing in one year over total long-term
debt (dd1_lt), a dummy which equals 1 if long-term debt maturing in one year over total long-term
debt is larger than 0.2 (ro_dummy1), a dummy which equals 1 if long-term debt maturing in one
year over asset is larger than 0.05 (ro_dummy2), and bond liquidity measure (Roll), respectively. All
changes are log changes. Control variables are defined in appendix 1. Standard errors in parentheses
are corrected using the Newey West method allowing for 12 lags. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CDS RO: dd1_at RO: dd1_lt RO Dummy: RO Dummy: RO: Roll
dd1_lt>0.2 dd1_at>.05
RO * 0.505*** 0.007 -0.006 0.011 0.055***
∆Baa_aaa (0.170) (0.041) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006)
RO* 0.023 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.002**
∆on_off (0.030) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
RO * 0.187*** -0.009 -0.008* 0.002 0.012***
∆vix (0.047) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
RO * -0.589*** -0.076** -0.026* -0.030** 0.018***
∆T10 (0.143) (0.036) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004)
dd1_at 0.001
(0.004)
dd1_lt 0.001*
(0.001)
ro_dummy1 0.000
(0.000)
ro_dummy2 0.001
(0.000)
Roll -0.000
(0.000)
∆vol 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆mklev 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.202***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
∆Baa_aaa 0.318*** 0.308*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.316*** 0.326***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆on_off 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆T10 -0.129*** -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.134***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆V IX 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.067***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log asset 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mk2bk 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
mklev 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
tangible -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
profit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm-fixed Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 198,522 198,522 198,522 198,522 198,522 162,176
R-squared 0.105 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.117
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Table C.3 The Determinants of Beta Sensitivities to Market Conditions
This table reports the determinants of beta sensitivities, controlling for the liquidity of CDS con-
tracts. Using firm-year data, the following equation is estimated: βk,i,t = α+ θkcontrolsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where t is closest trading date to June 30th each year; k=1, 2, 3, and 4, represent Baa_AAA, on_oﬀ,
VIX, and 10-year Treasury rates, respectively; βk,i,t are estimated within window [t-180, t-1] for each
firm each year; controlsi,t−1 are firm characters from the latest annual report on December 31 of
last calendar year. The liquidity of CDS contracts are controlled by the “CDX dummy” and “quote
depth”. “CDX dummy” equals one if the firm is a investment-grade CDX member in a year. “quote
depth” is the median number of contributor prices used to build the composite price daily data in
the estimation window. The higher the “quote depth”, the more liquid the CDS contract. Industry
fixed eﬀects are controlled at the one-digit SIC level. Other variables are defined in the appendix.
Four equations corresponding to these four beta sensitivities are estimated using seemingly unrelated
equations. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
βBaa_AAA βon_off βV IX βT 10
Roll -0.017** 0.002 -0.001 -0.009
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
dd1_at 0.212 0.128* 0.150 0.009
(0.291) (0.072) (0.098) (0.357)
log asset 0.030*** -0.000 0.006* -0.029**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
implied volatility -0.075 -0.021 0.048** -0.033
(0.070) (0.017) (0.024) (0.086)
mk2bk 0.008 0.001 -0.003 0.022
(0.020) (0.005) (0.007) (0.024)
mk leverage 0.055 0.013 -0.006 0.100
(0.091) (0.023) (0.030) (0.111)
tangibility 0.035 -0.008 0.007 -0.039
(0.045) (0.011) (0.015) (0.056)
profitability 0.017 -0.012 -0.014 -0.168
(0.157) (0.039) (0.053) (0.192)
distance to default -0.010*** 0.001* -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
cp user -0.050** 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.021) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026)
financial segment 0.034 0.009 -0.025*** -0.011
(0.024) (0.006) (0.008) (0.029)
IG 0.239 -0.063 -0.126* 0.146
(0.218) (0.054) (0.073) (0.268)
CDX dummy -0.017 -0.012** 0.030*** -0.108***
(0.021) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026)
quote depth 0.016*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant -0.075 0.121** 0.059 -0.168
(0.238) (0.059) (0.080) (0.292)
Rating Fixed Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Y Y Y Y
Industry Fixed Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690
R-squared 0.260 0.192 0.388 0.223
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Table C.4 Robustness: The Impact of QE on Risk Premia
The table shows the impact of QE on risk premia using error-weighted β estimations as independent
variables. The following equation is estimated:
∆CDSi,t = α+
∑
∆γk,jβk,i,t/σk,i,t∗Eventj+
∑
θjEventj+
∑
ηkβk,i,t/σk,i,t+κControli,t−1+εi,t
where βk,i,t, k=1, 2, 3, and 4 are the estimated sensitivity of log 2-day changes in CDS
spreads to log 2-day changes in Baa-AAA spreads, on-oﬀ run 10-year Treasury spreads, 10-
year Treasury rates, and VIX in the window [t-180,t-1]; σk,i,t are standard errors of the β
estimations; Eventj , j=1 to 16, are the QE, FG, and OT announcement dates; Controli,t−1
are firms characteristics including maturing long-term debt, firm size, market to book ra-
tio, market leverage ratio, tangibility, and profitability with no forward looking information.
To save space, this table only reports the estimations of ∆γk,j . The equations are esti-
mated using the whole sample and IG and HY subsamples. Columns 1-3 report the estimations
of ∆γBaaAAA,j ; columns 4-6 report the estimations of ∆γon_off,j , columns 7-9 report the estima-
tions of ∆γT 10,j , and columns 10-12 report the estimations of ∆γV IX,j . Firm-fixed eﬀects are
controlled. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
∆γBaa_AAA,j ∆γon_off,j ∆γT10,j ∆γV IX,j
(Expected sign if easing: -) (Expected sign if easing: -) (Expected sign if easing: +) (Expected sign if easing: -)
All IG HY All IG HY All IG HY All IG HY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
QE 1
QE 1_1 -0.004 -0.005* -0.001 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.006** -0.005* -0.009**
QE 1_2 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010** -0.006* -0.007* -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
QE 1_3 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.007*** 0.006** 0.010* -0.011*** -0.005* -0.021***
QE 1_4 -0.009*** -0.007** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009**
QE 1_5 -0.007*** -0.007** -0.008* 0.006* 0.004 0.011* -0.004 -0.002 -0.011* -0.008*** -0.007** -0.010**
QE 2
QE 2_1 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008**
QE 2_2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.010* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003
QE 2_3 -0.004 -0.006* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005* -0.001 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009***
OT OT 2011 0.006** 0.007** 0.004 0.008*** 0.007** 0.011** -0.006** -0.004 -0.009* 0.005** 0.006** 0.005OT 2012 -0.004 -0.005* -0.002 -0.007** -0.008** -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005
FG FG 2011 -0.008*** -0.008** -0.006 -0.006* -0.007* -0.001 0.010*** 0.005 0.017*** -0.004 -0.005 -0.004FG 2012 -0.004* -0.003 -0.008** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.011*** -0.006*** -0.006* -0.006*
Taper
QE 1 T_1 0.006** 0.008** 0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.006** 0.009** 0.002
QE 1 T_2 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.008
QE 1 T_3 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.006* 0.004 0.012* -0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
QE 2 T -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
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